83 min 2026-05
How Brian Chesky Is Redesigning Airbnb for the AI Era
概要
Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky 分享疫情后从 founder mode 到 AI founder mode 的转变，用10人精英团队创造数亿美元价值，预判 consumer AI 将在12-24个月内爆发。
核心洞察
- Chesky 在疫情中 8 周失去 80% 业务后彻底转向"Founder Mode"——用 2-3 年时间每周工作 100 小时审视公司每一个细节，从 Steve Jobs 的 creative director Hiroki Asai 那里学到"简约"和"细节即一切"两条 Apple 原则。他认为 AI 时代需要更激进的"AI Founder Mode"：异步取代会议、削减管理层级、每个管理者必须亲手做业务。
- 他用一个 10-12 人的精英小团队（Project Hawaii）验证了"把问题做小"的威力——这个团队聚焦转化率优化，第一年创造 $2 亿内部收入，第二年 $4-5 亿，现在贡献 600 个基点（基于 $1,340 亿年毛销售额）。这套方法正在复制到定价、服务体验等新业务，目标从 3 个业务扩展到 50-70 个垂直领域。
- Chesky 判断 consumer AI 是下一个大浪潮——目前 AI 几乎全是 enterprise 现象（YC 最近一批 175 家公司中 159 家做企业服务），但他预测 12-24 个月内 consumer AI 复兴将开始。OpenAI、Google 都没有真正全力做 consumer，这是一个巨大的空白。
- 他正在把 Airbnb 的原子单位从"房子"转变为"人"——要建设互联网上最强的实名身份、偏好库和社交图谱，然后围绕"人"这个原子单位扩展到 50 个品类，像 Amazon 从书到万物一样。他同时在探索一个"沙盒"——几乎是一个独立 app——来实验 AI 时代的全新 Airbnb。
- 贯穿全场的核心线索是"把问题做到最小"——从 Paul Graham 第一天说的"100 个人爱你好过 100 万人觉得还行"，到 Airbnb 最初在纽约一个城市起步，到 Project Hawaii 的 10 人团队，到新业务 1→10→Many 的扩张节奏，到他个人从健美运动学到的"每天 1% 进步"——Chesky 的每一个决策都在重复同一个原则：缩小问题、贴近现实、消除抽象层。
工业设计教育：产品思维和同理心的源头
核心要点：Chesky 的工业设计训练让他把"用户旅程"和"商业可行性"刻进了 DNA，这是他后来做 CEO 的底层操作系统。
- 17 岁进入 RISD（Rhode Island School of Design），听到"工业设计——从牙刷到太空船"这句话后立刻决定了一生的方向。之前考虑过建筑，但工业设计的跨度打动了他。
- 工业设计和建筑的关键区别：建筑可以拿奖但没人租用，工业设计如果没人买就是失败。商业成功内嵌在评价体系中——你必须思考营销、制造、分销、解决问题，而不只是赢得同行认可。
- 毕业设计做的是儿童呼吸机。他必须同时想象：6 岁的孩子仰头看着机器时的恐惧感、父母看到机器时的焦虑、护士技师因操作门槛降低而感到职业自尊受损——多重利益相关方的平衡。
- 工业设计中没有"产品经理"这个角色——设计师就是 PM。只有设计师、工程师和项目经理。Chesky 认为这正是他后来成为 CEO 的原因之一。
- Raymond Loewy 是 20 世纪最重要的工业设计师，设计了 Air Force One 和大量消费产品。Apple 从 1998 年 iMac 开始、Johnny Ive 领导的工业设计黄金时代，深刻影响了 Chesky 在 RISD 的学习。
"Design is only successful if it sells. If you design a product and no one buys it, it's considered a failure." —— Brian Chesky
从挣扎的 CEO 到 Founder Mode：疫情是分水岭
核心要点：Chesky 经历了从"优秀创始人"到"糟糕 CEO"再到"重生 CEO"的完整弧线——他发现创始人的直觉几乎全是反直觉的 CEO 毒药，而过度授权让 7,000 人的公司变成了没有方向盘的汽车。
- 2019 年末，Chesky 醒来发现自己完全不认识正在运营的公司：7,000 名员工，不知道任何人在做什么，说"往左"公司就往右。他做了一个梦——感觉自己离开公司 10 年后回来，发现有人把它变成了一个巨大的政治官僚机构——然后意识到"那个人就是我自己"。
- 2010 年代骑着火箭船高速增长（和 Uber 等公司一起），但代价是丧失了控制力。数以千计的决策在没有他参与的情况下被做出，他过度尊重高管团队、不听自己的直觉。
- 疫情前他从 Apple 招来 Hiroki Asai（Steve Jobs 的 creative director，marketing 下属职能，负责广告和视觉设计）。Hiroki 是一个"传说中的神秘人物"——网上几乎找不到他的照片和视频。他告诉 Chesky，Jobs 1997 年 7 月回到 Apple 时距离破产只有 9 天，然后直接进入"founder mode"——深入每一个细节。
- 疫情中 8 周内失去 80% 业务，Chesky 从"和平时期"切换到"战时"，彻底接管整个公司且再也没有松手。2-3 年间每周工作 100 小时，审查公司的每一个细节。
- 最初公司强烈抵抗——所有人觉得他在微管理。但危机让抵抗消失了。最终"讨厌它的人离开了，留下来的人爱上了这种模式"。
"No one is born a good CEO. The job of CEO is completely counterintuitive and almost all of your intuition about what to do is wrong." —— Brian Chesky
"A pitcher never takes himself off the mound. As a manager, you got to go take them off the mound. And the longer you leave a pitcher on the mound, the more home runs they give up." —— Brian Chesky
Hiroki Asai 教的两条 Apple 原则：简约与细节
核心要点：Hiroki 把 Steve Jobs 运营 Apple 的核心方法论浓缩为两个词——简约（simplicity）和细节（craft），Chesky 将其植入 Airbnb 的组织基因。
- 简约不是删减，是蒸馏：创业初期因为资源匮乏天然简约，一旦融了钱、招了人就失去约束力，开始四面出击。Heroki 教他：simplicity 是把事物蒸馏到本质（distill to its essence），不是砍功能。Steve Jobs 曾说："Design is the fundamental soul of a man-made creation that reveals itself through subsequent layers."
- 细节即一切——"how you do anything is how you do everything"：Chesky 引用了两个体育教练的例子。John Wooden（UCLA，10 次 NCAA 冠军）开训第一天花一小时教球员怎么穿袜子——这是一个隐喻，一切都要这么严格。Bill Walsh（旧金山 49 人）说球衣塞进裤子的方式是决定胜负的一万个细节之一。
- Chesky 的管理哲学变成了"不追求增长，追求让每一件事都完美"——如果所有 input 都完美但仍不增长，说明 input 选错了；如果 input 对了且完美了，增长是自然的结果。
"Simplicity is not removing things. Simplicity is distilling something so fundamentally that you understand its essence." —— Brian Chesky（转述 Hiroki Asai）
AI Founder Mode：管理方式即将被重新设计
核心要点：Chesky 认为 AI 时代需要比 founder mode 更激进的"AI founder mode"——从会议驱动转向异步、大幅削减管理层级、纯 people manager 将被淘汰。
- Founder mode 的机制是大量会议：Chesky 每周做约 35 小时会议（与 Steve Jobs 类似），不做 one-on-one 只做群会，全链条在场（从直报到三四级下属），任何人可以发言，他最后说话、做最终决策，90% 的时间同意团队但会 ratify 每一个决策。
- AI 时代将从会议驱动转向异步。天主教会运行 2,000 年只有 4 层管理——为什么企业要 7-9 层？Chesky 正在思考如何把 Airbnb 扁平化到极少层级。
- 两类人将无法在 AI 时代生存：（1）纯 people manager——只做人员管理不碰实际工作的人；（2）思维僵化、不愿改变的人。他举例：一个不亲自做设计的"设计领导"是荒谬的，Johnny Ive 领导设计是因为他自己设计，Frank Lloyd Wright 通过作品管理团队。
- "You manage people through the work, not the people."——管理应该通过工作本身发生，不是通过 one-on-one 当员工的心理咨询师。每年可以和下属吃几次饭、交流感情，但这不是日常工作。
- Chesky 对 AI 工具的当前状态持务实态度：Claude Code 和 Co-work 对普通人不够直觉化，但经济激励会让工具变得越来越简单——"这不是我的担心"。
"Pure people managers who think it's all about just leadership — no, it's about content and leadership." —— Brian Chesky
Consumer AI 是下一个大浪潮：目前几乎无人在做
核心要点：AI 目前几乎完全是 enterprise 现象，consumer AI 是一片空白——Chesky 预测 12-24 个月内 consumer AI 复兴将开始。
- YC 最近一批 175 家公司中 159 家是 enterprise。作为 YC 董事会成员，Chesky 对数据有一手了解。
- 他总结了 consumer AI 起步难的四个原因：
- 恐惧：ChatGPT 出来后很多人害怕被颠覆，投资人也不想投可能被 ChatGPT 干掉的项目
- 商业模式不清晰：ChatGPT 有三种变现路径——订阅（但 Claude/Gemini 免费给，碰到天花板）、广告（Claude/Gemini 不做广告）、电商（关闭了第三方应用）。没有成型的 consumer AI 商业模式
- 分发渠道成熟：虽然 App Store 前三都是 AI 应用（说明革命性产品可以突围），但起步难
- Silicon Valley 的从众心理：趋势驱动、herd mentality，YC 鼓励创业者"让其他 YC 公司做你的第一批用户"，这个策略的副作用是所有人都在做 enterprise
- Consumer 公司更难，也更 hits-driven：风险更高、需要更多技能（设计、营销、文化、公关），不能像 enterprise 那样"垂直切入一个窄领域，smart and grow"。但历史上最伟大的公司大多是 consumer 公司。
"AI right now is really an enterprise thing. If you take out ChatGPT and people screwing around with image generation, it's pretty much just an enterprise phenomenon." —— Brian Chesky
Project Hawaii：10 个人如何创造数亿美元价值
核心要点：Chesky 用一个 10-12 人的精英小团队（设计师、工程师、产品、数据科学家）专注改善搜索到预订的转化率，年一贡献 $2 亿，年二 $4-5 亿，现在运行率达到 $134B 年毛销售的 600 个基点。
- 团队运作方式像一个创业公司（"we treated it like a little startup"），采用"爬、走、跑、飞"四阶段：
- 爬：修 bug、修转化漏斗中的问题
- 走：开发新功能，重构用户旅程
- 跑：重新思考整个流程，做大功能
- 飞：彻底重新设计自己
- 一切都要可衡量。Chesky 最初每周和团队开会，然后隔周，然后每月——"start hands-on and let go over time"。
- 他用了一个高尔夫教练的类比：你要在学员形成任何坏习惯之前手把手教，看他们挥杆几千次，然后逐渐放手。大多数创始人做反了——先放手让人自己摸索，等出了问题再介入，这时坏习惯已经形成了。
- 这个模式后来被复制到定价团队和其他团队。从一个团队发展到几十个人（50-60 人），但仍然极其精干。
"把问题做到最小"：1→10→Many 的扩张哲学
核心要点：Airbnb 花了 16 年才做出第二个业务。Chesky 现在用"一个城市 → 十个城市 → 工业化"的方法，同时有 10-20 个 pilot，目标 50-70 个垂直领域。
- Airbnb 核心业务做到了近 $1,000 亿年毛销售（"for every thousand dollars spent in the world, $1 was spent on an Airbnb"），但 18 年来像一个"one-hit wonder"——始终无法推出第二个成功业务。
- 问题的根源很简单但一直被忽视：每次新业务都试图从一开始就在全球 100 个城市铺开。而 Airbnb 自己最初只在纽约一个城市起步（Paul Graham 问"你的用户在纽约，你在 Mountain View 干嘛？"，他们就飞去纽约挨家挨户见用户），Uber 从旧金山，DoorDash 从 Palo Alto。
- 去年推出的 service experiences 在 100 个城市同时上线，效果不好。Chesky 回到原点：先在一个城市做到完美，证明模型，再扩展到 10 个，再工业化。
- Peter Thiel（Airbnb 早期投资人）的话："It's better to have a monopoly of a tiny market than a small share of a big market." Chesky 说这是反直觉的——每个投资人都想进大市场，但他不喜欢大市场，大市场有太多竞争。
"It's better to have 100 people love you than a million people sort of like you." —— Paul Graham（Y Combinator 第一天）
11 星体验框架：通过荒诞推演回到现实
核心要点：从 5 星推到 10 星是一个刻意走向荒诞的想象力练习，让 6-7 星（产品市场匹配的甜蜜点）看起来完全可行。
- Airbnb 的评分存在"评价压缩"（review compression）——和 Uber 一样，正常体验给 5 星，任何低于 5 星都意味着出了问题。问题是体验超级好也只能给 5 星。
- Chesky 的推演（以入住为例）：
- 5 星：到达，门锁密码正确，一切正常
- 6 星：桌上有你最爱的红酒、水果、零食、手写卡片
- 7 星：机场有豪车接你，知道你喜欢冲浪，有冲浪板等着，带你游览城市
- 8 星：机场有一头大象，你骑着大象参加为你举办的游行
- 9 星："Beatles 式入住"——下飞机后 5,000 个尖叫的少女举着你的名字，Airbnb 门前有以你名义举办的新闻发布会
- 10 星：Elon Musk 亲自迎接你，带你上太空
- 关键原理：推到极端荒诞之后，回头看 6-7 星就完全不疯狂了。5 星和 6 星的差距可能就是你和竞争对手的差距。如果能把 6 星工业化、规模化，你可能就找到了 product-market fit。
AI 将引发创造力文艺复兴：从消费者到创造者
核心要点：Chesky 认为 AI 最深刻的影响不是效率提升，而是让所有人都能表达创意——"creator"一词将从"社交媒体表演者"回归"真正的创造者"。
- Patrick 分享了一个感受：使用 AI 工具后才发现自己的想象力已经"萎缩"了。坐下来发现"我可以做任何东西"，但不知道做什么。开始做小东西之后，想象力逐渐"重启"。
- Chesky 呼应：很多时候创意不是先想到然后执行，而是在创作的过程中产生。"The act of writing is the act of coming up with ideas." 我们缺的不是创意，是表达的工具。
- 他用音乐家做类比：有些人（像 Prince）用语言无法表达自己，但通过音乐展现出你从未想象的维度。AI 给了每个人"画笔和画布"。
- Picasso："All children are born artists. The problem is to remain one as you grow up." 如果每个孩子都有创造力，那每个成年人都有创造力——只是没有被练习和表达。
- "Creator" 这个词在社交媒体时代被等同于"表演者"（performer），但 AI 时代的 creator 可以真正地"make"——不再只是发表观点或消费内容。
"AI shifts our attention from consumption to creation. Social media — you're mostly consuming. What I love about AI is it's not about opinions. Suddenly all of us have a paintbrush and a canvas to make stuff." —— Brian Chesky
从追求崇拜到回归初心：IPO 后的觉醒
核心要点：Chesky 坦承自己曾把"成功"当作获得爱的途径，IPO 当天 $1,000 亿估值后的空虚感让他重新审视动机——最终回到"为自己创造"的艺术家心态。
- 他的心理模式：小时候学到"要被爱→要特别→要做特别的事→被表扬=被爱"。这个模式在创业成功后被放大——agilation（崇拜/赞誉）成了"底部有洞的杯子"，不断往里倒却永远填不满，需要越来越大的剂量才能感受到。
- IPO 那天是"一生中最好的一天之一"。第二天醒来穿上运动裤上 Zoom（疫情期间），一切如常——也成了"一生中最悲伤的一天"。他意识到："那现在呢？所有这些崇拜，我的感觉没有任何不同。"
- Rick Rubin 的理念：an artist is an artist when they make it for themselves. Chesky 说他"停止试图成功"，回到基础：做东西，像小时候那样，为了热爱。
- Obama 曾告诉他："If I focused on who I want to be — president of the United States — and I wasn't, my life would have been a failure. But if I focus on what I wanted to do — help people, be a community organizer — then I don't need to be president."
- 变化后最大的不同：不再"ruminating"——不再反复焦虑别人怎么看自己。"There's something mildly narcissistic about worrying about everyone's opinions as if they're all thinking about you. No one is."
"Don't try to be successful. Try to do something wonderful that you love for yourself." —— Brian Chesky
招聘哲学：Pipeline Recruiting，每天 2-3 小时
核心要点：Chesky 认为 CEO 最重要的工作是招聘，他是公司 top 200 人的 co-hiring manager，每天第一通和最后一通电话都打给招聘团队。
- Sam Altman 在 Sequoia 以 $3M post-money 估值投资 Airbnb 后（当时 YC 史上最高估值，现在平均估值 $3,000 万）告诉他"你会花 50% 的时间在招聘上"。Chesky 当时没有做到——这成了他"致命的打击"。"The less time I spent on hiring, the more time I spent managing."
- Pipeline recruiting vs Search recruiting（Chesky 认为后者是"几乎所有人"犯的错误）：
- ❌ Search：需要一个职位 → 找猎头 → 50 个简历 → 筛到 10 个 → 联系 → 5 个有兴趣 → 面试 → 3 个候选 → 选最好的 → 做 reference check（他们给的 reference 当然是正面的）→ 一年后发现好不好
- ✅ Pipeline：不做搜索，持续 informational meeting 最好的人。每次见面只有一个任务：拿到下一次见面的介绍。不断扩大 referral 网络。
- 两种发现人才的方法：（1）从结果倒推人——不是"去 Nike 找好的营销人"，而是"找到一个你喜欢的广告，然后查出是谁做的"；（2）不断问已知的优秀人才"你认识的最好的人是谁"，建立"小型黑帮"网络（Uber 有运营黑帮，Apple 有设计黑帮）。
- 他深入到高管下面的 2-3 层招人。原则："我的高管应该能招到好到他们自己请不动的人——只有加上我的力量才能请到。如果不需要我帮忙就能请到，说明我们不够有野心。"
"The more time you spend recruiting, the less time you spend on management. Because the really good people are just self-managing." —— Brian Chesky
Airbnb 的未来三大战略：从房子到人，从 3 到 50
核心要点：Chesky 把 Airbnb 的下一个 10 年定义为三件事——把原子单位从"房子"变为"人"、从 3 个业务扩展到 50+、在不伤害投资者和房东的前提下用 AI 自我颠覆。
- 原子单位转变：目前提到 Airbnb 人们想到的是一栋房子——它既是品类领导者的优势（"像 Kleenex 一样既是名词又是动词"），也是枷锁（"Kleenex 想卖洗发水，用户说'我不会把纸巾往头上放'"）。Chesky 要让"人"成为中心——围绕一个人的偏好、身份和社交关系，提供房屋、体验、服务、最终还有机票等 50 个品类。
- 身份与偏好基础设施：他要建设"互联网上最强的实名认证身份"（proof of personhood 在 AI 时代极其重要）、"最丰富的偏好库"、以及一个真实世界的社交图谱，最终推出会员计划。Facebook 曾经走这条路但已经放弃。
- 创新者困境：每年约 $1,000 亿通过 Airbnb 流转，作为上市公司要给 guidance、不能影响房东生计——这不是一个适合激进创新的环境。所以他在探索"沙盒"——可能是一个独立 app——来实验"Airbnb 之后的 Airbnb"是什么。
- 他认为未来不会有 app，只有 agent。"If we're attached to apps, I don't think there will be apps."
健美运动的两个人生启示：改变身体，然后改变世界
核心要点：16 岁 135 磅的 Chesky 告诉朋友他要在 19 岁成为全国顶级健美运动员——所有人觉得他疯了，但他做到了。这段经历教会他两条原则：如果你能改变身体就能改变一切；1% 的每日进步可以复利成巨大的改变。
- 背景：他的父亲想让他打冰球。他进了体育学院，但 14 岁时因为发育晚（青春期 15-16 岁才来）从一二线掉到三四线，从 Division I 级别掉到 Division III——"在冰球里这就是死刑"。
- 他转向举重。第一条启示："If you can change your body, you can change your life." 这是他体验到的最底层的赋能感——改变了身体之后，"还有什么不能改变？"从身体到环境，从环境到世界，由内而外。他甚至建议：如果你不开心，先改变身体（健康），再去做心理治疗——先搞定生物层面。
- 第二条启示：不可能一天练出好身材，连续练 20 小时反而过度训练。肌肉在运动中被破坏，在恢复中变强——progressive overload，每天进步 1%，复利效应是巨大的。这和创业一样：太多创始人放弃得太早，而关键是纪律和持续性——"练一个月然后停一个月，等于从零开始"。
- 健美也是一项极其分析化的运动：称食物重量、记录热量赤字、记录每次训练的重量——教会了他 metrics-driven 的思维方式。
最仁慈的事：有人相信你
核心要点：Chesky 认为别人给他最大的礼物是"相信他"，他最想回馈的也是相信别人——"我只有在别人相信我很久之后才学会相信自己。"
- Miss Williams：16 岁转入公立高中，美术老师 Miss Williams 告诉他父母"他会成为一个著名的艺术家"。他从未成为著名艺术家，但那份信任让他确认了"我在某件事上有天赋"，因为他在冰球上让父亲失望了。
- Paul Graham：几乎从不投非工程师创始人，但破例让 Chesky 进了 YC。Graham 觉得 air bed and breakfast 这个 idea 不好——"people are actually doing this?" / "what's wrong with them?"——但他相信 Chesky 这个人。
- John Wooden 的管理哲学：有人问他成功的秘诀，他说"我只要求球员尽全力"。听起来平淡，但关键是："I saw potential in people they didn't see in themselves." 当他说"不够好"的时候，不是在否定你，是在说"我看到你还没看到的潜力"。
- Chesky 的总结：很多创业者被不安全感驱动——"不是最酷的孩子"，想要证明些什么。成功后仍然有冒名顶替综合征。通往幸福的道路是"学会相信自己"。
"The biggest gift anyone's given me is believe in me. And the biggest gift you can give somebody is believe in them." —— Brian Chesky
附录：关键人/机构/产品/数据
| 项目 | 详情 |
|------|------|
| Brian Chesky | Airbnb CEO & 联合创始人，RISD 工业设计毕业 |
| Hiroki Asai | 前 Apple，Steve Jobs 的 creative director（marketing 下属），教 Chesky 简约和细节 |
| Johnny Ive | Apple 首席设计官，Chesky 的偶像 |
| Raymond Loewy | 20 世纪最重要的工业设计师，设计了 Air Force One |
| Paul Graham | Y Combinator 创始人，"Founder Mode" 命名者 |
| Paul Buchheit | YC 合伙人，Gmail 创始人，"100 人爱你" 原话出处 |
| Peter Thiel | Airbnb 早期投资人，"垄断小市场" |
| Sam Altman | OpenAI CEO，曾创立 Loopt（Sequoia 第一批 YC 投资），建议 50% 时间招聘 |
| Miss Williams | Chesky 高中美术老师，相信他会成为艺术家 |
| Joe & Nate | Airbnb 另外两位联合创始人 |
| Project Hawaii | Airbnb 转化率优化小组，10-12 人 → 年一 $2 亿 → 年二 $4-5 亿 → 600 bp on $134B |
| Airbnb 年毛销售额 | 近 $1,000 亿（全球每花 $1,000 有 $1 在 Airbnb） |
| 自由现金流率 | ~40% |
| YC 上一批 | 175 家公司，159 家 enterprise |
| IPO 估值 | ~$1,000 亿（疫情中 Zoom 上敲钟） |
| 1→10→Many | 新业务扩张框架，目前 10-20 个 pilot，目标 50-70 个垂直领域 |
| 11 星体验 | 从 5→10 星的想象力推演框架 |
| Founder Mode | Paul Graham 命名，基于 Chesky 经历 |
中文翻译 English Original
**Brian Chesky：** 没有人天生就是好 CEO。我觉得人天生可以是好的创始人，换句话说那是一种本能。你不需要学习如何成为好的创始人。但 CEO 这份工作完全是反直觉的，你几乎所有关于该怎么做的直觉都是错的。我们创始人被教导要在实践中学习，这对创始人来说很好，但对 CEO 来说不行。你不会想在工作中边干边学如何当 CEO。所以我是吃了苦头才学会的，核心就是不要为你想怎么经营公司而道歉，要深入细节。
**Brian Chesky:** No one is born a good CEO. I think people are basically born good founders or said differently it's innate. You don't have to learn how to be a good founder. The job of CEO is completely counterintuitive and almost all of your intuition about what to do is wrong. We founders were taught to learn by doing and that's great for a founder. It's not good as a CEO. You do not want to learn on the job how to be a CEO. And so I learned the hard way and it was really about not apologizing about how you want to run a company, being in the details.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 在我们正式开始之前，我们刚才在聊工业设计，你在 RISD 学的就是这个。我对这个领域的历史有一种奇怪的亲近感，因为 Raymond Loewy，那位著名的工业设计师，间接对我的职业帮助很大。我很想听你聊聊像他这样的人对你早期学习的影响，以及你为什么选择学这个。这个背景太有意思了。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Before we hit go here, we were talking about industrial design, which you studied at RISD. And I have this weird affinity for the history of this topic just because Raymond Loewy, one of the famous industrial designers, helped me a lot in my career indirectly. I'd love to hear you just riff on the influence that guys like him had in your early studies and why you studied that in the first place. Such an interesting background.
**Brian Chesky：** 我从小就是个搞艺术的孩子，但不知道自己这辈子要干什么。我去了 Rhode Island School of Design，在 RISD 你大一就必须选专业。我当时 17 岁，心想："好吧，三个月内我得决定这辈子要做什么。"一共有 18 个专业。我记得工业设计系的系主任来做介绍。我之前从没听过"工业设计"这个词，完全不知道是什么。他们说工业设计就是设计一切——从牙刷到太空船，以及中间的所有东西。我立刻就说这就是我这辈子要做的事，因为我之前在考虑当建筑师之类的。
然后我开始学工业设计，了解了 Charles 和 Ray Eames、Raymond Loewy。Raymond Loewy 大概是 20 世纪最重要的工业设计师，设计了非常多令人难以置信的产品。他最著名的设计之一是 Air Force One。他还设计了很多消费产品，非常漂亮的消费产品。他对社会产生了深远的影响。
当我学习工业设计史的时候，真的觉得太不可思议了。工业设计是一个高度技术化的领域。建筑也相当技术化，但它的边界更明确——有建筑物，有商业、住宅、零售，变化就那么多，而且是一个有几千年历史的领域。工业设计则大部分是从 Josiah Wedgwood 开始的，真正是大规模工业产品。所以工业设计实际上是从工业革命才开始的，很新。一开始是模拟物品——最早的工业设计是椅子、餐具和碗。但随着技术发展，工业设计突然变成了汽车和飞机。然后是微波炉和冰箱。再后来是医疗设备。到了计算机时代，全世界最著名的工业设计大概就是 iPhone 了。工业设计的广度令人难以置信。
你和产品之间那种亲密关系是不可思议的。我在 1980 年代长大，热爱电子游戏。我玩过 Game Boy、Game Gear、Super Nintendo。这些设备，还有 80、90 年代的 Nike 运动鞋、Reebok pumps——这些产品抓住了孩子们的想象力，和你建立了一种非常亲密的关系。它们真的有一种个性。计算机是我特别感兴趣的东西。然后当然就到了 Apple 的黄金时代，大概从 1998 年的 iMac 开始，Johnny Ive 就是我的偶像。
所以我去了 RISD，在 RISD 的时候正好赶上 Apple 工业设计的黄金时代。他们真的教育了公众什么是设计。一旦人们被教育了，他们就再也无法"看不见"好产品了。这真的抓住了我的想象力。我喜欢工业设计有几个原因：第一，它非常技术化，你要和机械工程师、电气工程师合作。第二，工业设计有一点几乎和所有其他设计都不同，这一点时装设计也一样——设计只有卖得出去才算成功。如果你设计一栋办公楼，建筑师可以因为那栋楼拿奖，即使它从来没被租出去过。你可以设计一栋房子，但没人会看这栋房子的零售价值。所以奖项和商业成功是脱钩的。但如果你设计了一个产品而没人买，那就是失败。
正因为商业成功很重要，你必须思考营销、制造、分销、解决问题。这不只是拿奖的事，而是要对客户有价值。另一个特点是工业设计非常注重解决问题，有很多不同的边界，非常强调同理心和用户旅程。在所有设计领域中，工业设计一直是那种让你站在用户的角度去设计用户旅程的领域。我觉得他们教工业设计就是通过用户旅程来教的。平面设计不是这么教的，至少当时不是。这是一个非常特殊的领域。我认为这真的为我后来的设计工作做好了准备。
举一个例子。我从 RISD 毕业时设计的项目之一是一个儿童呼吸机。不是仅仅想着怎么设计这个呼吸机的外形，而是要想象自己是医院里的那个孩子。你要想象自己是个孩子，这很难做到。你 6 岁，你很害怕，你仰头看着一台呼吸机。然后想象父母，父母走进来说："我的孩子会没事吗？"如果这台呼吸机看起来很阴森，好像在维持你的生命，父母会吓坏的——我的孩子到底怎么了。
另一个有趣的发现是关于护士技师。他们对这些设备的复杂性毫无怨言。但医院想要一台简单到所有人都能学会操作的呼吸机。问题是护士技师对"只有我才会操作"这件事感到自豪。所以你必须权衡各方利益相关者。如何从孩子的视角来设计？如何考虑父母的感受？如何让它对所有人都通用，同时不威胁到别人的工作？你看，维度太多了。这真的为我进入这个领域做好了准备。我认为我之所以成为了 CEO，其中一个原因就是工业设计里没有产品经理——你自己就是 PM。只有工业设计师、工程师和项目经理。所以工业设计师就是产品经理。
然后我开始学工业设计，了解了 Charles 和 Ray Eames、Raymond Loewy。Raymond Loewy 大概是 20 世纪最重要的工业设计师，设计了非常多令人难以置信的产品。他最著名的设计之一是 Air Force One。他还设计了很多消费产品，非常漂亮的消费产品。他对社会产生了深远的影响。
当我学习工业设计史的时候，真的觉得太不可思议了。工业设计是一个高度技术化的领域。建筑也相当技术化，但它的边界更明确——有建筑物，有商业、住宅、零售，变化就那么多，而且是一个有几千年历史的领域。工业设计则大部分是从 Josiah Wedgwood 开始的，真正是大规模工业产品。所以工业设计实际上是从工业革命才开始的，很新。一开始是模拟物品——最早的工业设计是椅子、餐具和碗。但随着技术发展，工业设计突然变成了汽车和飞机。然后是微波炉和冰箱。再后来是医疗设备。到了计算机时代，全世界最著名的工业设计大概就是 iPhone 了。工业设计的广度令人难以置信。
你和产品之间那种亲密关系是不可思议的。我在 1980 年代长大，热爱电子游戏。我玩过 Game Boy、Game Gear、Super Nintendo。这些设备，还有 80、90 年代的 Nike 运动鞋、Reebok pumps——这些产品抓住了孩子们的想象力，和你建立了一种非常亲密的关系。它们真的有一种个性。计算机是我特别感兴趣的东西。然后当然就到了 Apple 的黄金时代，大概从 1998 年的 iMac 开始，Johnny Ive 就是我的偶像。
所以我去了 RISD，在 RISD 的时候正好赶上 Apple 工业设计的黄金时代。他们真的教育了公众什么是设计。一旦人们被教育了，他们就再也无法"看不见"好产品了。这真的抓住了我的想象力。我喜欢工业设计有几个原因：第一，它非常技术化，你要和机械工程师、电气工程师合作。第二，工业设计有一点几乎和所有其他设计都不同，这一点时装设计也一样——设计只有卖得出去才算成功。如果你设计一栋办公楼，建筑师可以因为那栋楼拿奖，即使它从来没被租出去过。你可以设计一栋房子，但没人会看这栋房子的零售价值。所以奖项和商业成功是脱钩的。但如果你设计了一个产品而没人买，那就是失败。
正因为商业成功很重要，你必须思考营销、制造、分销、解决问题。这不只是拿奖的事，而是要对客户有价值。另一个特点是工业设计非常注重解决问题，有很多不同的边界，非常强调同理心和用户旅程。在所有设计领域中，工业设计一直是那种让你站在用户的角度去设计用户旅程的领域。我觉得他们教工业设计就是通过用户旅程来教的。平面设计不是这么教的，至少当时不是。这是一个非常特殊的领域。我认为这真的为我后来的设计工作做好了准备。
举一个例子。我从 RISD 毕业时设计的项目之一是一个儿童呼吸机。不是仅仅想着怎么设计这个呼吸机的外形，而是要想象自己是医院里的那个孩子。你要想象自己是个孩子，这很难做到。你 6 岁，你很害怕，你仰头看着一台呼吸机。然后想象父母，父母走进来说："我的孩子会没事吗？"如果这台呼吸机看起来很阴森，好像在维持你的生命，父母会吓坏的——我的孩子到底怎么了。
另一个有趣的发现是关于护士技师。他们对这些设备的复杂性毫无怨言。但医院想要一台简单到所有人都能学会操作的呼吸机。问题是护士技师对"只有我才会操作"这件事感到自豪。所以你必须权衡各方利益相关者。如何从孩子的视角来设计？如何考虑父母的感受？如何让它对所有人都通用，同时不威胁到别人的工作？你看，维度太多了。这真的为我进入这个领域做好了准备。我认为我之所以成为了 CEO，其中一个原因就是工业设计里没有产品经理——你自己就是 PM。只有工业设计师、工程师和项目经理。所以工业设计师就是产品经理。
**Brian Chesky:** I was an artist growing up, but I didn't know what to do with my life. And I went to the Rhode Island School of Design and at RISD when you're a freshman, you have to pick a major. I'm 17 years old and I'm like, "Okay, in three months I have to decide what I'm going to do the rest of my life." And there were 18 majors. And I remember the department head for industrial design came. I never even heard of the term industrial design. I don't know what it was. And they said industrial design, design of everything from a toothbrush to a spaceship and everything in between. I immediately said that's what I want to do with my life cuz I was thinking of maybe being an architect or something like that.
And so I started learning about industrial design and I learned about Charles and Ray Eames. Raymond Loewy. Raymond Loewy probably the most important industrial designer of the 20th century. Designed so many incredible products. His first designer, Air Force One. He designed like, you know, a lot of like consumer products, very beautiful consumer products. He had a profound impact, I think, on society.
And as I was studying the history of industrial design, it was so incredible cuz industrial design field is a deeply technical field. The thing about architecture is fairly technical, but the it's a more known boundary. Like there's buildings and there's commercial, there's residential, there's retail, there's only so much variation. It's a multi-thousand-year old field. Industrial design for the most part really started with Josiah Wedgwood. It's really the mass industrial products. So, industrial design is really new from the industrial revolution. And it used to be analog things. The first industrial design was chairs and tabletop dishes and bowls. But as technology grows, suddenly industrial design becomes cars and airplanes. And now you have microwaves and refrigerators. And then eventually it becomes like medical equipment. And then you know with computers the most famous industrial design probably in the world is the iPhone. And the vastness of industrial design is unbelievable.
The intimate relationship you have with a product is incredible. I remember in I grew up in the 1980s. I love video games. I played with a Game Boy, a Game Gear, Super Nintendo. These devices or remember Nike in the 80s and 90s. Those sneakers that were the Reebok pumps. These products captured kids imaginations and they had a very intimate relationship with you. They really had a sense of personality and computers in particular were something I was really really interested in. And then of course you get to the golden age of Apple starting probably in 1998 with the iMac and Johnny Ive who was like my hero.
So I went to RISD and when I was at RISD Apple was the golden age of industrial design. They really educated the public about design. Once they're educated, they couldn't unsee great products. And that really like captured my imagination. And what I loved about industrial design was a it was very technical. You work with mechanical engineers, you work with electrical engineers. B here's the thing about industrial design. It's almost different than any other design. This is also true of fashion design. A design is only successful if it sells. So if we design an office building, like architects can win awards in their office building and it can never get leased. You can design a house but no one looks at well what was the retail value of the house. So the awards are detached from the commercial success. If you design a product and no one buys it, it's considered a failure.
And so because the commercial success matters, you have to think about marketing, manufacturing, distribution, solving problems. It's not just about winning awards. It's about being viable to a customer. The other thing is it's very much a problem solving field. It's got so many different boundaries and it's very much about empathy, about user journeys. You know, more than I think any other design field, I think industrial design always seemed like it was the kind of field where you put yourself in the shoes of the user and you design these user journeys. And I think they really teach industrial design through user journeys. I don't think they teach graphic design that way. At least they didn't at the time. It's a very specific type of field. And I think that really prepared me for designing.
Just to give you one example. One of the projects I designed when I graduated RISD was a child's ventilator. And so instead of just thinking about like a child's breathing machine, instead of just thinking about the design of the ventilator, one of the projects I had to do was imagine being the child in a hospital. And so I had to imagine being a child. It's hard to do, but you're 6 years old. Imagine you're being six and you're scared. You're looking up at a breathing machine. And imagine the parents, the parents go in and the parents are like, "Is my child going to be okay?" If this breathing machine seems like ominous and like it's keeping you alive, the parents are going to freak out like what's wrong with my child.
The other thing is I learned that one of the interesting things that happened was the nurse technicians, they had no problem that these things were complicated. But the hospital wanted a breathing machine that was so simple that everyone can learn how to use it. Except the nurse technicians had pride that only they knew how to use it. So you had to like weigh the stakeholders. How do you design something from the vantage point of a child? Consider how it would feel to the parents? How can it be universally useful for everyone without threatening people's jobs? You see, there's so many dimensions and that just I think really prepared me for this field and I think there's a reason why I became a CEO because there's no product managers in industrial design like you are the PM. There's industrial designers and there's engineers and there's program managers. So, industrial designer is the product manager. So a design product is one function.
And so I started learning about industrial design and I learned about Charles and Ray Eames. Raymond Loewy. Raymond Loewy probably the most important industrial designer of the 20th century. Designed so many incredible products. His first designer, Air Force One. He designed like, you know, a lot of like consumer products, very beautiful consumer products. He had a profound impact, I think, on society.
And as I was studying the history of industrial design, it was so incredible cuz industrial design field is a deeply technical field. The thing about architecture is fairly technical, but the it's a more known boundary. Like there's buildings and there's commercial, there's residential, there's retail, there's only so much variation. It's a multi-thousand-year old field. Industrial design for the most part really started with Josiah Wedgwood. It's really the mass industrial products. So, industrial design is really new from the industrial revolution. And it used to be analog things. The first industrial design was chairs and tabletop dishes and bowls. But as technology grows, suddenly industrial design becomes cars and airplanes. And now you have microwaves and refrigerators. And then eventually it becomes like medical equipment. And then you know with computers the most famous industrial design probably in the world is the iPhone. And the vastness of industrial design is unbelievable.
The intimate relationship you have with a product is incredible. I remember in I grew up in the 1980s. I love video games. I played with a Game Boy, a Game Gear, Super Nintendo. These devices or remember Nike in the 80s and 90s. Those sneakers that were the Reebok pumps. These products captured kids imaginations and they had a very intimate relationship with you. They really had a sense of personality and computers in particular were something I was really really interested in. And then of course you get to the golden age of Apple starting probably in 1998 with the iMac and Johnny Ive who was like my hero.
So I went to RISD and when I was at RISD Apple was the golden age of industrial design. They really educated the public about design. Once they're educated, they couldn't unsee great products. And that really like captured my imagination. And what I loved about industrial design was a it was very technical. You work with mechanical engineers, you work with electrical engineers. B here's the thing about industrial design. It's almost different than any other design. This is also true of fashion design. A design is only successful if it sells. So if we design an office building, like architects can win awards in their office building and it can never get leased. You can design a house but no one looks at well what was the retail value of the house. So the awards are detached from the commercial success. If you design a product and no one buys it, it's considered a failure.
And so because the commercial success matters, you have to think about marketing, manufacturing, distribution, solving problems. It's not just about winning awards. It's about being viable to a customer. The other thing is it's very much a problem solving field. It's got so many different boundaries and it's very much about empathy, about user journeys. You know, more than I think any other design field, I think industrial design always seemed like it was the kind of field where you put yourself in the shoes of the user and you design these user journeys. And I think they really teach industrial design through user journeys. I don't think they teach graphic design that way. At least they didn't at the time. It's a very specific type of field. And I think that really prepared me for designing.
Just to give you one example. One of the projects I designed when I graduated RISD was a child's ventilator. And so instead of just thinking about like a child's breathing machine, instead of just thinking about the design of the ventilator, one of the projects I had to do was imagine being the child in a hospital. And so I had to imagine being a child. It's hard to do, but you're 6 years old. Imagine you're being six and you're scared. You're looking up at a breathing machine. And imagine the parents, the parents go in and the parents are like, "Is my child going to be okay?" If this breathing machine seems like ominous and like it's keeping you alive, the parents are going to freak out like what's wrong with my child.
The other thing is I learned that one of the interesting things that happened was the nurse technicians, they had no problem that these things were complicated. But the hospital wanted a breathing machine that was so simple that everyone can learn how to use it. Except the nurse technicians had pride that only they knew how to use it. So you had to like weigh the stakeholders. How do you design something from the vantage point of a child? Consider how it would feel to the parents? How can it be universally useful for everyone without threatening people's jobs? You see, there's so many dimensions and that just I think really prepared me for this field and I think there's a reason why I became a CEO because there's no product managers in industrial design like you are the PM. There's industrial designers and there's engineers and there's program managers. So, industrial designer is the product manager. So a design product is one function.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你觉得世界现在会朝这个方向走吗？你因为推动 founder mode 这个概念而出名。现在似乎又多了一层——那是 Opus 4.6 之前的事了。我很好奇我们该怎么称呼这个新模式。但似乎第一次，即使是像你这样运营一家很大的公司、有很多员工的人，也可以跳过从想法到结果之间的很多步骤，而且设计思维可能比以往更加适用。这个新模式是什么样的？你会怎么描述？因为每个人都在试图弄清楚在这个时代该怎么经营公司。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Do you think the world's going to go that way now? You were obviously famous for helping usher in this founder mode idea. It seems like there's now that was kind of pre-Opus 4.6 or whatever. There's like another layer to that now. I'm curious what we would call it. But it seems like for the first time again someone even like you running a very large company with lots of people can disintermediate lots of the steps between idea and outcome and this design stuff maybe even more applicable than ever. What is the new mode like? Like how would you describe because everyone's trying to figure out how do I run a company in this era? So how would you describe the new capabilities and the mode through the lens of this?
**Brian Chesky：** Founder mode 是 Paul Graham 创造的说法，但基于的是我的经历。我的经历基本上就是——让我先退一步说。我认为人天生就可以是好的创始人，换句话说那是一种本能。你不需要学习如何成为好的创始人。没有人天生就是好 CEO。CEO 这份工作完全是反直觉的，你几乎所有关于该怎么做的直觉都是错的。比如你听别人说了什么，你想同意他们，但你得小心，因为如果你在没听到另一方意见的情况下就同意了，就会出问题。当 CEO 有很多反直觉的地方。
问题是我们创始人从来没有真正准备好成为优秀的 CEO。我们创始人被教导要在实践中学习，这对创始人来说很好，但对 CEO 来说不行。你不会想在工作中边干边学当 CEO。换句话说，试错对 CEO 来说是糟糕的。你知道为什么试错特别糟糕吗？因为你雇了一个人，他建了一个帝国，然后走了，现在你得去拆解他的帝国。这得花四年。所以你白白浪费了好几年。学习如何当 CEO 是你应该去学的事。
所以我是吃了苦头才学会的。我发现创始人们把公司过度授权给了这些职业经理人。我不是在贬低他们，但创始人们在抽离自己，变成被管理而不是管理公司。核心就是不要为你想怎么经营公司而道歉，要深入细节。这就是 founder mode。
问题是我们创始人从来没有真正准备好成为优秀的 CEO。我们创始人被教导要在实践中学习，这对创始人来说很好，但对 CEO 来说不行。你不会想在工作中边干边学当 CEO。换句话说，试错对 CEO 来说是糟糕的。你知道为什么试错特别糟糕吗？因为你雇了一个人，他建了一个帝国，然后走了，现在你得去拆解他的帝国。这得花四年。所以你白白浪费了好几年。学习如何当 CEO 是你应该去学的事。
所以我是吃了苦头才学会的。我发现创始人们把公司过度授权给了这些职业经理人。我不是在贬低他们，但创始人们在抽离自己，变成被管理而不是管理公司。核心就是不要为你想怎么经营公司而道歉，要深入细节。这就是 founder mode。
**Brian Chesky:** I mean basically yeah like founder mode was something that Paul Graham coined but based on experience I had and the experience I basically had was like I felt like I was a just to back up I think people are basically born good founders or said differently it's innate you don't have to learn how to be a good founder no one is born a good CEO and the job of CEO is completely counterintuitive and almost all of your intuition about what to do is wrong like you listen to somebody and they tell you something you want to agree with them and then you got to be careful because if you agree with them without getting the other side. You know, like there's a lot of things that are counterintuitive about being a CEO.
And so the problem is we founders never were really prepared to be great CEOs. And I think we founders were taught to learn by doing. And that's great for a founder. It's not good as a CEO. You do not want to learn on the job how to be a CEO. In other words, trial and error is bad for CEO. You know why trial and error is really bad? Because you hire somebody, they build an empire, they leave, and now you got to unwind their empire. And it takes like four years. So, you've wasted years. So, actually learning how to be CEO is something you should learn.
And so, I learned the hard way. And I basically learned that what happened was founders were overdelegating their companies to these professional managers. I'm not disparaging them, but they were detaching themselves and they were being managed rather than managing the company. And it was really about not apologizing about how you want to run a company, being in the details. That was founder mode.
And so the problem is we founders never were really prepared to be great CEOs. And I think we founders were taught to learn by doing. And that's great for a founder. It's not good as a CEO. You do not want to learn on the job how to be a CEO. In other words, trial and error is bad for CEO. You know why trial and error is really bad? Because you hire somebody, they build an empire, they leave, and now you got to unwind their empire. And it takes like four years. So, you've wasted years. So, actually learning how to be CEO is something you should learn.
And so, I learned the hard way. And I basically learned that what happened was founders were overdelegating their companies to these professional managers. I'm not disparaging them, but they were detaching themselves and they were being managed rather than managing the company. And it was really about not apologizing about how you want to run a company, being in the details. That was founder mode.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 有没有某个时刻让你突然意识到你必须改变模式？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Was there a moment that that like clicked for you that you had to change the mode?
**Brian Chesky：** 有。疫情。两件事同时发生了。说到 Johnny Ive 和 Apple，还有一个人叫 Hiroki Asai。整个 2010 年代我都在坐火箭。Airbnb、Uber，我们几家一起。我们坐上了那种疯狂的火箭——就像现在的 OpenAI 和 Anthropic。那很棒，很震撼。但到了上个十年末、2019 年左右，我有一天醒来，发现自己经营的公司完全认不出来了。我有 7,000 名员工，我不知道任何人在做什么。我感觉自己在一辆没有方向盘的车里。我根本转不动这家公司。我说"往左"，公司就往右走。
不仅我觉得失控了，我觉得没有人觉得自己在掌控。完全是一片混乱。成千上万的决策在替我做出。我过度地顺从别人、不听自己的直觉。到了某个时候，我做了一个梦——我觉得自己离开公司 10 年后回来，发现有人运营了这家公司 10 年，把它变成了一个巨大的政治官僚机构，我完全认不出来了。然后我意识到：天哪，那个人一直是我自己。这是我的错。是我一手促成了这一切。然后我开始和其他人聊，发现他们都有同样的经历。所有这些创始人都觉得我们被逼疯了。
差不多在疫情同期，我雇了一个叫 Hiroki Asai 的人。他来自 Apple，他告诉我 Steve Jobs 是怎么管理 Apple 的。Steve Jobs 1997 年 7 月回到 Apple 的时候，距离破产只有 9 天。他基本上就直接进入了 founder mode——深入每一个细节。我也想这么做，但一开始公司强烈抵抗。就像有一种排斥力。然后疫情来了，我们 8 周内失去了 80% 的业务。那个时刻我们处于全面危机模式。我从和平时期切换到了战时。然后我就彻底接管了整个公司，再也没有松手。
我做的事情是，用了两三年时间审查公司的每一件事。我每周工作大概 100 小时，审查公司的每一个细节。我的目标不是永远这样做，不是永远微管理。我的目标是，在赋能别人之前，我需要知道正在发生什么。有一种说法叫"卓越领导力就是雇优秀的人然后信任他们"。但如果你不去审查他们在做什么，你怎么知道他们是优秀的？你应该从亲力亲为开始，然后慢慢放手。大多数人做的恰恰相反——先放手，雇个人，结果走错方向。而且这对那些人也不好，因为你没有在训练他们。
回到你的问题，这就是 founder mode。我们现在需要 AI founder mode。AI founder mode 会比 founder mode 更加激进。我还没准备好告诉你那是什么。我正在摸索中。
不仅我觉得失控了，我觉得没有人觉得自己在掌控。完全是一片混乱。成千上万的决策在替我做出。我过度地顺从别人、不听自己的直觉。到了某个时候，我做了一个梦——我觉得自己离开公司 10 年后回来，发现有人运营了这家公司 10 年，把它变成了一个巨大的政治官僚机构，我完全认不出来了。然后我意识到：天哪，那个人一直是我自己。这是我的错。是我一手促成了这一切。然后我开始和其他人聊，发现他们都有同样的经历。所有这些创始人都觉得我们被逼疯了。
差不多在疫情同期，我雇了一个叫 Hiroki Asai 的人。他来自 Apple，他告诉我 Steve Jobs 是怎么管理 Apple 的。Steve Jobs 1997 年 7 月回到 Apple 的时候，距离破产只有 9 天。他基本上就直接进入了 founder mode——深入每一个细节。我也想这么做，但一开始公司强烈抵抗。就像有一种排斥力。然后疫情来了，我们 8 周内失去了 80% 的业务。那个时刻我们处于全面危机模式。我从和平时期切换到了战时。然后我就彻底接管了整个公司，再也没有松手。
我做的事情是，用了两三年时间审查公司的每一件事。我每周工作大概 100 小时，审查公司的每一个细节。我的目标不是永远这样做，不是永远微管理。我的目标是，在赋能别人之前，我需要知道正在发生什么。有一种说法叫"卓越领导力就是雇优秀的人然后信任他们"。但如果你不去审查他们在做什么，你怎么知道他们是优秀的？你应该从亲力亲为开始，然后慢慢放手。大多数人做的恰恰相反——先放手，雇个人，结果走错方向。而且这对那些人也不好，因为你没有在训练他们。
回到你的问题，这就是 founder mode。我们现在需要 AI founder mode。AI founder mode 会比 founder mode 更加激进。我还没准备好告诉你那是什么。我正在摸索中。
**Brian Chesky:** Yes. The pandemic. Two things happened. Actually, speaking of Johnny Ive, Apple and another person named Hiroki Asai. So, I spent the 2010s riding a rocket ship. Airbnb, Uber, a few of us. We went on these crazy rocket ships that like, you know, OpenAI, Anthropic are doing now. It was awesome. It was amazing. But by the end of the last decade around 2019, I remember waking up one day and it was like completely unrecognizable the company I was running. I mean, I had like 7,000 employees. I didn't know what anyone was doing. I felt like I was in a car without a steering wheel. And I just could not turn the company. I was like, "Turn left." And the company would go right.
And actually, not only did I feel like I was not in control, I don't think anyone felt like they were in control. It was just a free-for-all. And it was just thousands of thousands of decisions being made for me. Me overly deferring, not listening to my intuition. And I got to this point where I remember having this dream where I felt like I'd left the company for 10 years and I'd come back and somebody had been running the company for 10 years and they kind of turned it into this giant political bureaucracy and I didn't even recognize the company and then I realized, oh my god, it was me the whole time. And so it was my fault. Like I had actually enabled all this to happen and then I started talking to people and they all had the same experience and all these founders felt like we were all made to feel crazy.
So around the same time as the pandemic I hired a guy named Hiroki Asai. He was from Apple and he told me about how Steve Jobs ran Apple and Steve Jobs when he came back to Apple in 1997 in July of 1997 there were nine days from bankruptcy and he basically just went into founder mode. What you call founder mode. He got into the details of every little detail and I wanted to do that but initially the company braced against it. It was almost like it repelled against it and then the pandemic happened and we lost 80% of our business in 8 weeks. We were in total crisis mode at that moment. I went from peace time to wartime and then I just totally took control of the entire company and I just never let go.
Basically what I did is I reviewed every single thing for 2, 3 years. I worked like a 100 hours a week, reviewed every little detail of the company. My vision wasn't do this forever. My vision wasn't to micromanage forever. My vision was before I empower people, I need to know what's going on. This notion that great leadership is hiring great people and trust them to know what to do. Well, how do you know they're great if you're not auditing what they're doing? And you actually want to start hands-on under control and give ground grudgingly. Everyone does the opposite. They let go. They hire someone. They go in the wrong direction. And by the way, that's bad for the leader. You're not training them.
So to bring it back to your question, that's founder mode. We need AI founder mode. AI founder mode is going to be even more intense than founder mode. I'm not yet ready to tell you what that is. I'm in the middle of it.
And actually, not only did I feel like I was not in control, I don't think anyone felt like they were in control. It was just a free-for-all. And it was just thousands of thousands of decisions being made for me. Me overly deferring, not listening to my intuition. And I got to this point where I remember having this dream where I felt like I'd left the company for 10 years and I'd come back and somebody had been running the company for 10 years and they kind of turned it into this giant political bureaucracy and I didn't even recognize the company and then I realized, oh my god, it was me the whole time. And so it was my fault. Like I had actually enabled all this to happen and then I started talking to people and they all had the same experience and all these founders felt like we were all made to feel crazy.
So around the same time as the pandemic I hired a guy named Hiroki Asai. He was from Apple and he told me about how Steve Jobs ran Apple and Steve Jobs when he came back to Apple in 1997 in July of 1997 there were nine days from bankruptcy and he basically just went into founder mode. What you call founder mode. He got into the details of every little detail and I wanted to do that but initially the company braced against it. It was almost like it repelled against it and then the pandemic happened and we lost 80% of our business in 8 weeks. We were in total crisis mode at that moment. I went from peace time to wartime and then I just totally took control of the entire company and I just never let go.
Basically what I did is I reviewed every single thing for 2, 3 years. I worked like a 100 hours a week, reviewed every little detail of the company. My vision wasn't do this forever. My vision wasn't to micromanage forever. My vision was before I empower people, I need to know what's going on. This notion that great leadership is hiring great people and trust them to know what to do. Well, how do you know they're great if you're not auditing what they're doing? And you actually want to start hands-on under control and give ground grudgingly. Everyone does the opposite. They let go. They hire someone. They go in the wrong direction. And by the way, that's bad for the leader. You're not training them.
So to bring it back to your question, that's founder mode. We need AI founder mode. AI founder mode is going to be even more intense than founder mode. I'm not yet ready to tell you what that is. I'm in the middle of it.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你在推进这件事时思考的原则是什么？即使你还没完全想清楚。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** What are the principles that you're thinking about as you go into it? Like even if you don't have it ironed out yet.
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得 AI founder mode 意味着你要深入更多的细节，因为你几乎可以随时获取一切信息。Founder mode 的机制是大量的会议，因为那是我获取信息的唯一方式。我大概每周要开 35 小时的会，和 Steve 管理 Apple 的方式非常相似。我不做一对一会议，只做群体会议。我有一个固定的机制，每周、每两周或每季度，在线下现场的群体会议中审查公司的每一件事，而且是全链条在场。
我跟大家说，很多公司你得让你的老板批准，然后老板的老板批准，然后老板的老板的老板批准。我是让全链条的人都在一个房间里，任何人都可以发表意见。最终决策由我来做。我不会第一个发言，通常最后一个说。90% 的时候我同意团队的意见，但有 10% 的时候我不同意。不过每一个决策我都会签核。这是一个非常清晰的指挥链。
但这是一种以会议为基础的文化。我认为在 AI 时代，我们会从会议驱动转向异步。我们已经在很大程度上是远程办公了，所以我觉得这对我们有利。我认为管理层级会大幅减少。有一句老话说，天主教会运行了 2,000 年，只有四层管理。为什么其他公司都要七八九层管理？
有一种思想实验是：如果我理论上可以直接管理 7,000 人呢？我不觉得那是好主意，那太极端了。但我确实认为减少到很少的管理层级是很合理的。我现在正在思考如何重新设计这家公司。我认为公司里每一个人的工作都会改变。
我现在正在做的事是让大家采用 AI 工具。我想看看在 AI 工具的世界里每个人的工作会怎么变化，然后我要对公司进行一次根本性的重新设计。我认为纯粹的人员管理者（people manager）在未来没有价值。我说的是那些只管人的人。我觉得每个人都必须成为混合型的——既管理人也做实际工作。
我跟大家说，很多公司你得让你的老板批准，然后老板的老板批准，然后老板的老板的老板批准。我是让全链条的人都在一个房间里，任何人都可以发表意见。最终决策由我来做。我不会第一个发言，通常最后一个说。90% 的时候我同意团队的意见，但有 10% 的时候我不同意。不过每一个决策我都会签核。这是一个非常清晰的指挥链。
但这是一种以会议为基础的文化。我认为在 AI 时代，我们会从会议驱动转向异步。我们已经在很大程度上是远程办公了，所以我觉得这对我们有利。我认为管理层级会大幅减少。有一句老话说，天主教会运行了 2,000 年，只有四层管理。为什么其他公司都要七八九层管理？
有一种思想实验是：如果我理论上可以直接管理 7,000 人呢？我不觉得那是好主意，那太极端了。但我确实认为减少到很少的管理层级是很合理的。我现在正在思考如何重新设计这家公司。我认为公司里每一个人的工作都会改变。
我现在正在做的事是让大家采用 AI 工具。我想看看在 AI 工具的世界里每个人的工作会怎么变化，然后我要对公司进行一次根本性的重新设计。我认为纯粹的人员管理者（people manager）在未来没有价值。我说的是那些只管人的人。我觉得每个人都必须成为混合型的——既管理人也做实际工作。
**Brian Chesky:** I think AI founder mode, you're even in significantly more details because you have almost everything on demand, right? Like the mechanism of founder mode was I had a lot of meetings because that was the only way I get information. So I probably did 35 hours of meetings which is very similar to the way Steve ran Apple. So I wouldn't do one-on-ones. I'd only do group meetings. I'd do a recurring thing where I review every single thing in the company either on a weekly basis, by monthly or quarterly, live in person group meeting and I'd have a full chain of command.
So I used to tell people like you know a lot of companies you have to like get your boss to approve it and your boss's boss to approve it and your boss's boss's boss to approve it. I'd have the full chain of command in the room and anyone can give their opinion. I would make all the final decisions. I would not speak first. I'd usually speak last and I'd usually agree with the team, but 10% of the time I'd disagree, but I'd ratify every decision. It was a very clear chain of command.
But this is a meeting based culture. I think in AI, I think we're going to move away from meeting based to asynchronous and we're fairly remote and so I think that will benefit us. I think you're going to have a lot fewer layers of management. You know, I think there was an old famous saying, the Catholic Church has been going on for 2,000 years, only have four layers of management. Why do every other company have like seven, eight, nine layers of management?
I know there's this general idea like as a thought experiment, what if I could theoretically manage all 7,000 people flat? I don't think that's a good idea. I think that's an extreme, but I do think going to a few layers of management would make a lot of sense. We're in the I'm in the middle of trying to think about how to redesign the company. I think every single person in this company's job will change.
What I'm amazingly doing now is trying to get people to adopt AI tools and I want to see how everyone's job changes in the world of AI tooling and then I want to basically embark on like a fundamental redesign. I don't think people managers will have any value in the future. When I mean people managers, people that only manage people. I think everyone's going to have to be a hybrid people manager or manager IC.
So I used to tell people like you know a lot of companies you have to like get your boss to approve it and your boss's boss to approve it and your boss's boss's boss to approve it. I'd have the full chain of command in the room and anyone can give their opinion. I would make all the final decisions. I would not speak first. I'd usually speak last and I'd usually agree with the team, but 10% of the time I'd disagree, but I'd ratify every decision. It was a very clear chain of command.
But this is a meeting based culture. I think in AI, I think we're going to move away from meeting based to asynchronous and we're fairly remote and so I think that will benefit us. I think you're going to have a lot fewer layers of management. You know, I think there was an old famous saying, the Catholic Church has been going on for 2,000 years, only have four layers of management. Why do every other company have like seven, eight, nine layers of management?
I know there's this general idea like as a thought experiment, what if I could theoretically manage all 7,000 people flat? I don't think that's a good idea. I think that's an extreme, but I do think going to a few layers of management would make a lot of sense. We're in the I'm in the middle of trying to think about how to redesign the company. I think every single person in this company's job will change.
What I'm amazingly doing now is trying to get people to adopt AI tools and I want to see how everyone's job changes in the world of AI tooling and then I want to basically embark on like a fundamental redesign. I don't think people managers will have any value in the future. When I mean people managers, people that only manage people. I think everyone's going to have to be a hybrid people manager or manager IC.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 意思是他们必须和现实有接触，比如做出客户最终能看到的东西？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Meaning they have to have contact with reality in some sense like a thing a customer ends up seeing or—
**Brian Chesky：** 没错。工程师必须懂技术。换句话说，每个工程师都需要写代码，连管理者也需要写代码。不管你在哪个领域，你都需要"写代码"。如果你是律师，你不能只管人，你必须自己去读判例法，必须参与其中。
这很合理。你不能只做那种当人们心理治疗师的管理者，天天开会、做一对一。我不认为那些开大量固定一对一会议的人能活下来。他们做的事就是：你有什么问题就来找我，我帮你解决。像导师或教授一样。这种领导风格行不通了。你必须有上下文。
很多人会在 AI 时代活下来。但有两类人不会。第一类是纯人员管理者——觉得领导力就是一切的人。不对，是内容加领导力。我听说有些设计领导者，那些设计部门的负责人，他们自己不做设计。Johnny Ive 管理设计——他自己设计，同时领导团队。一个只管人不做设计的设计领导？这在我看来太疯狂了。Frank Lloyd Wright 管理他的设计团队是通过作品来管的。我说你通过工作来管理人，而不是管理人本身。
不然你在干什么呢？一年可以有几次和下属出去吃饭、谈谈心、问问他们家庭的情况、建立关系。这些你都应该做。但这不是每天的事，你不是他们的心理咨询师。你是通过工作来管理人的。
所以两类人无法适应 AI 时代：纯人员管理者，以及思维僵化、不愿改变进化的人。只要你有成长思维，工具不会是问题。有经济激励让这些工具变得简单到所有人都能用。所以我不觉得 AI 工具会很复杂。现在确实有很多命令行的东西。我觉得 Claude Code 和 Co-work 对普通人来说不够直觉化，但经济激励会推动它们变得极其直觉化。
最后一点想法：AI 目前真的主要是一个企业现象。如果你把 ChatGPT 和大家拿图像生成玩的部分去掉，它基本就是一个纯企业现象。我在 Y Combinator 董事会。上一批 175 家公司，159 家做 enterprise。没有 consumer 公司。
这很合理。你不能只做那种当人们心理治疗师的管理者，天天开会、做一对一。我不认为那些开大量固定一对一会议的人能活下来。他们做的事就是：你有什么问题就来找我，我帮你解决。像导师或教授一样。这种领导风格行不通了。你必须有上下文。
很多人会在 AI 时代活下来。但有两类人不会。第一类是纯人员管理者——觉得领导力就是一切的人。不对，是内容加领导力。我听说有些设计领导者，那些设计部门的负责人，他们自己不做设计。Johnny Ive 管理设计——他自己设计，同时领导团队。一个只管人不做设计的设计领导？这在我看来太疯狂了。Frank Lloyd Wright 管理他的设计团队是通过作品来管的。我说你通过工作来管理人，而不是管理人本身。
不然你在干什么呢？一年可以有几次和下属出去吃饭、谈谈心、问问他们家庭的情况、建立关系。这些你都应该做。但这不是每天的事，你不是他们的心理咨询师。你是通过工作来管理人的。
所以两类人无法适应 AI 时代：纯人员管理者，以及思维僵化、不愿改变进化的人。只要你有成长思维，工具不会是问题。有经济激励让这些工具变得简单到所有人都能用。所以我不觉得 AI 工具会很复杂。现在确实有很多命令行的东西。我觉得 Claude Code 和 Co-work 对普通人来说不够直觉化，但经济激励会推动它们变得极其直觉化。
最后一点想法：AI 目前真的主要是一个企业现象。如果你把 ChatGPT 和大家拿图像生成玩的部分去掉，它基本就是一个纯企业现象。我在 Y Combinator 董事会。上一批 175 家公司，159 家做 enterprise。没有 consumer 公司。
**Brian Chesky:** Yes an engineer, recall they have to be technical. In other words, they have to be, every engineer needs to code. Even the managers need to code and whatever the version of that is for your field, you need to code. So, if you're a lawyer, you're not just managing people. You have to actually read the case law and you have to get involved.
And that makes sense, right? Like you can't just be like these managers where you're kind of people's therapists and you're just doing meetings, you're doing one-on-ones. Like I do not think people who have lots of recurring one-on-ones are going to survive because what they're doing is like that. Oh, you come to me with whatever your problem is. I'm here to help you. Like a mentor or professor. That kind of leadership style is not going to work. You need to have context.
And I think a lot of people will survive this age of AI. The two types of people that will not survive the age of AI are two types of people. Pure people managers who like think it's all about just leadership. No, it's about content and leadership. And by the way, like I hear about design leaders that like the heads of design, they don't actually manage the design. Johnny Ive manages design. He designs and he leads people. A design leader who only manages the people. That's crazy to me. The way Frank Lloyd Wright managed his design team is through the work. I say you manage people through the work. You don't manage the people, you manage the work.
Otherwise, what are you doing? I mean, yeah, like maybe a couple times a year you should have like a check-in and go out to dinner with a direct report, have a heart-to-heart, ask them about their family, like build relationships. You should do that. You should have relationships. That's not a day-to-day thing. You're not their therapist. You're managing people through the work.
So the two types of people will not make the shift to AI are pure people managers and people that are rigid and don't want to change and evolve. As long as you've got a growth mindset, I think the tools are going to be very easy. There's an economic incentive for the tools to be so easy everyone can figure them out. So I don't think the AI tools are going to be complicated. Right now there's a lot of command line. I think Claude Code and Co-work are not the most intuitive to an average person, but I think economic incentives will be for this to become incredibly intuitive.
And I think maybe one last thought is AI is really an enterprise thing right now. If you take out ChatGPT and like people screwing around like image generation, it's pretty much just an enterprise phenomenon. I'm on the board of Y Combinator. 175 companies last batch. 159 were enterprise. There are no consumer companies.
And that makes sense, right? Like you can't just be like these managers where you're kind of people's therapists and you're just doing meetings, you're doing one-on-ones. Like I do not think people who have lots of recurring one-on-ones are going to survive because what they're doing is like that. Oh, you come to me with whatever your problem is. I'm here to help you. Like a mentor or professor. That kind of leadership style is not going to work. You need to have context.
And I think a lot of people will survive this age of AI. The two types of people that will not survive the age of AI are two types of people. Pure people managers who like think it's all about just leadership. No, it's about content and leadership. And by the way, like I hear about design leaders that like the heads of design, they don't actually manage the design. Johnny Ive manages design. He designs and he leads people. A design leader who only manages the people. That's crazy to me. The way Frank Lloyd Wright managed his design team is through the work. I say you manage people through the work. You don't manage the people, you manage the work.
Otherwise, what are you doing? I mean, yeah, like maybe a couple times a year you should have like a check-in and go out to dinner with a direct report, have a heart-to-heart, ask them about their family, like build relationships. You should do that. You should have relationships. That's not a day-to-day thing. You're not their therapist. You're managing people through the work.
So the two types of people will not make the shift to AI are pure people managers and people that are rigid and don't want to change and evolve. As long as you've got a growth mindset, I think the tools are going to be very easy. There's an economic incentive for the tools to be so easy everyone can figure them out. So I don't think the AI tools are going to be complicated. Right now there's a lot of command line. I think Claude Code and Co-work are not the most intuitive to an average person, but I think economic incentives will be for this to become incredibly intuitive.
And I think maybe one last thought is AI is really an enterprise thing right now. If you take out ChatGPT and like people screwing around like image generation, it's pretty much just an enterprise phenomenon. I'm on the board of Y Combinator. 175 companies last batch. 159 were enterprise. There are no consumer companies.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 因为没有 consumer 公司，就没有动力让界面变得真正简单，反正用的人是被要求去搞懂界面的。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Because there's no consumer companies, the incentive to make the interfaces really simple is not there because it's their job to figure out the interface.
**Brian Chesky：** AI 的下一波浪潮会是 consumer AI。Consumer AI 才是大奖。你能想到一家 consumer AI 公司吗？也许 OpenAI 算，但他们大部分精力现在都在 Codex 上。Google 有 Gemini，但大部分资源还是投在搜索上，他们不想蚕食自己的业务。所以我认为趋势就在那里。我在开始把 AI 当作一个 consumer 机会来思考——怎么让工具简单到这里的每个人都能用。
**Brian Chesky:** The next wave of AI is going to be consumer AI. Consumer AI is going to be the big prize. Can you think of a consumer AI company? You know, maybe OpenAI, but most their energy is now going to Codex. Google, yeah, with Gemini, but most of it's still going to search. They don't want to cannibalize their business. So, I think that's where it's all going to go. And I'm trying to start thinking about AI as a consumer play and how do we make tools so simple that everyone here can figure out how to use them.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 令人惊讶的是，这么少人在做 consumer。历史上最大的公司有很多都是 consumer 公司。你建立了上一代最伟大的 consumer 公司之一。你会给那些想用这项技术做 consumer 业务的人什么建议？如果 YC 下一批创业公司因为你的建议而翻转方向，你会告诉他们什么？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** It's surprising that so few have tackled consumer. So many of the biggest companies in history are consumer companies. You built one of the great consumer companies of the last generation of companies. What advice would you give to people that do want to build consumer businesses using this technology? Like if the next batch of YC startups were to invert because of your advice what would you tell them? How would you guide them?
**Brian Chesky：** 这个问题真的很有意思。我觉得有三四个原因导致了目前的状况。第一，ChatGPT 出来的时候很多人很害怕。他们怕 ChatGPT 会杀死自己的业务。很多投资人也不想投他们觉得会被 ChatGPT 干掉的东西。
第二，商业模式很棘手。ChatGPT 到目前为止还没有一个清晰的 consumer AI 商业模式。比如 ChatGPT 有三种变现路径：订阅——但他们在订阅用户比例上可能会碰到天花板，因为 Claude 和 Gemini 在免费提供。广告——同样会碰到天花板，因为 Claude、Gemini 不打算做广告。电商——他们关掉了第三方应用。而推理成本又足够贵，所以他们在烧很多钱。我认为第一件事就是你得有一个围绕 consumer AI 的商业模式。你不能只做信息生意，因为人们没有被训练过为信息付费。这是第一个问题。
第二个问题是分发渠道已经很成熟了。不过话说回来，App Store 前三名都是 AI 应用，这确实证明如果你有革命性的东西，你能冲到最前面。第三，虽然 Silicon Valley 喜欢自称叛逆者，但我觉得它其实非常趋势驱动、氛围驱动。大家都在做大家都在做的事。现在的趋势就是 enterprise。
另外，在 Y Combinator，我在董事会所以我很了解这个——我们会告诉创业者"让其他 YC 创业公司做你的第一批用户"。这是个非常好的分发策略。但这个逻辑的延伸就是所有人都在做 enterprise 公司。
最后一个原因可能是 consumer 公司就是更难。更依赖爆款。奖金更大但风险更高，更像孤注一掷。你可以选一个垂直细分领域，建一个中到大规模的企业，路径很清晰。你可以让其他 YC 公司采用你的产品，然后逐步做大 enterprise。你可以垂直整合一个切口加上 AI，很直接。但 consumer 是一门爆款驱动的生意。你需要在更多方面做得好——设计、营销、文化、公关。不像 enterprise 主要是技术加销售。在 enterprise 里，用产品的人往往不是买产品的人，所以销售变得非常重要，但你可以从聪明的小公司开始小规模销售。consumer 要怎么小规模起步？你在街上找谁开始？这很难想清楚。
所以我的预测是我们正生活在 enterprise AI 的时代，但我认为在接下来的 12 到 24 个月内，你会看到 consumer AI 复兴的开始。
第二，商业模式很棘手。ChatGPT 到目前为止还没有一个清晰的 consumer AI 商业模式。比如 ChatGPT 有三种变现路径：订阅——但他们在订阅用户比例上可能会碰到天花板，因为 Claude 和 Gemini 在免费提供。广告——同样会碰到天花板，因为 Claude、Gemini 不打算做广告。电商——他们关掉了第三方应用。而推理成本又足够贵，所以他们在烧很多钱。我认为第一件事就是你得有一个围绕 consumer AI 的商业模式。你不能只做信息生意，因为人们没有被训练过为信息付费。这是第一个问题。
第二个问题是分发渠道已经很成熟了。不过话说回来，App Store 前三名都是 AI 应用，这确实证明如果你有革命性的东西，你能冲到最前面。第三，虽然 Silicon Valley 喜欢自称叛逆者，但我觉得它其实非常趋势驱动、氛围驱动。大家都在做大家都在做的事。现在的趋势就是 enterprise。
另外，在 Y Combinator，我在董事会所以我很了解这个——我们会告诉创业者"让其他 YC 创业公司做你的第一批用户"。这是个非常好的分发策略。但这个逻辑的延伸就是所有人都在做 enterprise 公司。
最后一个原因可能是 consumer 公司就是更难。更依赖爆款。奖金更大但风险更高，更像孤注一掷。你可以选一个垂直细分领域，建一个中到大规模的企业，路径很清晰。你可以让其他 YC 公司采用你的产品，然后逐步做大 enterprise。你可以垂直整合一个切口加上 AI，很直接。但 consumer 是一门爆款驱动的生意。你需要在更多方面做得好——设计、营销、文化、公关。不像 enterprise 主要是技术加销售。在 enterprise 里，用产品的人往往不是买产品的人，所以销售变得非常重要，但你可以从聪明的小公司开始小规模销售。consumer 要怎么小规模起步？你在街上找谁开始？这很难想清楚。
所以我的预测是我们正生活在 enterprise AI 的时代，但我认为在接下来的 12 到 24 个月内，你会看到 consumer AI 复兴的开始。
**Brian Chesky:** Yeah, this is really interesting. Here are the three or four reasons I think it's happening. Number one, I think a lot of people when ChatGPT came out were afraid. They're afraid ChatGPT was going to kill their business. And I think a lot of investors didn't want to invest in something where they thought ChatGPT was going to kill it.
Number two, the business model is tricky. ChatGPT, there is no yet consumer business model for AI that I've seen. For example, ChatGPT, there's three ways it can monetize. Subscriptions. Unfortunately, they're probably going to hit a local maximum percentage of users subscribing because Claude and Gemini are giving away for free. Ads, again, they're hitting a local maximum because Claude Gemini are not going to do ads. And then e-commerce, they shut down the third party apps. And the inference costs are expensive enough that, you know, it's just they're burning a lot of money. And so, I think the first thing is you need to have a business model around consumer AI. You can't just be in a business of information because people are not trained to pay for information. They're not trained to do that. So that's the first problem.
The second problem is distribution is mature. Now again, top three apps in app store are AI. So it does prove you have something revolutionary. You'll find your way to the top. The third thing is while I think Silicon Valley we like to describe ourselves as rebels. I think and maybe it's a little bit like the always on nature of Twitter. I think it's very trend based and vibe based. I think there's a sense that like everyone kind of does what everyone kind of does. That makes sense. I think the trend is enterprise.
The other thing is with Y Combinator and this is I'm on the board of Y Combinator so I have a good like we tell entrepreneurs get other YC startups to be your first users. It's a really great distribution strategy right like the way we got our first users is you do things that don't scale. Now what happened was that has taken the logical extension that everyone just keeps making enterprise companies.
Maybe finally the reason people aren't doing consumer companies they're just harder. They're more hits driven. The prize is bigger but the risk is higher. It's more all or nothing. You can pick a narrow vertical build a good medium to large size business. It's pretty straightforward. You can get other YC companies to adopt it and you can grow into larger and larger enterprise. You can pick a sliver vertically integrate with AI. It's very straightforward. It is much more hits-driven business. You have to be good at a lot more things. You generally have to be better at design, marketing, culture, press. Like it's not purely, you know, technology and sales, which is what I'd say enterprise is like you make a product, it can be a technology based product. Often times in enterprise, the person using the product is not the person buying the product. And so sales becomes really important, but you can start sales really small with smart companies. It's really hard to figure out how do you start small consumer like who do you start with on the street?
So I think these are the reasons why my prediction is that we're living in the age of enterprise AI and I think in the next 12 to 24 months you're going to see the beginning of a consumer AI renaissance.
Number two, the business model is tricky. ChatGPT, there is no yet consumer business model for AI that I've seen. For example, ChatGPT, there's three ways it can monetize. Subscriptions. Unfortunately, they're probably going to hit a local maximum percentage of users subscribing because Claude and Gemini are giving away for free. Ads, again, they're hitting a local maximum because Claude Gemini are not going to do ads. And then e-commerce, they shut down the third party apps. And the inference costs are expensive enough that, you know, it's just they're burning a lot of money. And so, I think the first thing is you need to have a business model around consumer AI. You can't just be in a business of information because people are not trained to pay for information. They're not trained to do that. So that's the first problem.
The second problem is distribution is mature. Now again, top three apps in app store are AI. So it does prove you have something revolutionary. You'll find your way to the top. The third thing is while I think Silicon Valley we like to describe ourselves as rebels. I think and maybe it's a little bit like the always on nature of Twitter. I think it's very trend based and vibe based. I think there's a sense that like everyone kind of does what everyone kind of does. That makes sense. I think the trend is enterprise.
The other thing is with Y Combinator and this is I'm on the board of Y Combinator so I have a good like we tell entrepreneurs get other YC startups to be your first users. It's a really great distribution strategy right like the way we got our first users is you do things that don't scale. Now what happened was that has taken the logical extension that everyone just keeps making enterprise companies.
Maybe finally the reason people aren't doing consumer companies they're just harder. They're more hits driven. The prize is bigger but the risk is higher. It's more all or nothing. You can pick a narrow vertical build a good medium to large size business. It's pretty straightforward. You can get other YC companies to adopt it and you can grow into larger and larger enterprise. You can pick a sliver vertically integrate with AI. It's very straightforward. It is much more hits-driven business. You have to be good at a lot more things. You generally have to be better at design, marketing, culture, press. Like it's not purely, you know, technology and sales, which is what I'd say enterprise is like you make a product, it can be a technology based product. Often times in enterprise, the person using the product is not the person buying the product. And so sales becomes really important, but you can start sales really small with smart companies. It's really hard to figure out how do you start small consumer like who do you start with on the street?
So I think these are the reasons why my prediction is that we're living in the age of enterprise AI and I think in the next 12 to 24 months you're going to see the beginning of a consumer AI renaissance.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 我手机主屏幕上几乎每一个 app 自从 AI 出现以来都没有根本性地改变过，包括 Airbnb——
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** I mean almost every app on my home screen has not changed fundamentally since AI including Airbnb and—
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得两年内这会改变。
**Brian Chesky:** I think that's going to change in two years.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 在你最近的财报电话会上，你提到了一个叫 Project Hawaii 的东西，它好像就是那个即将被定义的 AI founder mode 的实际应用。也许你可以描述一下那是什么，以及你作为一家现有的 consumer 公司，如何让自己变成一家 AI 公司，以及这样一个项目的可能性是什么。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Yeah. On your most recent earnings call, you referenced this thing, Project Hawaii, I think it was called, which is like the on the ground direct application of the soon to be defined founder AI mode or whatever. Maybe just describe what that is and how you as an incumbent consumer company are trying to make yourself into one of these AI companies and sort of like what's possible with a project like this.
**Brian Chesky：** 这是一个很棒的故事。我遇到了一个困境。我们有大概 7,000 人，后来降到 5,000 人。我想重新找回创业早期的魔力。那时候我们在一间小公寓里一起工作，我想和一个 10 人的团队一起，让这个团队专注于一个问题。
我们说，组一个团队专注于改善客人体验、提高转化率。转化率基本上就是从搜索到预订。人们输入地点和日期然后预订的转化率——有一个漏斗，你可以衡量这个漏斗，可以做 AB 测试。但比 AB 测试更重要的是，我想做的事情是以"让体验更好、提高转化"为北极星。我们要从更好的用户体验开始。
所以我们组了一个大概 10 到 12 人的团队——设计师、工程师、几个产品人、数据科学家。基本上就是一个纯软件团队，我们把它当作一个小创业公司来运作。我们说，我们要专注，我们要用一个"爬、走、跑、飞"的体系。爬——修 bug、修转化的问题。建立了一点信心后，走——开始开发功能，重新构建用户旅程。然后跑——重新思考整个流程、做大功能。飞——彻底重新发明自己。一切都要可衡量。
团队的结果非常惊人。第一年他们创造了相当于 2 亿美元的内部收入。第二年大概是 4 到 5 亿美元。现在我们的运行速率超过 600 个基点。134 亿美元的 600 个基点，你可以感受到这个杠杆有多大。就是一个团队。后来可能扩展到了几十个人，也许 50 到 60 人。但它一直是一个非常精干的团队。
然后我们说，如果把同样的方法应用到下一个问题呢？定价。同一批人、另一个团队、完全不同的团队，同一套模式，然后再一个模式，再一个模式。我真的在努力和团队一起工作。一开始我每周见他们一次，然后变成每两周，然后每月。我的基本理念是开始时非常亲力亲为，然后随时间放手。
打个比方，我不打高尔夫，但我上过几节高尔夫课。这是一个管理的类比。如果你学高尔夫，你想在养成任何习惯之前就跟着教练学，因为如果你自己学，你会形成奇怪的挥杆动作，等教练来了还得改你的肌肉记忆。所以教练得看着你挥杆几千次。最终他们不需要再看了。你随时间慢慢放手。
大多数创始人做的恰恰相反。他们把人招进来，让他们自己摸索，然后后面才介入，但那时候错误的肌肉记忆已经形成了。所以我决定要完全亲力亲为。我要和团队一起做每件事，教他们我知道的一切，然后放手。然后对下一个团队也这样做。然后让团队互相学习。
后来当我们推出服务体验的时候，我们发现了另一种创新方式。这是一个谜题——至少对我来说是。Airbnb 有一个非常成功的核心业务，年毛销售额接近 1,000 亿美元。全球每花 1,000 美元就有 1 美元花在 Airbnb 上。但我们的问题是像一个"one-hit wonder"。18 年来我没能做出第二个爆款。我一直在想为什么这不奏效？
答案其实太明显了，就摆在我们面前。但我们一直背负着从一开始就要在全球规模运营新业务的负担。当我们创立 Airbnb 的时候，我们是从一个城市起步的——纽约。我们有 100 个用户。我在 Y Combinator。Paul Graham 问："你的用户在哪？"我说："在纽约。不多，但在纽约。"他说："你在 Mountain View，用户在纽约。你在这儿干嘛？去纽约。"我们就挨家挨户去见用户。
基本理念是把问题做到最小。先找到产品市场匹配，再规模化。所以我们去年推出服务体验，没有立即见效。我想："完了。"我们在 100 个城市同时推出了服务体验。我回过头想："等一下。Airbnb 是在纽约起步的，Uber 在旧金山，DoorDash 在 Palo Alto。让我们把问题做小，先把一个城市做到完美。"
于是我们开始用这个方法做新业务。任何新业务，我们都走 1→10→Many 的路径。在一个市场做试点。如果这个市场跑通了，就去 10 个。10 个跑通了就工业化。我们花了 16 年才做出第二个和第三个业务。现在那两个开始跑通了。目前我们有 10 到 20 个试点项目。最终我们会有 50 到 70 个新的垂直领域。
这就是 Hawaii 体系。它本质上是把一家巨型公司变成一个非常小的精英团队，就像海豹突击队一样。我和团队一起非常精干地工作。把问题做到最小——这是关键。把问题做到最小，主导一个利基。Peter Thiel 经常说这个。他是我们最早的投资人之一。他说："垄断一个小市场好过在大市场占一小份额。"
我们说，组一个团队专注于改善客人体验、提高转化率。转化率基本上就是从搜索到预订。人们输入地点和日期然后预订的转化率——有一个漏斗，你可以衡量这个漏斗，可以做 AB 测试。但比 AB 测试更重要的是，我想做的事情是以"让体验更好、提高转化"为北极星。我们要从更好的用户体验开始。
所以我们组了一个大概 10 到 12 人的团队——设计师、工程师、几个产品人、数据科学家。基本上就是一个纯软件团队，我们把它当作一个小创业公司来运作。我们说，我们要专注，我们要用一个"爬、走、跑、飞"的体系。爬——修 bug、修转化的问题。建立了一点信心后，走——开始开发功能，重新构建用户旅程。然后跑——重新思考整个流程、做大功能。飞——彻底重新发明自己。一切都要可衡量。
团队的结果非常惊人。第一年他们创造了相当于 2 亿美元的内部收入。第二年大概是 4 到 5 亿美元。现在我们的运行速率超过 600 个基点。134 亿美元的 600 个基点，你可以感受到这个杠杆有多大。就是一个团队。后来可能扩展到了几十个人，也许 50 到 60 人。但它一直是一个非常精干的团队。
然后我们说，如果把同样的方法应用到下一个问题呢？定价。同一批人、另一个团队、完全不同的团队，同一套模式，然后再一个模式，再一个模式。我真的在努力和团队一起工作。一开始我每周见他们一次，然后变成每两周，然后每月。我的基本理念是开始时非常亲力亲为，然后随时间放手。
打个比方，我不打高尔夫，但我上过几节高尔夫课。这是一个管理的类比。如果你学高尔夫，你想在养成任何习惯之前就跟着教练学，因为如果你自己学，你会形成奇怪的挥杆动作，等教练来了还得改你的肌肉记忆。所以教练得看着你挥杆几千次。最终他们不需要再看了。你随时间慢慢放手。
大多数创始人做的恰恰相反。他们把人招进来，让他们自己摸索，然后后面才介入，但那时候错误的肌肉记忆已经形成了。所以我决定要完全亲力亲为。我要和团队一起做每件事，教他们我知道的一切，然后放手。然后对下一个团队也这样做。然后让团队互相学习。
后来当我们推出服务体验的时候，我们发现了另一种创新方式。这是一个谜题——至少对我来说是。Airbnb 有一个非常成功的核心业务，年毛销售额接近 1,000 亿美元。全球每花 1,000 美元就有 1 美元花在 Airbnb 上。但我们的问题是像一个"one-hit wonder"。18 年来我没能做出第二个爆款。我一直在想为什么这不奏效？
答案其实太明显了，就摆在我们面前。但我们一直背负着从一开始就要在全球规模运营新业务的负担。当我们创立 Airbnb 的时候，我们是从一个城市起步的——纽约。我们有 100 个用户。我在 Y Combinator。Paul Graham 问："你的用户在哪？"我说："在纽约。不多，但在纽约。"他说："你在 Mountain View，用户在纽约。你在这儿干嘛？去纽约。"我们就挨家挨户去见用户。
基本理念是把问题做到最小。先找到产品市场匹配，再规模化。所以我们去年推出服务体验，没有立即见效。我想："完了。"我们在 100 个城市同时推出了服务体验。我回过头想："等一下。Airbnb 是在纽约起步的，Uber 在旧金山，DoorDash 在 Palo Alto。让我们把问题做小，先把一个城市做到完美。"
于是我们开始用这个方法做新业务。任何新业务，我们都走 1→10→Many 的路径。在一个市场做试点。如果这个市场跑通了，就去 10 个。10 个跑通了就工业化。我们花了 16 年才做出第二个和第三个业务。现在那两个开始跑通了。目前我们有 10 到 20 个试点项目。最终我们会有 50 到 70 个新的垂直领域。
这就是 Hawaii 体系。它本质上是把一家巨型公司变成一个非常小的精英团队，就像海豹突击队一样。我和团队一起非常精干地工作。把问题做到最小——这是关键。把问题做到最小，主导一个利基。Peter Thiel 经常说这个。他是我们最早的投资人之一。他说："垄断一个小市场好过在大市场占一小份额。"
**Brian Chesky:** This is such a great story. So, you know, I had this conundrum. We had like 7,000 people or we were down to 5,000 and I needed to I wanted to basically take the magic of the founding of the company, the early stages. We were in this little apartment working together and I wanted to work with like this team of 10 people and I wanted to have that team work on one problem.
We said let's put a team together to focus on improving the guest experience, improving conversion rate. Conversion rate is basically search to book. The conversion rate of people typing in a location and dates and booking and there's a funnel and you can basically measure the funnel and you can do AB test. But more than AB testing, I wanted to do something where the north star was let's make the experience better and increase conversion. We're going to start with a better user experience.
And so we put together a team of like I think it was like 10 or 12 people, designers, engineers, a couple product people, data scientists. This is mostly just a pure software team and we treated it like a little startup and we said we're going to just focus and we're going to do a system of crawl, walk, run, then fly. Crawl, fix the bugs, fix the problems of conversion. Once you build a little bit more confidence, walk, start to develop features like really start to reframe the journey. Then run, rethink the entire flow, big features. Fly, like completely reinvent yourself and everything is going to be measured.
The team's results were phenomenal. They ended up delivering the equivalent of I think in year one $200 million in internal revenue for the company. The following year was like $400 or $500 million. Now, you know, we're at a run rate of like over 600 basis points. 600 basis points of 134 billion dollars. You get the sense of how much of a lever that is. It was just one team. I mean, it maybe it grew into dozens and dozens of people, maybe 50 or 60 people. But it was this really lean team.
We took that team. We said, what if we apply to the next problem? Pricing. Same people, another team, totally different team, same model, then another model, then another model. So it was really and I really tried to work with a team and initially I would meet with them every week and then it became every other week and then every month and you know my general philosophy is start really hands-on and let go over time.
It's like I'm not a golfer but like I took a couple golf lessons like a golf instructor. Here's an analogy for management. If you learn golf, you want to learn with a golf instructor before you build any habits because if you learn on your own, you're going to like have a weird swing and then when you get a golf instructor, they got to change your muscle memory. So the golf instructor's got to watch you swing like thousands of times. Eventually, they don't need to see it. You let go over time.
What most founders do is the opposite. They develop, they bring these people in, they let them figure it out, and then they intervene later, but they already have the wrong muscle memory. So, I decided I'm going to be totally hands-on. I'm going to do everything with a team, teach them everything I know and let go. Then do it the next team. And then I had teams learn from other teams.
Then when we launched services, experiences, we basically found this other way of innovating. So here's a riddle or it was a riddle to me. Airbnb, we had this core business that was really successful. It did nearly hundred billion dollars a year in gross sales. For every thousand dollars spent in the world, $1 was spent on an Airbnb. Except we had the problem of we're like a one-hit wonder. And for 18 years, I couldn't get a second hit out. And I kept wondering like why is this not working?
And the answer is like too obvious. It was staring us in the face. But we kept having the burden of trying to scale these businesses at a global scale from the beginning. When we started Airbnb, we started in one city, New York City. We had 100 users. I was in Y Combinator. Paul Graham goes, "Where are your users?" I'm like, "They're in New York." We have like not many, but they're in New York. He goes, "You're in Mountain View. Users in New York. What are you doing here? Go to New York." We went door to door meeting the users.
The basic philosophy is make the problem as small as possible. Get to product market fit, then scale. So, we launched service experiences last year and it didn't work right away. And I'm like, "Oh shit." We launched service experiences in a hundred cities. And I went back and I thought to myself, "Wait a second. Airbnb launched in New York, Uber launched in San Francisco, DoorDash launched in Palo Alto. Let's make the problem small and just perfect a city."
And so we started doing this with new businesses. We basically go to any new business, we're going to do one to 10 to many. We'll pilot in one market. Any idea if we get the market to work, we'll go to 10. You get to 10, it works, we'll industrialize. It took us 16 years to get to our second and third business. We started getting those two working. Now we have like 10 to 20 pilots. Eventually we'll have 50 to 70 new verticals.
So these are the this is like the Hawaii system. It's basically taking this giant company making it a really small elite team. So the Navy, it's like the Navy SEALs. I work with the teams really really leanly. Make the problem as small as possible. I think that's a key thing. Make the problem as small as possible. Dominate a niche. Peter Thiel used to say this. He was one of our first investors. He said, "It's better to have a monopoly of a tiny market than a small share of a big market."
We said let's put a team together to focus on improving the guest experience, improving conversion rate. Conversion rate is basically search to book. The conversion rate of people typing in a location and dates and booking and there's a funnel and you can basically measure the funnel and you can do AB test. But more than AB testing, I wanted to do something where the north star was let's make the experience better and increase conversion. We're going to start with a better user experience.
And so we put together a team of like I think it was like 10 or 12 people, designers, engineers, a couple product people, data scientists. This is mostly just a pure software team and we treated it like a little startup and we said we're going to just focus and we're going to do a system of crawl, walk, run, then fly. Crawl, fix the bugs, fix the problems of conversion. Once you build a little bit more confidence, walk, start to develop features like really start to reframe the journey. Then run, rethink the entire flow, big features. Fly, like completely reinvent yourself and everything is going to be measured.
The team's results were phenomenal. They ended up delivering the equivalent of I think in year one $200 million in internal revenue for the company. The following year was like $400 or $500 million. Now, you know, we're at a run rate of like over 600 basis points. 600 basis points of 134 billion dollars. You get the sense of how much of a lever that is. It was just one team. I mean, it maybe it grew into dozens and dozens of people, maybe 50 or 60 people. But it was this really lean team.
We took that team. We said, what if we apply to the next problem? Pricing. Same people, another team, totally different team, same model, then another model, then another model. So it was really and I really tried to work with a team and initially I would meet with them every week and then it became every other week and then every month and you know my general philosophy is start really hands-on and let go over time.
It's like I'm not a golfer but like I took a couple golf lessons like a golf instructor. Here's an analogy for management. If you learn golf, you want to learn with a golf instructor before you build any habits because if you learn on your own, you're going to like have a weird swing and then when you get a golf instructor, they got to change your muscle memory. So the golf instructor's got to watch you swing like thousands of times. Eventually, they don't need to see it. You let go over time.
What most founders do is the opposite. They develop, they bring these people in, they let them figure it out, and then they intervene later, but they already have the wrong muscle memory. So, I decided I'm going to be totally hands-on. I'm going to do everything with a team, teach them everything I know and let go. Then do it the next team. And then I had teams learn from other teams.
Then when we launched services, experiences, we basically found this other way of innovating. So here's a riddle or it was a riddle to me. Airbnb, we had this core business that was really successful. It did nearly hundred billion dollars a year in gross sales. For every thousand dollars spent in the world, $1 was spent on an Airbnb. Except we had the problem of we're like a one-hit wonder. And for 18 years, I couldn't get a second hit out. And I kept wondering like why is this not working?
And the answer is like too obvious. It was staring us in the face. But we kept having the burden of trying to scale these businesses at a global scale from the beginning. When we started Airbnb, we started in one city, New York City. We had 100 users. I was in Y Combinator. Paul Graham goes, "Where are your users?" I'm like, "They're in New York." We have like not many, but they're in New York. He goes, "You're in Mountain View. Users in New York. What are you doing here? Go to New York." We went door to door meeting the users.
The basic philosophy is make the problem as small as possible. Get to product market fit, then scale. So, we launched service experiences last year and it didn't work right away. And I'm like, "Oh shit." We launched service experiences in a hundred cities. And I went back and I thought to myself, "Wait a second. Airbnb launched in New York, Uber launched in San Francisco, DoorDash launched in Palo Alto. Let's make the problem small and just perfect a city."
And so we started doing this with new businesses. We basically go to any new business, we're going to do one to 10 to many. We'll pilot in one market. Any idea if we get the market to work, we'll go to 10. You get to 10, it works, we'll industrialize. It took us 16 years to get to our second and third business. We started getting those two working. Now we have like 10 to 20 pilots. Eventually we'll have 50 to 70 new verticals.
So these are the this is like the Hawaii system. It's basically taking this giant company making it a really small elite team. So the Navy, it's like the Navy SEALs. I work with the teams really really leanly. Make the problem as small as possible. I think that's a key thing. Make the problem as small as possible. Dominate a niche. Peter Thiel used to say this. He was one of our first investors. He said, "It's better to have a monopoly of a tiny market than a small share of a big market."
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 这是反直觉的。每个投资人都想进大市场。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** This is counterintuitive. Every investor wants to go into big markets.
**Brian Chesky：** 我不喜欢大市场。大市场有太多竞争。去一个小市场，然后把它做大。
**Brian Chesky:** I don't like big markets. Big markets have a lot of competition. Go into a small market and make it big.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 这两件事的原因是不是一样的？在 Toronto 能跑通但在 100 个城市跑不通，10 个人的团队能跑赢 100 个人的团队——背后是不是某种更好的"与现实的接触"？好像当你变大了，现实就开始扭曲了。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Is the reason for both of these things, the idea that it works in Toronto, but not at 100 city scale. And the reason a 10 person team can outperform a 100 person team. Is the shared reason some sort of like better contact with reality? And like somehow reality starts getting distorted as you get bigger or something.
**Brian Chesky：** 根本原则要回到我收到过的最重要的一条建议。Y Combinator 第一天，Paul Graham 说："100 个人爱你，好过 100 万人觉得你还行。"这句话来自 Paul Buchheit。他是 Y Combinator 的合伙人，Gmail 的创造者。有一个著名的故事——他做了 Gmail，花了两年时间，他们说"Google 内部要有 100 个人爱上这个产品才能发布"。实际上花了大概两年才让 100 个人真正喜欢上它。但一旦 100 个人喜欢某个东西，1 亿人就会喜欢它。这个样本量就足够了。
问题是如果你想做一个 100 万人喜欢的东西，你没法和 100 万人交谈。于是你得到的是一个浅浅的游泳池。这就像你在试图加热一片海洋。海洋太大了，加热太慢，你甚至感觉不到变化。与其加热海洋，不如加热一个浴缸——把问题做到最小，你就能贴近客户。
事实上，如果你只专注于一个城市甚至城市的一个子集，你可以和每个人交谈。你可以把所有资源投入到一个微小的问题上。我保证，当你把大量资源投入到一个小问题上时，问题越小，你改变数字和轨迹的幅度就越大，你学到的东西就越多。先做那些不能规模化的事，然后再规模化。规模化就是工业化。但产品市场匹配和工业化是完全不同的两个问题。所以你要把问题做到最小。理解用户，站在他们的角度。让他们惊叹。做从没想过的事。用手做。让它不可规模化。不要在意花多少钱。就是证明这个模型可行。换句话说，这就像研发。这很像工业设计。这就是我们所说的原型制作。在你制造之前，你做原型，一个接一个地做原型，直到你做出自己爱的东西或者别人爱的东西。
是的，问题越小，抽象层就越少。你真的在一线。你在和人交谈。这就是你验证的方式。从 Hawaii 到这些试点，都是同一回事。AI 也一样。你在去除抽象层，你在把问题做到最小，你在直达源头。我认为所有这些事情的共同原则就是这个。
问题是如果你想做一个 100 万人喜欢的东西，你没法和 100 万人交谈。于是你得到的是一个浅浅的游泳池。这就像你在试图加热一片海洋。海洋太大了，加热太慢，你甚至感觉不到变化。与其加热海洋，不如加热一个浴缸——把问题做到最小，你就能贴近客户。
事实上，如果你只专注于一个城市甚至城市的一个子集，你可以和每个人交谈。你可以把所有资源投入到一个微小的问题上。我保证，当你把大量资源投入到一个小问题上时，问题越小，你改变数字和轨迹的幅度就越大，你学到的东西就越多。先做那些不能规模化的事，然后再规模化。规模化就是工业化。但产品市场匹配和工业化是完全不同的两个问题。所以你要把问题做到最小。理解用户，站在他们的角度。让他们惊叹。做从没想过的事。用手做。让它不可规模化。不要在意花多少钱。就是证明这个模型可行。换句话说，这就像研发。这很像工业设计。这就是我们所说的原型制作。在你制造之前，你做原型，一个接一个地做原型，直到你做出自己爱的东西或者别人爱的东西。
是的，问题越小，抽象层就越少。你真的在一线。你在和人交谈。这就是你验证的方式。从 Hawaii 到这些试点，都是同一回事。AI 也一样。你在去除抽象层，你在把问题做到最小，你在直达源头。我认为所有这些事情的共同原则就是这个。
**Brian Chesky:** The general principle, this comes back to the most important piece of advice I ever got. The first day Y Combinator, Paul Graham said, "It's better to have 100 people love you than a million people sort of like you." And that came from Paul Buchheit. Paul Buchheit was a partner Y Combinator. He created Gmail. And I think that this old famous story was he created Gmail and it took him two years and they said, "You can't ship until a 100 people inside of Google loved it." And actually it took like two years to get 100 people to actually like the product. But once a 100 people like something, 100 million people like it. It's like the sample size is enough.
And so the problem is you try to make something a million people like, you can't talk to a million people. And so you end up like with this shallow swimming pool, it's like you're trying to heat up an ocean. And the ocean just it takes too long to heat up and you can't tell. Instead of heating up an ocean, heat up a bathtub and like just make the problem as small as possible and you're close to the customer.
In fact, if you only are focused on one city or even a subset of city, you can talk to every person. You can put all these resources on a tiny problem. And I guarantee you take a ton of resources you put on a tiny problem. The smaller the problem, the more you'll change the numbers, the trajectory and that will teach you lessons. And there's you do things that don't scale, then you scale. And the scaling is industrialization. But product market fit is a distinct problem from industrialization. So you want to basically make the problem as small as possible. Understand the user. Put yourself in their shoes. Blow their mind. Do things you've never thought before. Do them by hand. Make them unscalable. Don't worry how much it costs. Just prove the model. In other words, it's like R&D. This is a lot like industrial design. This is what we call prototyping. Before you manufacture something, you prototype and you make prototype after prototype after prototype and until you make something that you love for yourself or someone loves.
So yes, the smaller the problem, the more there's fewer abstraction layers. You're actually on the ground. You're talking to people and that's how you prove it. Hawaii to these pilots. It's all the same thing. By the way, same thing with AI. You're removing abstraction layers and you're going, you're making the problem as small as possible. You're going directly to the source. I think that's a principle that all these things have in common.
And so the problem is you try to make something a million people like, you can't talk to a million people. And so you end up like with this shallow swimming pool, it's like you're trying to heat up an ocean. And the ocean just it takes too long to heat up and you can't tell. Instead of heating up an ocean, heat up a bathtub and like just make the problem as small as possible and you're close to the customer.
In fact, if you only are focused on one city or even a subset of city, you can talk to every person. You can put all these resources on a tiny problem. And I guarantee you take a ton of resources you put on a tiny problem. The smaller the problem, the more you'll change the numbers, the trajectory and that will teach you lessons. And there's you do things that don't scale, then you scale. And the scaling is industrialization. But product market fit is a distinct problem from industrialization. So you want to basically make the problem as small as possible. Understand the user. Put yourself in their shoes. Blow their mind. Do things you've never thought before. Do them by hand. Make them unscalable. Don't worry how much it costs. Just prove the model. In other words, it's like R&D. This is a lot like industrial design. This is what we call prototyping. Before you manufacture something, you prototype and you make prototype after prototype after prototype and until you make something that you love for yourself or someone loves.
So yes, the smaller the problem, the more there's fewer abstraction layers. You're actually on the ground. You're talking to people and that's how you prove it. Hawaii to these pilots. It's all the same thing. By the way, same thing with AI. You're removing abstraction layers and you're going, you're making the problem as small as possible. You're going directly to the source. I think that's a principle that all these things have in common.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 就像在玩传话游戏一样。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** It's like we're playing this game of telephone.
**Brian Chesky：** 是的。
**Brian Chesky:** Yes.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 如果我们不那样做的话。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** If we don't do it that way.
**Brian Chesky：** 是的。每次传递你都在丢失信息。这就是创始人不喜欢经营大公司的原因——因为他们最终陷入了传话游戏。你说了什么，然后往下传了五层，然后又传回来五层，然后就是各种会议，会议变成了系统性评审。我最低谷的时候是在开"关于会议的会议"。那真的太 meta 了。
**Brian Chesky:** Yes. And you just lose information each time communication. And this is why founders don't like running large companies because they end up in a game of telephone. They say something and then it goes down like five layers and then it goes back up five layers and then these like meetings and the meetings become like system reviews and literally the lowest point for me when I was having meetings about meetings. It was like very meta.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你进入了这个新模式，叫 founder mode，现在叫 CEO mode。你觉得你现在是一个好 CEO 了吗？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** You've gotten into this new mode. It's called founder mode. It's now called CEO mode. Do you think you're now a good CEO?
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得是。我天生是个好创始人，不过我也得说我运气特别好，因为我有两个很棒的联合创始人，在这一点上我真的太幸运了。我觉得我是一个非常好的早期 CEO，但当我需要有一个高管团队的时候，我真的很挣扎。从创始人到 CEO 的转变，我挣扎得很厉害。我认为在 2010 年代我不是一个好 CEO，公司为我的学习曲线付出了代价。疫情是一个当头棒喝。
我那时候回避冲突。有人说过一句话：投手永远不会自己走下投手丘。作为管理者，你得去把他换下来。我一直在帮人，不想伤害他们的感情，希望他们自己走下来。但你越久不把投手换下来，他被打出的本垒打就越多，事情就越糟糕。而且不管你什么时候把他换下来，他都会生你的气。
所以我觉得我不是天生的好 CEO。在疫情前的某个时刻，我曾想过也许我就不适合当 CEO，也许这不是我该做的事。然后疫情来了。我们有过一次濒死体验。我说：去他的纠结，要么做要么死。我觉得就是在那时候我学会了怎么做这份工作。
CEO 有几个阶段。有想法、找到产品市场匹配。从产品市场匹配到高速增长。从高速增长到成为一家真正的公司——盈利、上市。然后最后一个阶段——我都做到了。我们有大约 40% 的自由现金流利润率，非常盈利，客户销售额近 1,000 亿美元。CEO 的最后一个阶段是重新发明公司、产品延伸。我们股价一直没怎么涨，因为我们只做一件事，核心业务开始有点饱和了，所以我们必须重新发明自己、做产品延伸。这一点我还得证明自己。
还有另一个需要证明的点——我能否驾驭 AI 的这次变革。顺便说一句，我认为 founder mode 将是 AI 时代唯一可行的运营方式。如果你是一个传统的职业 CEO，你也可以用 founder mode 的方式来操作。但如果你是那种回避风险、只想渐进改良的人，你在 AI 时代是活不下去的。
Einstein 有一句老话："在自行车上保持平衡的最好方法就是不停地骑。"你必须不停地前进。所以我觉得创始人们会非常适合这个 AI 时代，因为我们基本上得从头重新设计整个公司。
我那时候回避冲突。有人说过一句话：投手永远不会自己走下投手丘。作为管理者，你得去把他换下来。我一直在帮人，不想伤害他们的感情，希望他们自己走下来。但你越久不把投手换下来，他被打出的本垒打就越多，事情就越糟糕。而且不管你什么时候把他换下来，他都会生你的气。
所以我觉得我不是天生的好 CEO。在疫情前的某个时刻，我曾想过也许我就不适合当 CEO，也许这不是我该做的事。然后疫情来了。我们有过一次濒死体验。我说：去他的纠结，要么做要么死。我觉得就是在那时候我学会了怎么做这份工作。
CEO 有几个阶段。有想法、找到产品市场匹配。从产品市场匹配到高速增长。从高速增长到成为一家真正的公司——盈利、上市。然后最后一个阶段——我都做到了。我们有大约 40% 的自由现金流利润率，非常盈利，客户销售额近 1,000 亿美元。CEO 的最后一个阶段是重新发明公司、产品延伸。我们股价一直没怎么涨，因为我们只做一件事，核心业务开始有点饱和了，所以我们必须重新发明自己、做产品延伸。这一点我还得证明自己。
还有另一个需要证明的点——我能否驾驭 AI 的这次变革。顺便说一句，我认为 founder mode 将是 AI 时代唯一可行的运营方式。如果你是一个传统的职业 CEO，你也可以用 founder mode 的方式来操作。但如果你是那种回避风险、只想渐进改良的人，你在 AI 时代是活不下去的。
Einstein 有一句老话："在自行车上保持平衡的最好方法就是不停地骑。"你必须不停地前进。所以我觉得创始人们会非常适合这个 AI 时代，因为我们基本上得从头重新设计整个公司。
**Brian Chesky:** I think I am. I think I was naturally good founder although I would say I also got really lucky because I had two great co-founders and damn did I luck out on that. I think I was a very good early stage CEO and I think the moment I had to have like an executive team I really struggled to make the shift from a founder to CEO. I really struggled and I think in the 2010s I do not think I was a great CEO and I think that we paid the price for my learning curve and I think the pandemic was a rude awakening for me.
I think I was conflict averse. By the way, somebody once said a pitcher never takes himself off the mound. As a manager, you got to go take them off the mound. I was always helping, I didn't want to hurt people's feelings. I wanted them to take themselves off the mound. And the longer you leave a pitcher on the mound, the more home runs they give up, like the more upsetting they're going to get. And they're still going to be angry at you no matter when you take them off the mound.
So, I don't think I was naturally a good CEO. And I remember during the up to the pandemic, at one point, I wonder if I'm just not meant to be a CEO. Maybe I'm not meant to do it. And then the pandemic happened. We had a near-death experience and I said, well, there's no, screw the rumination. It's do or die. And I feel like I learned how to do the job.
And there's really a few phases of CEO. Have an idea, get to product market fit. Product market fit to hypergrowth. Hypergrowth scale to become a real company. Real company as in profitable public and then the last stage and I did all that, you know, we have like 40% free cash flow margin. We're very profitable. We do hundred billion dollars in sales, customer sales. The last phase of a CEO's reinvent the company, product extension and the reason our stock has been flat is because we only do one thing and we have kind of you know we've started to saturate a little bit of the core idea so we've had to reinvent ourselves we had to do product extension so I still got to prove myself.
And then there's another proof point, can I navigate this transformation of AI. By the way I think founder mode is going to be the only way to operate in the age of AI. If you're a giant professional CEO, I think you can operate in a founder mode, but if you're like, you know, risk averse, you want to be incremental, those types of people are not going to survive the age of AI.
So, I think there was an old Albert Einstein quote. He said, "The best way to keep your balance on a bicycle is to keep moving." You're going to have to keep moving. So, I think that like founders are going to be really well primed or really well set up for this age of AI because we kind of have to redesign our whole company from scratch again.
I think I was conflict averse. By the way, somebody once said a pitcher never takes himself off the mound. As a manager, you got to go take them off the mound. I was always helping, I didn't want to hurt people's feelings. I wanted them to take themselves off the mound. And the longer you leave a pitcher on the mound, the more home runs they give up, like the more upsetting they're going to get. And they're still going to be angry at you no matter when you take them off the mound.
So, I don't think I was naturally a good CEO. And I remember during the up to the pandemic, at one point, I wonder if I'm just not meant to be a CEO. Maybe I'm not meant to do it. And then the pandemic happened. We had a near-death experience and I said, well, there's no, screw the rumination. It's do or die. And I feel like I learned how to do the job.
And there's really a few phases of CEO. Have an idea, get to product market fit. Product market fit to hypergrowth. Hypergrowth scale to become a real company. Real company as in profitable public and then the last stage and I did all that, you know, we have like 40% free cash flow margin. We're very profitable. We do hundred billion dollars in sales, customer sales. The last phase of a CEO's reinvent the company, product extension and the reason our stock has been flat is because we only do one thing and we have kind of you know we've started to saturate a little bit of the core idea so we've had to reinvent ourselves we had to do product extension so I still got to prove myself.
And then there's another proof point, can I navigate this transformation of AI. By the way I think founder mode is going to be the only way to operate in the age of AI. If you're a giant professional CEO, I think you can operate in a founder mode, but if you're like, you know, risk averse, you want to be incremental, those types of people are not going to survive the age of AI.
So, I think there was an old Albert Einstein quote. He said, "The best way to keep your balance on a bicycle is to keep moving." You're going to have to keep moving. So, I think that like founders are going to be really well primed or really well set up for this age of AI because we kind of have to redesign our whole company from scratch again.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** Hiroki 还教了你什么？因为 Steve 可能就是你刚才说的所有事情的终极范例——深入细节、永远在一线、不断重新发明公司。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Was there anything else that Hiroki taught you? Because Steve was perhaps the literal ultimate example of everything you just said. Focused on the details, in the weeds, forever reinvention of the company.
**Brian Chesky：** Hiroki。在说他教了我什么之前，先介绍一下他是谁。所有人都知道 Johnny Ive。Hiroki 是一个不太被人知道的英雄。我一直听说过他。他是那种传说中的神秘人物——很难找到。网上几乎没有他的照片，没有他的视频。他从不出现在台前，但他是 Steve Jobs 的 creative director。这是 marketing 下面的一个职能。他做广告、做平面设计。那种黑色字体、灰色底色、白色背景前面放一个产品——那就是他的美学。
他教了我 Apple 的两个原则。第一个是简约（simplicity）。当你创办一家公司的时候，因为没钱、资源极度有限，你天然就是简约的。匮乏创造天然的约束，简约是被强加给你的，而这对你有好处。但一旦你融了一大笔钱、招了一大堆人，你就会四处出击，失去专注力。我们能想到多少今天因为缺乏专注而挣扎的创业公司？
于是你开始失去简约的肌肉。Hiroki 教我的是：简约不是删减，简约是把东西蒸馏到如此根本的程度，以至于你理解了它的本质。Steve 曾说过："设计是人造物的根本灵魂，通过层层表面展现自身。"这句话多美。换句话说，伟大的设计就是把事物蒸馏到它的本质。这也是 Elon 在 SpaceX 做的——他说的第一性原理。第一性原理是一个物理学术语，也是一个设计术语。如果我要重新发明这个产品，我必须理解玻璃的属性，我必须理解关于它的一切，才能把它蒸馏到本质。所以我对简约上了瘾——产品的简约、组织的简约、一切的简约。
第二个是工艺和细节的意识。你做任何一件事的方式就是你做所有事情的方式。我说一切都必须完美。有一本 Silicon Valley 很多人推荐的书《The Score Takes Care of Itself》，作者是旧金山 49 人队教练 Bill Walsh。John Wooden，大学篮球史上赢得最多冠军的教练，UCLA，同样的原则。John Wooden 在 12 年里赢了 10 次 NCAA 冠军。第一天、第一个小时，他花一个小时教你怎么穿袜子。一个小时。他说："按这个方式穿你的袜子。"像 Mr. Miyagi 一样。花一个小时教你穿袜子。这是一个隐喻。一切都是这么严格的。
Bill Walsh 说你把球衣塞进裤子的方式，是决定你能否获胜的一万个细节之一。基本理念是：不要关注赢。关注让所有的输入都完美。如果你把一切都做完美了，你自然会赢。不要盯着记分牌。
所以我们确实关注增长，但我们某种程度上不再关注增长了。我们开始关注让每件事都完美。如果一切完美但你不增长，说明你关注了错误的输入。但如果你的输入是对的而且都做到了完美，你就会增长得很快。这就是我从他那里学到的。他真的教会了我 founder mode，因为我从没见过 Steve，我是通过 Hiroki 了解到的。
我说："我太喜欢这个了。我是艺术家，是设计师。我能对产品有更多的掌控力。我能让一切都完美。"最初尝试 founder mode 的时候引发了巨大的反抗。所有人都讨厌它，因为所有人都觉得我在微管理他们。但我学到了一些根本性的东西。一开始所有人都讨厌它，最后所有人都爱上了它。当然，讨厌它的人走了，喜欢它的人留下来了——所以也许有选择性偏差。
但即使是那些觉得自己想要自主权和独立性的人，他们没有意识到的是：控制权和权力不是零和游戏。不是说我有了所有的权力你就没有了。有一种情况是我们所有人都没有权力。也有一种情况是如果我有权力，我因此可以给你权力。这不是零和的。这就是人们不理解的问题。如果我有更多的权力和控制力，我就能给你更多的权力和控制力，然后把它交给你。核心理念是这辆车有方向盘，你往左打它真的会往左走。就这么简单。我认为关键是让整个公司朝一个方向划。就是这样。
他教了我 Apple 的两个原则。第一个是简约（simplicity）。当你创办一家公司的时候，因为没钱、资源极度有限，你天然就是简约的。匮乏创造天然的约束，简约是被强加给你的，而这对你有好处。但一旦你融了一大笔钱、招了一大堆人，你就会四处出击，失去专注力。我们能想到多少今天因为缺乏专注而挣扎的创业公司？
于是你开始失去简约的肌肉。Hiroki 教我的是：简约不是删减，简约是把东西蒸馏到如此根本的程度，以至于你理解了它的本质。Steve 曾说过："设计是人造物的根本灵魂，通过层层表面展现自身。"这句话多美。换句话说，伟大的设计就是把事物蒸馏到它的本质。这也是 Elon 在 SpaceX 做的——他说的第一性原理。第一性原理是一个物理学术语，也是一个设计术语。如果我要重新发明这个产品，我必须理解玻璃的属性，我必须理解关于它的一切，才能把它蒸馏到本质。所以我对简约上了瘾——产品的简约、组织的简约、一切的简约。
第二个是工艺和细节的意识。你做任何一件事的方式就是你做所有事情的方式。我说一切都必须完美。有一本 Silicon Valley 很多人推荐的书《The Score Takes Care of Itself》，作者是旧金山 49 人队教练 Bill Walsh。John Wooden，大学篮球史上赢得最多冠军的教练，UCLA，同样的原则。John Wooden 在 12 年里赢了 10 次 NCAA 冠军。第一天、第一个小时，他花一个小时教你怎么穿袜子。一个小时。他说："按这个方式穿你的袜子。"像 Mr. Miyagi 一样。花一个小时教你穿袜子。这是一个隐喻。一切都是这么严格的。
Bill Walsh 说你把球衣塞进裤子的方式，是决定你能否获胜的一万个细节之一。基本理念是：不要关注赢。关注让所有的输入都完美。如果你把一切都做完美了，你自然会赢。不要盯着记分牌。
所以我们确实关注增长，但我们某种程度上不再关注增长了。我们开始关注让每件事都完美。如果一切完美但你不增长，说明你关注了错误的输入。但如果你的输入是对的而且都做到了完美，你就会增长得很快。这就是我从他那里学到的。他真的教会了我 founder mode，因为我从没见过 Steve，我是通过 Hiroki 了解到的。
我说："我太喜欢这个了。我是艺术家，是设计师。我能对产品有更多的掌控力。我能让一切都完美。"最初尝试 founder mode 的时候引发了巨大的反抗。所有人都讨厌它，因为所有人都觉得我在微管理他们。但我学到了一些根本性的东西。一开始所有人都讨厌它，最后所有人都爱上了它。当然，讨厌它的人走了，喜欢它的人留下来了——所以也许有选择性偏差。
但即使是那些觉得自己想要自主权和独立性的人，他们没有意识到的是：控制权和权力不是零和游戏。不是说我有了所有的权力你就没有了。有一种情况是我们所有人都没有权力。也有一种情况是如果我有权力，我因此可以给你权力。这不是零和的。这就是人们不理解的问题。如果我有更多的权力和控制力，我就能给你更多的权力和控制力，然后把它交给你。核心理念是这辆车有方向盘，你往左打它真的会往左走。就这么简单。我认为关键是让整个公司朝一个方向划。就是这样。
**Brian Chesky:** Yeah. Hiroki. So just I would love to say and before I say just to say who Hiroki is, everyone knows Johnny Ive. Hiroki is a bit of an unsung hero. I always heard about him. He was like this legendary mythical figure that was elusive. There's like almost no photos of him online. There's like no videos of him. He was never out in front, but he was Steve Jobs' creative director. It was a function under marketing. He did the ads. He did like the graphic design. He was really responsible for, you know, when there was like that black type with the gray font and like the product in front of white. Like that was really his aesthetic.
He taught me two principles of Apple that I brought. One was simplicity. When you start a company, because you have no money and you're so constrained, you're naturally simple. Lack of abundance creates natural constraints and so simplicity is thrust upon you and that is good for you and then once you raise a bunch of money and hire a bunch of people you go in a lot of directions then you lose your sense of focus. How many startups can we think of today who have struggled from lack of focus? Probably name a few.
So you start to lose your muscle for simplicity. Hiroki taught me simplicity and he taught me that simplicity is not removing things. Simplicity is distilling something so fundamentally that you understand its essence. I know Steve used to say design is the fundamental soul of a man-made creation that reveals itself through subsequent layers. In other words, isn't that a beautiful saying? In other words, great design is about distilling something to its essence. It's kind of what Elon does with SpaceX where he talks about first principles and first principles is kind of like a physics term but is also a design term. It's about understanding if I'm going to reinvent this product, I have to understand the properties of glass. I have to understand everything about it to distill it to its essence. So I got obsessed with simplicity. Simplicity of our products, simplicity of our organization, simplicity of everything.
The other one was a sense of craft and details. How you do anything is how you do everything. And I said everything must be perfect. It comes from, there's a book that a lot of people in Silicon Valley recommend, The Score Takes Care of Itself. Bill Walsh, the coach of the San Francisco 49ers. John Wooden, winningest coach in college basketball history, UCLA, same principle. First day UCLA. So John Wooden won 10 NCAA championships over 12 years. First day, first hour on his team, he spends an hour teaching you how to put your socks on. One hour and he said, "Put your socks on this way." Mr. Miyagi. Yeah. One hour teaching you how to put your socks on. It's a metaphor. Everything was that rigorous.
Bill Walsh said the way you tuck your jersey into your pants was one of 10,000 details that depend on whether you won or not. Basically, don't focus on winning. Focus on getting all the inputs perfect. And you get everything perfect then you will win and you don't focus on the scorecard.
And so we kind of we do focus on growth, but we kind of stopped focusing on growth. We started focusing on making everything perfect. And if everything is perfect and you don't grow, then you focused on the wrong inputs. But if you have the right inputs and you make them perfect, then you'll grow really fast. And so that's really what I learned from him. And I just he really taught me I think founder mode cuz I never met Steve. So I only knew through Hiroki.
And I said, "Well, I love this. I'm an artist. I'm a designer. I get to have more control of the product. I get to make everything perfect." The initial attempt at founder mode created giant revolts. Everyone hated it because everyone thought I was micromanaging them, taking their, and I learned something fundamental. Initially, everyone hated it and by the end everyone loved it. Now, the people that hated it left. So, maybe there's like selection bias. The people that liked it stayed.
But even the people that thought they wanted autonomy and independence and empowerment. What they didn't realize was control and power is not zero sum. It's not like if I have all the power, you don't. There's a scenario where we're all powerless. And there's also scenario where if I have power, I can therefore give you power. It's not zero sum. This is the problem people don't understand. If I have more power and control, I can give you more power and control and I can hand it off to you. It's about the idea that the car has a steering wheel. You turn it left and it actually goes left. That's the basic idea. I do think it's all about the company rowing in one direction. That's it.
He taught me two principles of Apple that I brought. One was simplicity. When you start a company, because you have no money and you're so constrained, you're naturally simple. Lack of abundance creates natural constraints and so simplicity is thrust upon you and that is good for you and then once you raise a bunch of money and hire a bunch of people you go in a lot of directions then you lose your sense of focus. How many startups can we think of today who have struggled from lack of focus? Probably name a few.
So you start to lose your muscle for simplicity. Hiroki taught me simplicity and he taught me that simplicity is not removing things. Simplicity is distilling something so fundamentally that you understand its essence. I know Steve used to say design is the fundamental soul of a man-made creation that reveals itself through subsequent layers. In other words, isn't that a beautiful saying? In other words, great design is about distilling something to its essence. It's kind of what Elon does with SpaceX where he talks about first principles and first principles is kind of like a physics term but is also a design term. It's about understanding if I'm going to reinvent this product, I have to understand the properties of glass. I have to understand everything about it to distill it to its essence. So I got obsessed with simplicity. Simplicity of our products, simplicity of our organization, simplicity of everything.
The other one was a sense of craft and details. How you do anything is how you do everything. And I said everything must be perfect. It comes from, there's a book that a lot of people in Silicon Valley recommend, The Score Takes Care of Itself. Bill Walsh, the coach of the San Francisco 49ers. John Wooden, winningest coach in college basketball history, UCLA, same principle. First day UCLA. So John Wooden won 10 NCAA championships over 12 years. First day, first hour on his team, he spends an hour teaching you how to put your socks on. One hour and he said, "Put your socks on this way." Mr. Miyagi. Yeah. One hour teaching you how to put your socks on. It's a metaphor. Everything was that rigorous.
Bill Walsh said the way you tuck your jersey into your pants was one of 10,000 details that depend on whether you won or not. Basically, don't focus on winning. Focus on getting all the inputs perfect. And you get everything perfect then you will win and you don't focus on the scorecard.
And so we kind of we do focus on growth, but we kind of stopped focusing on growth. We started focusing on making everything perfect. And if everything is perfect and you don't grow, then you focused on the wrong inputs. But if you have the right inputs and you make them perfect, then you'll grow really fast. And so that's really what I learned from him. And I just he really taught me I think founder mode cuz I never met Steve. So I only knew through Hiroki.
And I said, "Well, I love this. I'm an artist. I'm a designer. I get to have more control of the product. I get to make everything perfect." The initial attempt at founder mode created giant revolts. Everyone hated it because everyone thought I was micromanaging them, taking their, and I learned something fundamental. Initially, everyone hated it and by the end everyone loved it. Now, the people that hated it left. So, maybe there's like selection bias. The people that liked it stayed.
But even the people that thought they wanted autonomy and independence and empowerment. What they didn't realize was control and power is not zero sum. It's not like if I have all the power, you don't. There's a scenario where we're all powerless. And there's also scenario where if I have power, I can therefore give you power. It's not zero sum. This is the problem people don't understand. If I have more power and control, I can give you more power and control and I can hand it off to you. It's about the idea that the car has a steering wheel. You turn it left and it actually goes left. That's the basic idea. I do think it's all about the company rowing in one direction. That's it.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你之前说过的最让我印象深刻的概念是 11 星体验——这个练习是不断往上推，不是 5 星而是 6 星，然后逼自己写出来。这和简约与蒸馏的理念结合在一起特别美，对吧？它本质上是对客户的同理心。但为什么这个方法在实践中如此强大？当你沿着星级往上推到 11 星的时候，到底发生了什么？为什么这个练习这么有价值？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** The thing that you've said historically that had the largest impact on me was this notion of the 11-star experience, the exercise of going from not a five star but a six star and actually forcing yourself to write it. And I have this idea in mind because of this idea of simplicity and distillation and it's a beautiful thing, right? It's I guess it's ultimately empathetic with the customer. But why is that idea in practice so powerful? Like what happens as you go down or up the star count to 11 stars? Like why is that such a valuable exercise?
**Brian Chesky：** 让我花一分钟解释一下这是什么。基本上当你预订 Airbnb 的时候，大多数人都给 5 星。如果你给 4 星，那就是体验出了问题。5 星意味着一切按计划进行。这叫"评价压缩"（review compression）。和 Uber 一样，你总是给 5 星。如果你给低于 5 星，说明出了严重问题。但如果司机真的特别棒呢？你也只能给 5 星。
所以我开始想象如果我们可以给 6 星会怎样。我做了一个从 6 星到 10 或 11 星的练习。比如说取一个场景——入住 Airbnb。5 星入住是你到了，房东迎接你或者有一个门锁密码而且管用。换句话说，没出任何问题。你给 5 星。出了任何问题，你给 4 星或更低。但这就是评价压缩。如果你做到了超越预期呢？
6 星是什么样的？你到了 Airbnb，桌上放着你最爱的红酒、水果、零食，还有一张手写卡片。好，这比只是让我进门好多了。那 7 星呢？7 星是机场有一辆豪车等着你。他们知道你喜欢冲浪，有一块冲浪板等着你，他们带你游览城市。各种各样的东西。
8 星呢？我到了机场，那里有一头大象。我骑上大象，参加一个为我举办的游行。我想："哇，我真的觉得自己好特别。"9 星呢？我叫它 Beatles 式入住。我下了飞机，就像 1964 年的 Beatles——有 5,000 个少女尖叫着我的名字，举着牌子，让我觉得自己像个流行巨星。我到了 Airbnb 的前院，那里有一场以我的名义举办的新闻发布会。
10 星呢？Elon Musk 亲自迎接我，带我上太空。对。你做这个练习的原因是——这是一个荒诞的练习。你不断把它推到如此荒诞的程度到 10 星，突然 6 星或 7 星看起来一点也不疯狂了。找到产品市场匹配的方法就是创造一个 6 星或 7 星的体验。但如果你不走到极端之外，你就创造不出 6 星或 7 星的体验。换句话说，先超越现实的边界，然后往回推。
所以这是一个有趣的练习。用什么最疯狂的方式让一个人、一个客户叹为观止？也许试试。也许你没法规模化那个因为那是 8 星体验，但你大概可以规模化 6 星。5 星和 6 星之间的差距可能就是你和竞争对手之间的差距。如果你能找到一种方法把它工业化、规模化，你可能就找到了产品市场匹配和真正特别的东西。
所以我开始想象如果我们可以给 6 星会怎样。我做了一个从 6 星到 10 或 11 星的练习。比如说取一个场景——入住 Airbnb。5 星入住是你到了，房东迎接你或者有一个门锁密码而且管用。换句话说，没出任何问题。你给 5 星。出了任何问题，你给 4 星或更低。但这就是评价压缩。如果你做到了超越预期呢？
6 星是什么样的？你到了 Airbnb，桌上放着你最爱的红酒、水果、零食，还有一张手写卡片。好，这比只是让我进门好多了。那 7 星呢？7 星是机场有一辆豪车等着你。他们知道你喜欢冲浪，有一块冲浪板等着你，他们带你游览城市。各种各样的东西。
8 星呢？我到了机场，那里有一头大象。我骑上大象，参加一个为我举办的游行。我想："哇，我真的觉得自己好特别。"9 星呢？我叫它 Beatles 式入住。我下了飞机，就像 1964 年的 Beatles——有 5,000 个少女尖叫着我的名字，举着牌子，让我觉得自己像个流行巨星。我到了 Airbnb 的前院，那里有一场以我的名义举办的新闻发布会。
10 星呢？Elon Musk 亲自迎接我，带我上太空。对。你做这个练习的原因是——这是一个荒诞的练习。你不断把它推到如此荒诞的程度到 10 星，突然 6 星或 7 星看起来一点也不疯狂了。找到产品市场匹配的方法就是创造一个 6 星或 7 星的体验。但如果你不走到极端之外，你就创造不出 6 星或 7 星的体验。换句话说，先超越现实的边界，然后往回推。
所以这是一个有趣的练习。用什么最疯狂的方式让一个人、一个客户叹为观止？也许试试。也许你没法规模化那个因为那是 8 星体验，但你大概可以规模化 6 星。5 星和 6 星之间的差距可能就是你和竞争对手之间的差距。如果你能找到一种方法把它工业化、规模化，你可能就找到了产品市场匹配和真正特别的东西。
**Brian Chesky:** Let me do like a one minute on what it is. So basically when you book an Airbnb most people leave a five star and if you leave a four star it's a bad experience. Five star everything went as planned. So it's called review compression. Similar to Uber you always leave a five star. And if you leave anything other than a five star something really went wrong. So but what if the driver was really amazing you can only leave a five star.
So I started imagining what if we could give a six star and I did this exercise from six to like 10 or 11 stars. So, a five star, let's say take one moment checking into Airbnb. Five star check-in is you get there and the host greets you or there's a door code and it works. In other words, nothing went wrong. You give a five star. Anything went wrong, you give a four star or less. But that's review compression. Like what if you went above and beyond?
So, what would a six star look like? A six star would look like you basically get to the Airbnb and there's like your favorite wine on the table and there's like fruit and there's snacks there and there's a handwritten card. Okay, that's better than just letting me in the house. So, what's a seven star experience? Seven star experience, there's like a limousine or something waiting for me at the airport. They know I like surfing. There's a surfboard waiting for me and they're like showing me around the city. There's all this stuff.
So, what's an eight star experience? An eight star experience, I get to the airport, there's an elephant. I go on the elephant. I go on a parade in my honor. I'm like, "Wow, I feel really special." What's a nine star experience? I call it the Beatles check-in. I get off the plane and like 1964 Beatles. There's 5,000 teenage girls screaming my name with cards making me feel like I'm a pop star. I get to the front lawn of the Airbnb and there's a press conference in my name.
So, what's a 10 star experience? 10 star experience. Elon Musk greets me and takes me to space. Right. And the reason you do this and it's an exercise. It's an exercise in the absurd. You keep pushing to go so absurd to 10 stars that suddenly six or seven stars doesn't seem crazy at all. And the way to get to product market fit is to just create a six or seven star experience. But you can't create a six or seven star experience without going beyond. In other words, go beyond the edge of reality and work backwards.
And so it's kind of a fun exercise. What would the craziest possible way to blow someone's mind, one person's mind, one customer, and maybe try that and maybe you can't scale that because that's like an eight star experience, but you can probably scale a six star. And that difference between the five and six star is probably difference between you and a competitor. And if you can find a way to industrialize it and scale it, you might have product market fit and something special.
So I started imagining what if we could give a six star and I did this exercise from six to like 10 or 11 stars. So, a five star, let's say take one moment checking into Airbnb. Five star check-in is you get there and the host greets you or there's a door code and it works. In other words, nothing went wrong. You give a five star. Anything went wrong, you give a four star or less. But that's review compression. Like what if you went above and beyond?
So, what would a six star look like? A six star would look like you basically get to the Airbnb and there's like your favorite wine on the table and there's like fruit and there's snacks there and there's a handwritten card. Okay, that's better than just letting me in the house. So, what's a seven star experience? Seven star experience, there's like a limousine or something waiting for me at the airport. They know I like surfing. There's a surfboard waiting for me and they're like showing me around the city. There's all this stuff.
So, what's an eight star experience? An eight star experience, I get to the airport, there's an elephant. I go on the elephant. I go on a parade in my honor. I'm like, "Wow, I feel really special." What's a nine star experience? I call it the Beatles check-in. I get off the plane and like 1964 Beatles. There's 5,000 teenage girls screaming my name with cards making me feel like I'm a pop star. I get to the front lawn of the Airbnb and there's a press conference in my name.
So, what's a 10 star experience? 10 star experience. Elon Musk greets me and takes me to space. Right. And the reason you do this and it's an exercise. It's an exercise in the absurd. You keep pushing to go so absurd to 10 stars that suddenly six or seven stars doesn't seem crazy at all. And the way to get to product market fit is to just create a six or seven star experience. But you can't create a six or seven star experience without going beyond. In other words, go beyond the edge of reality and work backwards.
And so it's kind of a fun exercise. What would the craziest possible way to blow someone's mind, one person's mind, one customer, and maybe try that and maybe you can't scale that because that's like an eight star experience, but you can probably scale a six star. And that difference between the five and six star is probably difference between you and a competitor. And if you can find a way to industrialize it and scale it, you might have product market fit and something special.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 当你举那些高端的荒诞例子时，我想到的一件事是我在使用 AI 时的一个感受——我的想象力几乎萎缩了。使用这些工具后我才意识到这有多难。我可以做任何东西。但我坐下来时，我不知道要做什么。然后当我开始做一些小东西的时候，我的想象力突然重新启动了。这个练习感觉就像一个想象力的练习。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** One of the things that I think about when you give some of the absurd examples at the high end of the range is this feeling that I've experienced with AI that my imagination had almost atrophied. That by using these tools, I realized how hard it was. Like, oh, I can make anything. And I sit down, I'm like, I have no idea what to make. And that as I started making little things all of a sudden my imagination got rebooted and it feels like this exercise is like an imagination exercise.
**Brian Chesky：** 没错。有一句话说"好的写作就是好的思考"。但我发现有些人是先有想法，然后把它们写下来。而我有时候是在写作的过程中才想到的。写作的行为就是产生想法的行为。设计的行为就是产生想法的行为。坐在房间里抽象地想创意真的很难，你需要动手去做点什么。
我觉得之前的问题是我们没有足够的工具来表达自己。很多工具是非常被动的。我们越来越多的时间花在像社交媒体这样的被动体验上。我认为 AI 把我们的注意力从消费转向了创造。社交媒体上我们大部分时间都在消费，唯一的"创造"就是发表观点或发帖，但你主要还是在消费。
我喜欢 AI 的地方是它不关乎观点。突然之间我们所有人都有了画笔和画布来创造东西。我认为 AI 将引发一场创造力的文艺复兴。我从小就是个艺术家，还不错的艺术家。所以我有表达想法的能力。打个比方——你有没有遇到过这样的人，你可以想想像 Prince 这样的音乐家，他也许用语言无法表达自己，但通过音乐展现出一个你从未想象的维度。一个艺术家看起来可能很内敛，但他们的艺术充满了情感。
我们中很多人心中都有这种创造力，但我们没有表达它的手艺或工具。而 AI 即将给我们表达的能力。我们会意识到创意人才比我们想象的多得多。因为我们通常认为有创意的人是那些知道如何表达创意的人。但如果每个人都能表达呢？
Pablo Picasso 曾说过："所有孩子天生都是艺术家。问题是长大后如何保持。"每个孩子都有创造力。如果每个孩子都有创造力，那意味着每个成年人都可以有创造力。我认为这个星球上的每个人都是有创造力的。你问普通人"你有创造力吗？"大约一半人说没有。这是我的经验。但那不是真的。只是他们没有锻炼这块肌肉。
我认为 AI 的魔力在于，我们脑中的想法可以直接变为现实。而且就像你说的，我们还能在这个过程中产生新的想法，因为这是一种互动关系。也许一开始只有一个小想法，你试了一下，它给你带来另一个想法，然后你就踏上了这段旅程。很多人称创始人为"远见者"，但我们其实更像"探险家"。我们是在探险的路上，事后才把它叫做"愿景"。实际上我们只是一步一个脚印地往前走。
我觉得之前的问题是我们没有足够的工具来表达自己。很多工具是非常被动的。我们越来越多的时间花在像社交媒体这样的被动体验上。我认为 AI 把我们的注意力从消费转向了创造。社交媒体上我们大部分时间都在消费，唯一的"创造"就是发表观点或发帖，但你主要还是在消费。
我喜欢 AI 的地方是它不关乎观点。突然之间我们所有人都有了画笔和画布来创造东西。我认为 AI 将引发一场创造力的文艺复兴。我从小就是个艺术家，还不错的艺术家。所以我有表达想法的能力。打个比方——你有没有遇到过这样的人，你可以想想像 Prince 这样的音乐家，他也许用语言无法表达自己，但通过音乐展现出一个你从未想象的维度。一个艺术家看起来可能很内敛，但他们的艺术充满了情感。
我们中很多人心中都有这种创造力，但我们没有表达它的手艺或工具。而 AI 即将给我们表达的能力。我们会意识到创意人才比我们想象的多得多。因为我们通常认为有创意的人是那些知道如何表达创意的人。但如果每个人都能表达呢？
Pablo Picasso 曾说过："所有孩子天生都是艺术家。问题是长大后如何保持。"每个孩子都有创造力。如果每个孩子都有创造力，那意味着每个成年人都可以有创造力。我认为这个星球上的每个人都是有创造力的。你问普通人"你有创造力吗？"大约一半人说没有。这是我的经验。但那不是真的。只是他们没有锻炼这块肌肉。
我认为 AI 的魔力在于，我们脑中的想法可以直接变为现实。而且就像你说的，我们还能在这个过程中产生新的想法，因为这是一种互动关系。也许一开始只有一个小想法，你试了一下，它给你带来另一个想法，然后你就踏上了这段旅程。很多人称创始人为"远见者"，但我们其实更像"探险家"。我们是在探险的路上，事后才把它叫做"愿景"。实际上我们只是一步一个脚印地往前走。
**Brian Chesky:** It is. Like one of the sayings is like great writing is great thinking but I find that like I don't know about you some people like have ideas and they think of the ideas and they write them down. Sometimes I figure out the ideas through the act of writing. The act of writing is the act of coming up with ideas. The act of designing is the act of coming up with ideas. It's really hard to just sit in a room and abstractly think of ideas. You need to like do something.
And so I think what was happening was we didn't have enough tools to express ourselves. I think a lot of the tools were very passive tools. I think increasingly we were spending more and more time on a sit-back experience like social media. I think AI shifts our attention from consumption to creation because I mean social media a lot of us spend our time on and the only type of creation is like giving your opinion or posting but you're mostly consuming.
What I love about AI is it's not about opinions. Suddenly all of us have a paintbrush and a canvas to make stuff and I think that AI is going to lead to a renaissance in creativity. I was an artist growing up. I was a pretty good artist. So I had the ability to express ideas. You ever, here's an analogy. You ever meet a person like, there's probably you could probably think of musicians like Prince. You name a musician that probably in words couldn't express themselves but then through music there's like this dimension you never knew. An artist they're like they seem really reserved but their art is like really emotional.
So many of us have this creativity inside of us, but we don't have the craftsmanship or tools to express it. And suddenly what AI is going to do is going to give us the ability to express it. We're going to realize there are a lot more creative people than we thought. Cuz we typically think of creative people as people that know how to express their creativity. It turns out what if everyone can express it.
Pablo Picasso once said, "All children are born artists. The problem is to remain one as you grow up." Every child's creative. If every child's creative, that means every adult could be creative. I think that every human on this planet is creative. You ask the average person, "Are you creative?" About one in two says they're not. That's my experience. That's not true. It's just that they haven't exercised the muscle.
And I think that the magic of AI is what's in our head can manifest. But also, as you said, we can develop new ideas in our head because it's a relationship. We maybe have a small idea, we try something, gives us another idea and you go on this journey. A lot of people call founders visionaries. We're more expeditionaries. We're on these expeditions. We only call it visions later. We're really just one foot in front of the other.
And so I think what was happening was we didn't have enough tools to express ourselves. I think a lot of the tools were very passive tools. I think increasingly we were spending more and more time on a sit-back experience like social media. I think AI shifts our attention from consumption to creation because I mean social media a lot of us spend our time on and the only type of creation is like giving your opinion or posting but you're mostly consuming.
What I love about AI is it's not about opinions. Suddenly all of us have a paintbrush and a canvas to make stuff and I think that AI is going to lead to a renaissance in creativity. I was an artist growing up. I was a pretty good artist. So I had the ability to express ideas. You ever, here's an analogy. You ever meet a person like, there's probably you could probably think of musicians like Prince. You name a musician that probably in words couldn't express themselves but then through music there's like this dimension you never knew. An artist they're like they seem really reserved but their art is like really emotional.
So many of us have this creativity inside of us, but we don't have the craftsmanship or tools to express it. And suddenly what AI is going to do is going to give us the ability to express it. We're going to realize there are a lot more creative people than we thought. Cuz we typically think of creative people as people that know how to express their creativity. It turns out what if everyone can express it.
Pablo Picasso once said, "All children are born artists. The problem is to remain one as you grow up." Every child's creative. If every child's creative, that means every adult could be creative. I think that every human on this planet is creative. You ask the average person, "Are you creative?" About one in two says they're not. That's my experience. That's not true. It's just that they haven't exercised the muscle.
And I think that the magic of AI is what's in our head can manifest. But also, as you said, we can develop new ideas in our head because it's a relationship. We maybe have a small idea, we try something, gives us another idea and you go on this journey. A lot of people call founders visionaries. We're more expeditionaries. We're on these expeditions. We only call it visions later. We're really just one foot in front of the other.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你能谈谈"为了成就感而创造"和"纯粹为了快乐而创造"之间的区别吗？后者似乎更接近你现在的状态。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Can you talk about the difference between the act of creation in pursuit of achievement, notches on the belt versus just for the raw pure joy of it which seems to be more the mode you're in now.
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得刚开始做 Airbnb 的时候，我们并不是完全冲着成功去的。说真的，创业故事我就不详细讲了，基本上就是我给三个气垫床充了气。Airbnb 的全称是 Air Bed and Breakfast。我经常开玩笑说，如果我真的想赚钱，我会想一个比"气垫床加早餐"更好的主意。我真的是出于热爱和好玩才做的。
但在某个节点上，我变得非常成功。这反而成了一种诅咒，因为成功变成了一张记分卡。然后我想变得更加成功。这件事不再是发自内心的驱动了，变成了一种追求地位和讨好他人的行为。我花了一些时间才意识到自己在做什么。我真正想要的是被爱。我从小就学到，获得爱的方式是变得与众不同。而与众不同的方式就是做出与众不同的事。如果我做出了与众不同的事，就会被夸奖，就会感到被爱。
我觉得这种心态转化成了——如果我非常成功，就会得到崇拜。如果得到崇拜，就能感受到我一直在追寻的那种感觉。但我并不是有意识地这样做的，我不是在说我当时就想明白了。花了很多年我才意识到自己一直在做什么。崇拜的问题在于，它本质上是一种对地位的追求。很多人都在追求地位，但问题是，伟大的产品和伟大的公司不是从这里诞生的。
崇拜就像一个底部有洞的杯子。你不断往里灌水，以为那是爱，但它一直从底部流走。到了某个时刻，你不得不面对一个问题：我到底是为谁在做这些？是为了让别人短暂地喜欢我、称赞我、然后转身离开？顺便说一句，这是一种毒品，跟真正的毒品一样。你需要越来越大的剂量才能达到同样的快感，最终它就不管用了，最终你到达了顶峰，一切变得毫无意义，空洞无比。
这件事发生在了我身上。大概在疫情期间，我们上市了，估值达到一千亿美元。这本该是我人生中最好的日子之一。但第二天醒来，就好像什么都没发生过。因为疫情，我们是在 Zoom 上敲的钟。我醒来，穿上运动裤，上 Zoom 开会。就好像那件事从来没发生过。那一天几乎成了我人生中最悲伤的一天，因为我意识到——然后呢？现在我该怎么办？我得到了所有的崇拜，但我的生活没有任何不同的感觉。
这让我重新审视自己做这一切到底是为了什么。我必须接受一个事实：我想做事情是出于纯粹的内在动力。所以我必须把自己从别人的认可中、从地位中、从担心 Airbnb 是否够热门或我是否够成功中解脱出来。这些在我们刚开始创业的时候，我根本不在乎。但一旦你开始获得荣誉，你就想要更多。你必须放下，因为这是一场必输的游戏。
我真正开始做的就是埋头工作。像你以前那样做事就好。就像小时候一样，做东西的时候有那种纯粹的快乐。就做东西。为自己做。Rick Rubin 那本很棒的书里说，艺术家只有在为自己创作的时候才是艺术家，而不是试图去做出成功的东西。我不再试图去成功了，我回归了基本。我意识到一个不认识你的人永远不会爱你，这没关系。爱你的人是那些了解你的人，而最重要的那个爱你的人是你自己。我们应该热爱自己正在做的事。
所以这变成了一整套理念。就是因为你热爱才去做，倾注全部心血。就像"分数会自己照顾自己"那个道理。不要试图成功，试图去做一件你自己热爱的精彩事情。也许你会成功，也许不会，但不要关注你想成为谁，关注你想做什么。这是当时还是副总统的 Obama 告诉我的。他说："如果我一心想着我要成为谁，我就会盯着美国总统这个位置，如果我没当上，我的人生就是失败的。但如果我关注的是我想做什么——我想帮助人们，我想做社区组织者——那我不需要当总统也能实现。"
所以我觉得太多创业者关注的是自己想成为什么。我想成为伟大的科技创始人，我想运营一家十亿美元的公司，我想做这个，做那个。而不是关注我想创造什么。一旦你在做你热爱的东西，就不存在失败了。
但在某个节点上，我变得非常成功。这反而成了一种诅咒，因为成功变成了一张记分卡。然后我想变得更加成功。这件事不再是发自内心的驱动了，变成了一种追求地位和讨好他人的行为。我花了一些时间才意识到自己在做什么。我真正想要的是被爱。我从小就学到，获得爱的方式是变得与众不同。而与众不同的方式就是做出与众不同的事。如果我做出了与众不同的事，就会被夸奖，就会感到被爱。
我觉得这种心态转化成了——如果我非常成功，就会得到崇拜。如果得到崇拜，就能感受到我一直在追寻的那种感觉。但我并不是有意识地这样做的，我不是在说我当时就想明白了。花了很多年我才意识到自己一直在做什么。崇拜的问题在于，它本质上是一种对地位的追求。很多人都在追求地位，但问题是，伟大的产品和伟大的公司不是从这里诞生的。
崇拜就像一个底部有洞的杯子。你不断往里灌水，以为那是爱，但它一直从底部流走。到了某个时刻，你不得不面对一个问题：我到底是为谁在做这些？是为了让别人短暂地喜欢我、称赞我、然后转身离开？顺便说一句，这是一种毒品，跟真正的毒品一样。你需要越来越大的剂量才能达到同样的快感，最终它就不管用了，最终你到达了顶峰，一切变得毫无意义，空洞无比。
这件事发生在了我身上。大概在疫情期间，我们上市了，估值达到一千亿美元。这本该是我人生中最好的日子之一。但第二天醒来，就好像什么都没发生过。因为疫情，我们是在 Zoom 上敲的钟。我醒来，穿上运动裤，上 Zoom 开会。就好像那件事从来没发生过。那一天几乎成了我人生中最悲伤的一天，因为我意识到——然后呢？现在我该怎么办？我得到了所有的崇拜，但我的生活没有任何不同的感觉。
这让我重新审视自己做这一切到底是为了什么。我必须接受一个事实：我想做事情是出于纯粹的内在动力。所以我必须把自己从别人的认可中、从地位中、从担心 Airbnb 是否够热门或我是否够成功中解脱出来。这些在我们刚开始创业的时候，我根本不在乎。但一旦你开始获得荣誉，你就想要更多。你必须放下，因为这是一场必输的游戏。
我真正开始做的就是埋头工作。像你以前那样做事就好。就像小时候一样，做东西的时候有那种纯粹的快乐。就做东西。为自己做。Rick Rubin 那本很棒的书里说，艺术家只有在为自己创作的时候才是艺术家，而不是试图去做出成功的东西。我不再试图去成功了，我回归了基本。我意识到一个不认识你的人永远不会爱你，这没关系。爱你的人是那些了解你的人，而最重要的那个爱你的人是你自己。我们应该热爱自己正在做的事。
所以这变成了一整套理念。就是因为你热爱才去做，倾注全部心血。就像"分数会自己照顾自己"那个道理。不要试图成功，试图去做一件你自己热爱的精彩事情。也许你会成功，也许不会，但不要关注你想成为谁，关注你想做什么。这是当时还是副总统的 Obama 告诉我的。他说："如果我一心想着我要成为谁，我就会盯着美国总统这个位置，如果我没当上，我的人生就是失败的。但如果我关注的是我想做什么——我想帮助人们，我想做社区组织者——那我不需要当总统也能实现。"
所以我觉得太多创业者关注的是自己想成为什么。我想成为伟大的科技创始人，我想运营一家十亿美元的公司，我想做这个，做那个。而不是关注我想创造什么。一旦你在做你热爱的东西，就不存在失败了。
**Brian Chesky:** I think when I started Airbnb I don't think we were totally trying to be successful. I mean literally I won't go through the whole founding story but basically I inflated three air mattresses and Airbnb stands for air bed and breakfast. And I like to joke that if I was trying to make money, I would have come up with a better idea than air bed and breakfast. I truly did it for the love and the fun.
And somewhere along the way, I got really successful. And that almost became a curse because success became a scorecard. And then I want to get even more successful. And it stopped being intrinsic and it started being a version of status and people pleasing. You see, it took me a little while to realize what I was doing. What I really wanted was love. I learned growing up as a child, the way to get love is to be special. And the way to be special is to do special things. And if I do special things, I get praised and I feel loved.
And I think that translated into if I'm really successful, I will get adulation. And if I get adulation, I'll feel that feeling that I'm always seeking. And but I didn't do this consciously. I'm not saying this. It took me many years to realize this is what I was doing. The problem with adulation, by the way, adulation is kind of like seeking status. So many people seek status, but the problem is that's not where great products and great companies come from.
See, adulation is like a cup with a hole at the bottom. And you keep filling it in thinking it's love, except it just keeps coming out the bottom. And at some point, you have to confront, who am I doing this for? Am I doing it for other people? For them to briefly love me and commend me to then move on. And by the way, that's a drug and it's like real drugs. You need a greater hit to get the high and eventually it stops working and eventually you reach a peak and it gets really meaningless and empty.
And that happened to me. And at some point around the pandemic, we go public, we have a hundred billion dollar valuation. It's like one of the best days of my life. And the next day I wake up as if it never happened. We were on Zoom because of the pandemic. And I wake up, I put on sweatpants, I go on a Zoom meeting. It was like it never happened. And it became like the saddest day of my life cuz I realized, okay, what now? What do I do now? I got all this adulation and my life, I don't feel any different.
And that made me re-evaluate what I'm doing this for. I had to just come to terms with I want to do things for pure intrinsic reasons. And so I had to basically just detach myself from people's approval, from status, from worrying about how hot Airbnb is or how successful I am, which I never gave a damn about when we started. But like, you know, you start getting accolades and you want more of them. And you got to let go of that cuz it's a losing game.
And I just really started focusing on just being heads down. Do the work like you used to do. Like when you were a kid, there was delight. Just make stuff. Make it for yourself. That great book Rick Rubin, he says an artist is an artist when they make it for themselves and they don't try to make something successful and I stopped trying to be successful and I just went back to the basics and I realized a person who doesn't know you will never love you. That's okay. The people that love you are the people that know you and the most important person to love you is yourself. And we should love the thing you're doing.
So this became like a whole thing. It became about just doing it because you love it, putting your heart and soul in it. It's like the score takes care of itself. It goes back to that. Don't try to be successful. Try to do something wonderful that you love for yourself. And maybe you'll be successful, maybe you won't, but don't focus on who you want to be. Focus on what you want to do. That was what Vice President Obama once told me. He said, "If I focused on who I want to be, I focus on being president of the United States and I wasn't, my life would have been a failure. But if I focus on what I wanted to do, I want to help people, I want to be a community organizer, then I don't need to be president."
And so I think so many entrepreneurs focus on what they want to be. I want to be a giant tech founder. I want to run a billion dollar company. I want to do this. I want to do that. Instead of focus on what do I want to make and then suddenly there's no way to fail if you're making what you love.
And somewhere along the way, I got really successful. And that almost became a curse because success became a scorecard. And then I want to get even more successful. And it stopped being intrinsic and it started being a version of status and people pleasing. You see, it took me a little while to realize what I was doing. What I really wanted was love. I learned growing up as a child, the way to get love is to be special. And the way to be special is to do special things. And if I do special things, I get praised and I feel loved.
And I think that translated into if I'm really successful, I will get adulation. And if I get adulation, I'll feel that feeling that I'm always seeking. And but I didn't do this consciously. I'm not saying this. It took me many years to realize this is what I was doing. The problem with adulation, by the way, adulation is kind of like seeking status. So many people seek status, but the problem is that's not where great products and great companies come from.
See, adulation is like a cup with a hole at the bottom. And you keep filling it in thinking it's love, except it just keeps coming out the bottom. And at some point, you have to confront, who am I doing this for? Am I doing it for other people? For them to briefly love me and commend me to then move on. And by the way, that's a drug and it's like real drugs. You need a greater hit to get the high and eventually it stops working and eventually you reach a peak and it gets really meaningless and empty.
And that happened to me. And at some point around the pandemic, we go public, we have a hundred billion dollar valuation. It's like one of the best days of my life. And the next day I wake up as if it never happened. We were on Zoom because of the pandemic. And I wake up, I put on sweatpants, I go on a Zoom meeting. It was like it never happened. And it became like the saddest day of my life cuz I realized, okay, what now? What do I do now? I got all this adulation and my life, I don't feel any different.
And that made me re-evaluate what I'm doing this for. I had to just come to terms with I want to do things for pure intrinsic reasons. And so I had to basically just detach myself from people's approval, from status, from worrying about how hot Airbnb is or how successful I am, which I never gave a damn about when we started. But like, you know, you start getting accolades and you want more of them. And you got to let go of that cuz it's a losing game.
And I just really started focusing on just being heads down. Do the work like you used to do. Like when you were a kid, there was delight. Just make stuff. Make it for yourself. That great book Rick Rubin, he says an artist is an artist when they make it for themselves and they don't try to make something successful and I stopped trying to be successful and I just went back to the basics and I realized a person who doesn't know you will never love you. That's okay. The people that love you are the people that know you and the most important person to love you is yourself. And we should love the thing you're doing.
So this became like a whole thing. It became about just doing it because you love it, putting your heart and soul in it. It's like the score takes care of itself. It goes back to that. Don't try to be successful. Try to do something wonderful that you love for yourself. And maybe you'll be successful, maybe you won't, but don't focus on who you want to be. Focus on what you want to do. That was what Vice President Obama once told me. He said, "If I focused on who I want to be, I focus on being president of the United States and I wasn't, my life would have been a failure. But if I focus on what I wanted to do, I want to help people, I want to be a community organizer, then I don't need to be president."
And so I think so many entrepreneurs focus on what they want to be. I want to be a giant tech founder. I want to run a billion dollar company. I want to do this. I want to do that. Instead of focus on what do I want to make and then suddenly there's no way to fail if you're making what you love.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 这真是一组很棒的想法。我很好奇，在你最近这段心态转变的过程中，你的生活里什么变化最大？你不再追求崇拜之后，有哪些事情你做得少了，而以前做得很多？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** It's an incredible set of ideas. I'm curious what most fell away in your life in this recent period as a result of this shift in mindset. Like what do you do less of that you used to do a lot of when you stopped chasing adulation?
**Brian Chesky：** 主要是胡思乱想少了。你不再反复纠结。就是不再担心别人怎么看我。担心所有人对你的看法本身就有一点自恋——好像所有人都在想着你似的。实际上没人在想你。即使是看这个节目的人，我可能会有点不自在，但他们也就想我一会儿，然后就回去想自己的事了，这很正常。
我们每个人都以为所有人都在想着我们，但他们其实在想自己或者他们生活中的人。他们不会一直惦记一个播客上的人，最多一个小时就过去了，然后他们就回到自己的生活里了。所以放下别人对你的看法吧。因为那是一座监狱——一旦你陷进去，你就会开始为了获得认可而做事，然后你就失去了勇气。这是最关键的，就是心理能量的问题。
但我真的努力去做有意义的事情。有意义的事情其实就两类：创造，以及和你在乎的人在一起。就这两件事。其他的都算是义务，偶尔做做就行了。
我们每个人都以为所有人都在想着我们，但他们其实在想自己或者他们生活中的人。他们不会一直惦记一个播客上的人，最多一个小时就过去了，然后他们就回到自己的生活里了。所以放下别人对你的看法吧。因为那是一座监狱——一旦你陷进去，你就会开始为了获得认可而做事，然后你就失去了勇气。这是最关键的，就是心理能量的问题。
但我真的努力去做有意义的事情。有意义的事情其实就两类：创造，以及和你在乎的人在一起。就这两件事。其他的都算是义务，偶尔做做就行了。
**Brian Chesky:** Mostly ruminating. You ruminate less. Yeah. Just like worrying about people's opinions of me. There's something mildly narcissistic about worrying about everyone's opinions as if they're all thinking about you. No one is. Like the reality is even people watching this, I'm going to be self-conscious except for a moment they're going to think about me but then they're going to be mostly thinking about themselves and that's okay.
And all of us are thinking everyone's thinking about us and they're thinking about themselves or the people in their life. They're not thinking about some guy on a podcast except for like maybe an hour and then it's over and then they're thinking about the people in their life. So letting go of what people think about you. Because that's a prison because then suddenly you're making things for approval and then you lose your courage. That's the main thing. It's just the mental energy.
But I really try to do things that are meaningful and meaningful things are really two buckets. It's making and spending time with people you care about. Those are just two things. Anything else is kind of an obligation where I'll do it once in a while.
And all of us are thinking everyone's thinking about us and they're thinking about themselves or the people in their life. They're not thinking about some guy on a podcast except for like maybe an hour and then it's over and then they're thinking about the people in their life. So letting go of what people think about you. Because that's a prison because then suddenly you're making things for approval and then you lose your courage. That's the main thing. It's just the mental energy.
But I really try to do things that are meaningful and meaningful things are really two buckets. It's making and spending time with people you care about. Those are just two things. Anything else is kind of an obligation where I'll do it once in a while.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 有两个很不一样的想法，我想听听你的看法。第一个是 Warren Buffett 的名言："作为投资者，你想买的是那种连火腿三明治都能经营的公司，因为迟早会有火腿三明治来经营。"想想那些支付处理公司，比如 Visa 或 Mastercard，非常优雅的商业模式。实际上像 Airbnb 这样有网络效应的公司通常也属于这一类。然后在光谱的另一端，我最喜欢的一位早期投资人说，他告诉每个创始人，应该把公司看作自己个人成长的平台或工具，你的成长能力决定了公司的天花板。这两个想法几乎是对立的，而我们今天聊了很多关于领导力的内容更偏向第二类。我很好奇你怎么看——你是否在意如果有一天一个火腿三明治来经营 Airbnb，商业模式已经完美到无所谓了？以及你怎么看你的天花板就是公司天花板这个说法？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** There are two very different ideas I'm curious for you to react to. The first was made famous by Warren Buffett who said, "You want to buy as an investor businesses that a ham sandwich could run because eventually one will." And think not to pick on anyone but think about the card payment processors like Visa or Mastercard, just extremely elegant business models. Actually network effect businesses like Airbnb tend to be in this category. And then you've got this opposite end of the spectrum which is one of my favorite investors, early stage investor, said he tells every founder that they should think about the company as a platform or a vehicle for their own personal growth. And that their ability to grow will set the ceiling for the company. This is sort of like opposite ideas and we've been talking a lot more about leadership in this second bucket. I'm curious how you think about like whether or not you care that if eventually a ham sandwich ran Airbnb like the business model would be so perfected that it wouldn't matter in the Warren Buffett sense and just like in general how you think about if that's true that your ceiling is the company's ceiling as its leader.
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得两个都对。让我用一个例子来调和这两种观点。我同意这两种说法。举个例子——Walt Disney。观看节目的朋友们，请试着说出一部 Paramount Pictures 的电影。很难吧。说一部 Warner Brothers 的电影，也许你会想到 Batman。说一部 Universal Pictures 的电影。说一部 MGM 片库里的电影。挺难的吧？但我敢打赌你能说出很多 Disney 的电影，还有 Pixar 黄金时代的作品。
这两者有很大的区别。Disney 是典型的创始人主导型公司，Disney 完全是一个人的个人表达。而讽刺的是，一家公司在 founder mode 下运营得越久，反而越能在创始人离开后让任何人来经营。
我觉得 Disney，不是要贬低他们的 CEO，新任 CEO Josh 非常出色，我见过他，他很棒。而且他们历来有很多优秀的 CEO。但总的来说，我觉得 Disney 的 CEO 接手的时候已经是满垒的状态了。你有一个不管经营得好不好人们都会去的主题公园，你有令人难以置信的 IP。这不是说这份工作容易，但 Walt 留下了太多遗产。
我记得大概十年前和 Disney 的前 CFO 聊天，他说 Disney 自从 Walt 去世之后就没有真正做过什么新东西了。Walt 是 1966 年去世的。从 1966 年至今，我们还是在做动画长片、电视节目和 Magic Kingdom。当然他们有做一些新东西，但本质上还是同一套打法。
所以我觉得这就是一个例子——创始人不断重塑公司、倾注个人表达，创造了如此巨大的 IP 储备和动能，以至于他去世五十年了，五十年后 Walt Disney 的精神仍然无处不在。而 Louis B. Mayer，大多数人可能连他是哪个片厂的都说不清楚。我想是 MGM，我自己都不太确定，我觉得是 MGM，另外两个人我都说不出名字。你明白我的意思吧？差距是巨大的。
所以总的来说这是一个悖论。火腿三明治理论——让公司好到谁都能经营，因为迟早会有那一天。最好的公司是那些由创始人经营、不断重塑、创造了巨大资产和护城河的公司，这样当他们交棒的时候，公司能在他们身后继续发展壮大。
我觉得 Apple 也类似。他们在很大程度上不需要发明新产品，还是在靠 iPhone。Steve 留给他们的礼物太大了——他去世时公司价值几千亿美元，现在是数万亿美元的公司。
我要补充一点，科技公司有所不同。Warren Buffett 基本上不投科技公司，除了 Apple 之外。他的大手笔投资是 Coca-Cola 或者 Sees Candy，这些是不会被颠覆的东西。而技术本质上就是变化的同义词。如果你身处变革行业，你就需要更长时间保持在 founder mode。
但这就是我调和两者的方式——公司的上限就是创始人潜力的上限，而你在 founder mode 下运营得越久，公司就越能持久。我记得有一个创始人跟我说："我希望这家公司能存在一百年，所以我不能陷在所有细节里，我需要放权给团队。"我当时回他说："如果你希望一样东西存在一百年，你就应该尽可能久地掌控它，尽可能久地保持 founder mode，就像 Disney 那样。"这是我的理论。我觉得这个观点其实是反直觉的。
有人说："可是公司会变得非常依赖你。"是的，但另一面是——你会把这种魔力深深植入公司的制度中，让它在你之后依然能延续。
这两者有很大的区别。Disney 是典型的创始人主导型公司，Disney 完全是一个人的个人表达。而讽刺的是，一家公司在 founder mode 下运营得越久，反而越能在创始人离开后让任何人来经营。
我觉得 Disney，不是要贬低他们的 CEO，新任 CEO Josh 非常出色，我见过他，他很棒。而且他们历来有很多优秀的 CEO。但总的来说，我觉得 Disney 的 CEO 接手的时候已经是满垒的状态了。你有一个不管经营得好不好人们都会去的主题公园，你有令人难以置信的 IP。这不是说这份工作容易，但 Walt 留下了太多遗产。
我记得大概十年前和 Disney 的前 CFO 聊天，他说 Disney 自从 Walt 去世之后就没有真正做过什么新东西了。Walt 是 1966 年去世的。从 1966 年至今，我们还是在做动画长片、电视节目和 Magic Kingdom。当然他们有做一些新东西，但本质上还是同一套打法。
所以我觉得这就是一个例子——创始人不断重塑公司、倾注个人表达，创造了如此巨大的 IP 储备和动能，以至于他去世五十年了，五十年后 Walt Disney 的精神仍然无处不在。而 Louis B. Mayer，大多数人可能连他是哪个片厂的都说不清楚。我想是 MGM，我自己都不太确定，我觉得是 MGM，另外两个人我都说不出名字。你明白我的意思吧？差距是巨大的。
所以总的来说这是一个悖论。火腿三明治理论——让公司好到谁都能经营，因为迟早会有那一天。最好的公司是那些由创始人经营、不断重塑、创造了巨大资产和护城河的公司，这样当他们交棒的时候，公司能在他们身后继续发展壮大。
我觉得 Apple 也类似。他们在很大程度上不需要发明新产品，还是在靠 iPhone。Steve 留给他们的礼物太大了——他去世时公司价值几千亿美元，现在是数万亿美元的公司。
我要补充一点，科技公司有所不同。Warren Buffett 基本上不投科技公司，除了 Apple 之外。他的大手笔投资是 Coca-Cola 或者 Sees Candy，这些是不会被颠覆的东西。而技术本质上就是变化的同义词。如果你身处变革行业，你就需要更长时间保持在 founder mode。
但这就是我调和两者的方式——公司的上限就是创始人潜力的上限，而你在 founder mode 下运营得越久，公司就越能持久。我记得有一个创始人跟我说："我希望这家公司能存在一百年，所以我不能陷在所有细节里，我需要放权给团队。"我当时回他说："如果你希望一样东西存在一百年，你就应该尽可能久地掌控它，尽可能久地保持 founder mode，就像 Disney 那样。"这是我的理论。我觉得这个观点其实是反直觉的。
有人说："可是公司会变得非常依赖你。"是的，但另一面是——你会把这种魔力深深植入公司的制度中，让它在你之后依然能延续。
**Brian Chesky:** I think they're both true. Let me try to square those with one example. I agree with both sentiments. Here's an example. Walt Disney. So people watching, I want them to try to name a Paramount Pictures film. Hard. I want you to name a Warner Brothers film. Maybe you'll think of like Batman. I want you to name a Universal Pictures film. I want you to name something from the MGM library. Pretty hard, right? But I bet you can name a lot of Disney films and probably Pixar during their golden age.
There's a big difference in those two. One is that Disney was very founder-led and that Disney was all about a personal expression of one man. And the irony is the longer a company is run by founders in a founder mode, the more I think it can let go and anyone can run it.
I think Disney, not to take away from the CEO of Disney, the new guy Josh is really great. I've met him. He's great. And I think they've had a lot of good CEOs. But I generally think the CEO of Disney has the bases loaded, right? You've got this incredible theme park that people are going to visit no matter how well it's run. They've got this incredible IP. It's not that it's an easy job, but Walt left so much.
And I remember I was speaking to the former CFO at Disney once, this was like 10 years ago, and he said Disney hasn't really done anything new since Walt died. Walt died in 1966. Since 1966, we still make feature animated films, TV, and Magic Kingdoms. And of course, yeah, they do new things, but fundamentally that's the same playbook.
And so I do think that that's an example where the founder reinventing the company and their expression created such a reservoir of IP, of momentum that he died 50 years ago. 50 years later, Walt Disney's spirit seems very very omnipresent. Whereas Louis B. Mayer, I don't know if most people can tell you which studio he was, you know. I think it was MGM and I'm not even, I think it was MGM and I couldn't even tell you the other two people. You see what I'm saying? There's a huge difference.
So I generally think this is a paradox. The ham sandwich, you know, have a business so good anyone can run it because sooner or later they will. The best businesses are ones that founders run and they reinvent and they create so much equity and such a great moat that then when they hand it off they will endure and grow after them.
I think Apple's very similar. They've had not had to invent new products for the most part. They're still running the iPhone. I mean what a gift Steve left them that they were a few hundred billion dollar company when he died. They're like a multi-trillion dollar company now.
I think the one caveat is I think tech companies are different. Warren Buffett generally didn't invest in tech companies. He didn't invest with the exception of Apple. So I think you know like Coca-Cola was a big investment of his or Sees Candy. These are things that don't get disrupted. I think technology is a synonym for change. If we're in the change industry you kind of need to be more in founder mode more of the time.
But I think that's how I square it that the company is the upper bound of the founder's potential and then the longer you're in founder mode the more it will endure. I remember one founder told me I want this company to last 100 years so therefore I can't be in all the details and so therefore I need to empower people and I remember saying if you want something to be around for 100 years you want to control it as long as possible and keep it in founder mode as long as possible like Disney. That's my theory. That's I think that's counterintuitive.
And I think people say, "Oh, but the company's going to get very dependent on you." Well, yeah, but the alternative is you're going to have so institutionalized this magic that it can endure after you.
There's a big difference in those two. One is that Disney was very founder-led and that Disney was all about a personal expression of one man. And the irony is the longer a company is run by founders in a founder mode, the more I think it can let go and anyone can run it.
I think Disney, not to take away from the CEO of Disney, the new guy Josh is really great. I've met him. He's great. And I think they've had a lot of good CEOs. But I generally think the CEO of Disney has the bases loaded, right? You've got this incredible theme park that people are going to visit no matter how well it's run. They've got this incredible IP. It's not that it's an easy job, but Walt left so much.
And I remember I was speaking to the former CFO at Disney once, this was like 10 years ago, and he said Disney hasn't really done anything new since Walt died. Walt died in 1966. Since 1966, we still make feature animated films, TV, and Magic Kingdoms. And of course, yeah, they do new things, but fundamentally that's the same playbook.
And so I do think that that's an example where the founder reinventing the company and their expression created such a reservoir of IP, of momentum that he died 50 years ago. 50 years later, Walt Disney's spirit seems very very omnipresent. Whereas Louis B. Mayer, I don't know if most people can tell you which studio he was, you know. I think it was MGM and I'm not even, I think it was MGM and I couldn't even tell you the other two people. You see what I'm saying? There's a huge difference.
So I generally think this is a paradox. The ham sandwich, you know, have a business so good anyone can run it because sooner or later they will. The best businesses are ones that founders run and they reinvent and they create so much equity and such a great moat that then when they hand it off they will endure and grow after them.
I think Apple's very similar. They've had not had to invent new products for the most part. They're still running the iPhone. I mean what a gift Steve left them that they were a few hundred billion dollar company when he died. They're like a multi-trillion dollar company now.
I think the one caveat is I think tech companies are different. Warren Buffett generally didn't invest in tech companies. He didn't invest with the exception of Apple. So I think you know like Coca-Cola was a big investment of his or Sees Candy. These are things that don't get disrupted. I think technology is a synonym for change. If we're in the change industry you kind of need to be more in founder mode more of the time.
But I think that's how I square it that the company is the upper bound of the founder's potential and then the longer you're in founder mode the more it will endure. I remember one founder told me I want this company to last 100 years so therefore I can't be in all the details and so therefore I need to empower people and I remember saying if you want something to be around for 100 years you want to control it as long as possible and keep it in founder mode as long as possible like Disney. That's my theory. That's I think that's counterintuitive.
And I think people say, "Oh, but the company's going to get very dependent on you." Well, yeah, but the alternative is you're going to have so institutionalized this magic that it can endure after you.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** Edwin Land，Polaroid 的创始人，最出名的一件事就是让 Ansel Adams 做他产品的终极测试者。他在意的是有史以来最伟大的摄影师之一对他设备的看法。你谈到 Disney 的时候让我想到了这一点，因为我脑海中有一个画面：Walt 不断向下钻探，一直挖到某种基岩。而作为创始人，你的使命就是找到那个基岩。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Edwin Land, the founder of Polaroid, was very famous for using Ansel Adams as his ultimate tester of his equipment. And so he cared about the most important maybe best photographer of all time and what he thought of his device. It comes to mind when you talk about Disney because there's something about, I have this visual of Walt just continuing to drill down to some sort of bedrock and that's the mission that you're on as a founder is like bedrock.
**Brian Chesky：** 是的，我很喜欢这个比喻。
**Brian Chesky:** Yeah, I love that.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 从现在往前看，你的基岩是什么？你继续往下挖的时候，你的天花板还有哪些提升空间，让公司也能跟着——
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** What is that for you from this point forward? Like as you keep drilling, what is the nature, what do you think you're still after? Where is there still room for your ceiling to raise so that the business can—
**Brian Chesky：** 我想到几件事。当人们想到 Airbnb 的时候，如果你闭上眼睛说"我要你想一个 Airbnb 的画面"，你脑海里浮现的大概是一栋房子。我们既是一个名词也是一个动词，就像 Kleenex 一样。这既好也不好。好的一面是我们基本上是品类领导者。不好的一面是，当你是 Kleenex 的时候，你想卖洗发水，别人会说："等等，我不会把 Kleenex 抹在头上。"对吧？所以这是一把双刃剑。
对我来说，基岩就是：如何把 Airbnb 的原子单位（atomic unit）从房子变成人。我不希望 Airbnb 的核心是房子，我希望核心是人，让人成为原子单位。在 Airbnb 上你可以找到房子、体验、服务，未来还有机票，还有这个那个。想象一个人站在中心，周围有一圈大概 50 样东西，这些都是你能获取的。
所以 Airbnb 的基岩将会是身份、个人档案、用户偏好。我想打造互联网上最经过认证的身份系统。在 AI 时代，人格证明（proof of personhood）将变得极其重要。我想打造互联网上最丰富的个人档案——以前是 Facebook 在做这件事，但他们已经基本放弃了那个战略。我想建立最丰富的用户偏好库。因为这非常有价值。我想建立一个真实世界的社交图谱，最终还要做一个会员计划，让你享受各种不同的权益。
所以基岩是人。然后我想搞清楚怎么像 Amazon 那样扩展——Amazon 从卖书扩展到上百种品类。我不想只有房子，我想有一百种东西。所以我们需要建立一套工业化的体系，去理解所有这些不同业务之间有哪些共同的底层元素（primitives）。
最后一个是 AI。我们面临着一定程度的创新者困境（innovator's dilemma）。大约一千亿美元通过我们的应用流转。我有很多彻底改变它的愿景，但你是一家上市公司，你要给业绩指引，差一点达标和达标之间的差距——不仅仅是上市公司的压力，人们的生计依赖 Airbnb。如果我们改动了什么东西，某人可能从有收入变成没收入。所以必须非常谨慎。
但过于谨慎的环境又不适合大规模创新。所以我也在探索一些小沙盒，也许几乎是一个独立的应用。一个完全不同的 Airbnb 会是什么样子？Airbnb 之后是什么？我开始思考这些问题了。
所以这就是我在思考的三件事。第一，怎么把原子单位从房子变成人？第二，怎么把 Airbnb 的业务工业化到能做五十件事而不是三件事？第三，怎么在不坑投资人和依赖我们的房东的前提下，用 AI 颠覆自己，赶在别人颠覆我们之前？
也许最后一件我作为 CEO 在思考的事是——我觉得自己已经达到了某个层级的精通。我已经掌握了产品市场契合（product-market fit）、超级增长、盈利能力。现在我进入了第四阶段。第四阶段是自我重塑、产品延伸。我觉得在 AI 时代可能还有超越这个的第五阶段——我的所有经验是我的优势，但现在也是我的弱点。
我今年 44 岁了。不算老，但也不年轻了。我不像 22 岁的人那样是 AI 原生的。举个不太恰当的例子——我创立 Airbnb 的时候 25、26 岁，我们在和 Expedia 竞争。他们还在用 Outlook，我们用 Google Docs，我们有 iPhone。现在看起来都过时了，但在当时那是最前沿的，我们用着最酷的新工具，行动就是比他们快。
Pablo Picasso 说过一句话：你年纪越大，风越大，而且永远是迎面吹来的。你必须保持轻盈，保持年轻，不断重塑自己，保持好奇心。我不想变成一个陷在老路子里的老派人物。我必须重塑自己。
对我来说，基岩就是：如何把 Airbnb 的原子单位（atomic unit）从房子变成人。我不希望 Airbnb 的核心是房子，我希望核心是人，让人成为原子单位。在 Airbnb 上你可以找到房子、体验、服务，未来还有机票，还有这个那个。想象一个人站在中心，周围有一圈大概 50 样东西，这些都是你能获取的。
所以 Airbnb 的基岩将会是身份、个人档案、用户偏好。我想打造互联网上最经过认证的身份系统。在 AI 时代，人格证明（proof of personhood）将变得极其重要。我想打造互联网上最丰富的个人档案——以前是 Facebook 在做这件事，但他们已经基本放弃了那个战略。我想建立最丰富的用户偏好库。因为这非常有价值。我想建立一个真实世界的社交图谱，最终还要做一个会员计划，让你享受各种不同的权益。
所以基岩是人。然后我想搞清楚怎么像 Amazon 那样扩展——Amazon 从卖书扩展到上百种品类。我不想只有房子，我想有一百种东西。所以我们需要建立一套工业化的体系，去理解所有这些不同业务之间有哪些共同的底层元素（primitives）。
最后一个是 AI。我们面临着一定程度的创新者困境（innovator's dilemma）。大约一千亿美元通过我们的应用流转。我有很多彻底改变它的愿景，但你是一家上市公司，你要给业绩指引，差一点达标和达标之间的差距——不仅仅是上市公司的压力，人们的生计依赖 Airbnb。如果我们改动了什么东西，某人可能从有收入变成没收入。所以必须非常谨慎。
但过于谨慎的环境又不适合大规模创新。所以我也在探索一些小沙盒，也许几乎是一个独立的应用。一个完全不同的 Airbnb 会是什么样子？Airbnb 之后是什么？我开始思考这些问题了。
所以这就是我在思考的三件事。第一，怎么把原子单位从房子变成人？第二，怎么把 Airbnb 的业务工业化到能做五十件事而不是三件事？第三，怎么在不坑投资人和依赖我们的房东的前提下，用 AI 颠覆自己，赶在别人颠覆我们之前？
也许最后一件我作为 CEO 在思考的事是——我觉得自己已经达到了某个层级的精通。我已经掌握了产品市场契合（product-market fit）、超级增长、盈利能力。现在我进入了第四阶段。第四阶段是自我重塑、产品延伸。我觉得在 AI 时代可能还有超越这个的第五阶段——我的所有经验是我的优势，但现在也是我的弱点。
我今年 44 岁了。不算老，但也不年轻了。我不像 22 岁的人那样是 AI 原生的。举个不太恰当的例子——我创立 Airbnb 的时候 25、26 岁，我们在和 Expedia 竞争。他们还在用 Outlook，我们用 Google Docs，我们有 iPhone。现在看起来都过时了，但在当时那是最前沿的，我们用着最酷的新工具，行动就是比他们快。
Pablo Picasso 说过一句话：你年纪越大，风越大，而且永远是迎面吹来的。你必须保持轻盈，保持年轻，不断重塑自己，保持好奇心。我不想变成一个陷在老路子里的老派人物。我必须重塑自己。
**Brian Chesky:** A few things come to mind. You know, when people think of Airbnb, if you close your eyes and say, "I want you to think of a picture of Airbnb," you probably think of a house. We're a noun and a verb like Kleenex, which is amazing and not amazing. It's amazing in that we're kind of the category leader. It's also tough because when you're Kleenex, you want to sell shampoo. They're like, "Wait a second. I'm not putting Kleenex on my head." Right? So, it's a double-edged sword brand.
So the bedrock for me is how do I change the atomic unit of Airbnb from a home to a person. I do not want Airbnb to be about homes. I want it to be about people and I want the people to be the atomic unit. And on Airbnb you can get a home, you can get an experience, you can get a service, eventually a flight, eventually this, that. Imagine a person in the center with a ring with like 50 things around. These are the things you can get.
And so the thing, the bedrock of Airbnb is going to be identity, profile, the person's preferences. I want to develop the most authenticated identity on the internet. Proof of personhood is going to be really really important in an age of AI. I want to develop the most robust profile on the internet. I mean it used to be Facebook. They've kind of abandoned that strategy. I want to build one of the richest preference libraries of you as a person. Because that would be useful to have. I want to build a social graph but in the real world and I want to eventually have a membership program where you get all these different benefits.
So the bedrock is the person and then I want to basically figure out how we can launch like Amazon, Amazon from books to like 100 things. I don't want us to just have homes. I want us to have a hundred things. So we need to develop this industrialized machine of understanding what are the primitives that are consistent across all these different businesses.
And then the last one is AI. We have a bit of the innovator's dilemma. Plus or minus hundred billion dollars goes through our app. I have all these visions to totally change it but you're a public company and you're giving guidance and the difference between missing and hitting earnings is, but not just being a public company, people's livelihood depends on Airbnb. If we mess with something somebody could go from making a living to not making a living. So you got to be very careful.
And yet that is not an environment for mass innovation when you're being really careful. So I'm also exploring little sandboxes, maybe almost like a separate app. Like what is a radically different Airbnb? What's after Airbnb? And so I'm starting to think about that.
So, those are the three things I'm thinking about. Number one, how do we take the atomic unit from a home to a person? Number two, how do we basically industrialize what Airbnb offers to do like 50 things, not three things? And then, how do we disrupt ourselves before someone else does with AI without screwing over our investors and our hosts who depend on us?
Maybe the last thing I'm thinking just as a CEO is I think I've reached a certain level of mastery. I've reached a mastery of product market fit, hypergrowth, profitability. I'm beginning level four. Level four is reinvent yourself, product extension. I think there's something potentially even beyond that in the age of AI, which is like one of my strengths is all my experience and that's also my weakness now.
Like I'm 44. I'm not old, but I'm not young. I'm not AI native in the same way a 22-year-old is. Here's a bad example. When I started Airbnb I was 25, 26 and we were competing against Expedia and we were on like they were on Outlook and we used Google Docs and we had an iPhone. It all seems anachronistic now but back then that was innovative and we were on the coolest new tools and we just moved faster.
Pablo Picasso, another quote. He said the older you get the stronger the wind gets and it's always in your face. You got to stay light on your feet. You got to stay young. You got to keep reinventing yourself. You got to have curiosity. And so I don't want to become like this old school person in a groove. I got to reinvent myself.
So the bedrock for me is how do I change the atomic unit of Airbnb from a home to a person. I do not want Airbnb to be about homes. I want it to be about people and I want the people to be the atomic unit. And on Airbnb you can get a home, you can get an experience, you can get a service, eventually a flight, eventually this, that. Imagine a person in the center with a ring with like 50 things around. These are the things you can get.
And so the thing, the bedrock of Airbnb is going to be identity, profile, the person's preferences. I want to develop the most authenticated identity on the internet. Proof of personhood is going to be really really important in an age of AI. I want to develop the most robust profile on the internet. I mean it used to be Facebook. They've kind of abandoned that strategy. I want to build one of the richest preference libraries of you as a person. Because that would be useful to have. I want to build a social graph but in the real world and I want to eventually have a membership program where you get all these different benefits.
So the bedrock is the person and then I want to basically figure out how we can launch like Amazon, Amazon from books to like 100 things. I don't want us to just have homes. I want us to have a hundred things. So we need to develop this industrialized machine of understanding what are the primitives that are consistent across all these different businesses.
And then the last one is AI. We have a bit of the innovator's dilemma. Plus or minus hundred billion dollars goes through our app. I have all these visions to totally change it but you're a public company and you're giving guidance and the difference between missing and hitting earnings is, but not just being a public company, people's livelihood depends on Airbnb. If we mess with something somebody could go from making a living to not making a living. So you got to be very careful.
And yet that is not an environment for mass innovation when you're being really careful. So I'm also exploring little sandboxes, maybe almost like a separate app. Like what is a radically different Airbnb? What's after Airbnb? And so I'm starting to think about that.
So, those are the three things I'm thinking about. Number one, how do we take the atomic unit from a home to a person? Number two, how do we basically industrialize what Airbnb offers to do like 50 things, not three things? And then, how do we disrupt ourselves before someone else does with AI without screwing over our investors and our hosts who depend on us?
Maybe the last thing I'm thinking just as a CEO is I think I've reached a certain level of mastery. I've reached a mastery of product market fit, hypergrowth, profitability. I'm beginning level four. Level four is reinvent yourself, product extension. I think there's something potentially even beyond that in the age of AI, which is like one of my strengths is all my experience and that's also my weakness now.
Like I'm 44. I'm not old, but I'm not young. I'm not AI native in the same way a 22-year-old is. Here's a bad example. When I started Airbnb I was 25, 26 and we were competing against Expedia and we were on like they were on Outlook and we used Google Docs and we had an iPhone. It all seems anachronistic now but back then that was innovative and we were on the coolest new tools and we just moved faster.
Pablo Picasso, another quote. He said the older you get the stronger the wind gets and it's always in your face. You got to stay light on your feet. You got to stay young. You got to keep reinventing yourself. You got to have curiosity. And so I don't want to become like this old school person in a groove. I got to reinvent myself.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 我自己最近在真正动手做东西——我不是工程师，以前也做东西，但我只能告诉别人我的想法，反馈循环非常慢而且损失很大。现在是 5 到 15 分钟就能得到相当高保真的结果，很快就会变成 5 秒钟加上完美保真。Brett Victor 提出过一个理念——让输入和输出之间的距离尽可能近。我们正在接近那个阶段。
我在这个过程中感到的焦虑是——好像什么都不会持久了。我很喜欢商业，我把商业当作一种艺术形式。历史上有很多建立持久护城河的方法。你有两亿用户的深度数据，你有数亿条评价，这些是我从你那里拿不走的东西。但是当我自己动手做东西的时候，就会觉得——天哪，要做出持久的东西真的太难了。
我在这个过程中感到的焦虑是——好像什么都不会持久了。我很喜欢商业，我把商业当作一种艺术形式。历史上有很多建立持久护城河的方法。你有两亿用户的深度数据，你有数亿条评价，这些是我从你那里拿不走的东西。但是当我自己动手做东西的时候，就会觉得——天哪，要做出持久的东西真的太难了。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** One of the things that as I've been building stuff myself really for the first time, I'm not an engineer. I used to build stuff, but I'd tell people and the feedback loop was like painfully slow and lossy. Now it's like 5 to 15 minutes and pretty high fidelity and soon it'll be 5 seconds and perfect fidelity. And so there's this Brett Victor idea of wanting to be as close to the output, the input and the output being as linked as possible. And we're getting to that stage.
The anxiety I have having this experience is that it feels like just nothing will last. And as I think about, I love business. I love business as an art form. Historically there's been these ways to have enduring moats. You have 200 million people that you know a lot about already. You've got hundreds of millions of reviews. You have these embedded things that I can't just get that from you. But it just seems as I build this stuff like oh the it's going to be really hard to have something enduring and lasting.
The anxiety I have having this experience is that it feels like just nothing will last. And as I think about, I love business. I love business as an art form. Historically there's been these ways to have enduring moats. You have 200 million people that you know a lot about already. You've got hundreds of millions of reviews. You have these embedded things that I can't just get that from you. But it just seems as I build this stuff like oh the it's going to be really hard to have something enduring and lasting.
**Brian Chesky：** 是啊。
**Brian Chesky:** Yeah.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你也有这种焦虑吗？随着摩擦力不断降低，你会不会觉得彩虹尽头的那罐金子也在越来越远？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Do you share that anxiety? How does that make you feel that as the frictions fall it also feels like the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow is disappearing into the distance or something?
**Brian Chesky：** 拿一个时尚品牌来说——Hermès，我认为是全球最有价值的单一时尚品牌。Birkin 包和 Kelly 包，他们大概每十年才出一个新产品。这些都是存在了几十年的东西，而且还在升值，还有二手市场。然后你看看 Zara 这种快时尚。我们都想做出能流传下去的东西，但我们生活在软件的超级快时尚时代。
如果你看十年前的软件，不管当时有多好，现在看起来都很老旧。看十年前的硬件，还挺不错的。看十年前的室内设计，依然好看。看建筑物，经过一段时间之后，它们有了包浆（patina），变得更有味道了。你去巴黎，古老的东西依然迷人。所以实体环境有巨大的持久力，硬件和实物有中等的持久力，而软件是极其短暂的。观点也是如此，但有些理念会穿透时间。
这也是我自己在纠结的事情，因为我想做出能持久的东西。我还没完全想明白怎么和解，但我至少有一个想法。我意识到我非常执着于我们的应用，Airbnb 的应用。它的设计、它的界面。但不管现在多好，十年后我回头看会觉得它很丑。因为我现在看十年前的界面就觉得很丑。不管当时有多好。
软件永远不会看起来好看。那什么能持久呢？我确实认为有些东西是持久的。Airbnb 的社区能持久。我开始意识到软件不会持久，但网络效应能相当持久。而 Airbnb 的理念、原则、使命、组织、公司、品牌、标识、Logo、声音、社区、它所代表的东西——这些会持久。最重要的是社区。
我在某个时刻告诉整个公司：我们不是在做一个应用，不是在做一个服务，我们是在建一个社区。因为只有社区才能持久。我觉得未来不会有应用了，会有 agent。所以如果我们执着于应用这个形态，我不觉得以后还会有应用。所以我们最好放下这个执念。
如果你看十年前的软件，不管当时有多好，现在看起来都很老旧。看十年前的硬件，还挺不错的。看十年前的室内设计，依然好看。看建筑物，经过一段时间之后，它们有了包浆（patina），变得更有味道了。你去巴黎，古老的东西依然迷人。所以实体环境有巨大的持久力，硬件和实物有中等的持久力，而软件是极其短暂的。观点也是如此，但有些理念会穿透时间。
这也是我自己在纠结的事情，因为我想做出能持久的东西。我还没完全想明白怎么和解，但我至少有一个想法。我意识到我非常执着于我们的应用，Airbnb 的应用。它的设计、它的界面。但不管现在多好，十年后我回头看会觉得它很丑。因为我现在看十年前的界面就觉得很丑。不管当时有多好。
软件永远不会看起来好看。那什么能持久呢？我确实认为有些东西是持久的。Airbnb 的社区能持久。我开始意识到软件不会持久，但网络效应能相当持久。而 Airbnb 的理念、原则、使命、组织、公司、品牌、标识、Logo、声音、社区、它所代表的东西——这些会持久。最重要的是社区。
我在某个时刻告诉整个公司：我们不是在做一个应用，不是在做一个服务，我们是在建一个社区。因为只有社区才能持久。我觉得未来不会有应用了，会有 agent。所以如果我们执着于应用这个形态，我不觉得以后还会有应用。所以我们最好放下这个执念。
**Brian Chesky:** Take a fashion brand like Hermès, I think the most valuable single fashion brand in the world. And the Birkin bag and the Kelly bag, it's like they have a new product every decade or something. Like these are multi-decade old things and they appreciate and they resale. And then you've got like Zara fast fashion. And I feel like we all want to make these things that endure, but we're living in the hyper fast fashion of software.
If you look at software from 10 years ago, no matter how great it was at the time, it looks really old and dated. You look at hardware from 10 years ago, it looks pretty decent. You look at interior design, it looks pretty good. You look at buildings and after a certain period of time, they've got this patina and they're wonderful. You go to Paris and old endures. So environments and physical worlds have got huge endurance. Hardware and physical things have medium endurance. Software is extremely ephemeral. Opinions are like that, but some ideas permeate.
And so this is something that I'm wrestling with myself because I want to make things that endure. And I don't know how I've reconciled it except to say this. I kind of realized I obsess over our app, Airbnb's app. Its design, its interface. And yet, no matter how great it is, 10 years from now, I'm going to look at it and think it looks like crap. Cuz I look at the interface from 10 years ago and think it looks like crap. No matter how good it was.
Software never looks good. So then you got to ask what endures? I do think there are things that endure. Airbnb, the community endures. I started realizing the software won't endure but the network effect will decently endure. But the ideas of Airbnb, its principles, its mission, the organization, the company, the brand, the identity, the logo, the voice, the community, what it stands for, those things will endure. Most importantly the community.
I realized at some point I told the company we're not building an app. We're not building a service. We're building a community. And that's because that's the only thing that will last. I don't think there will be apps in the future. I think there'll be agents. So, if we're attached to apps, I don't think there will be apps. So, we better let go of that.
If you look at software from 10 years ago, no matter how great it was at the time, it looks really old and dated. You look at hardware from 10 years ago, it looks pretty decent. You look at interior design, it looks pretty good. You look at buildings and after a certain period of time, they've got this patina and they're wonderful. You go to Paris and old endures. So environments and physical worlds have got huge endurance. Hardware and physical things have medium endurance. Software is extremely ephemeral. Opinions are like that, but some ideas permeate.
And so this is something that I'm wrestling with myself because I want to make things that endure. And I don't know how I've reconciled it except to say this. I kind of realized I obsess over our app, Airbnb's app. Its design, its interface. And yet, no matter how great it is, 10 years from now, I'm going to look at it and think it looks like crap. Cuz I look at the interface from 10 years ago and think it looks like crap. No matter how good it was.
Software never looks good. So then you got to ask what endures? I do think there are things that endure. Airbnb, the community endures. I started realizing the software won't endure but the network effect will decently endure. But the ideas of Airbnb, its principles, its mission, the organization, the company, the brand, the identity, the logo, the voice, the community, what it stands for, those things will endure. Most importantly the community.
I realized at some point I told the company we're not building an app. We're not building a service. We're building a community. And that's because that's the only thing that will last. I don't think there will be apps in the future. I think there'll be agents. So, if we're attached to apps, I don't think there will be apps. So, we better let go of that.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 我们今天聊到的很多主题都是关于持续进步、通过时间积累学习、然后服务他人。年轻时候的健美训练教会了你什么关于持续进步的道理？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** So many of the themes that we've talked about is this steady progress and learning through time applied in service of others. What did bodybuilding when you were young teach you about steady progress over time?
**Brian Chesky：** 说来奇怪，健美教了我很多可以直接应用到硅谷的东西。它教了我两个重要的原则。先说点背景，我爸非常喜欢冰球，想让我成为冰球运动员。不幸的是我非常瘦，发育也很晚。我去了一个冰球体育学院。13 岁的时候我觉得自己可以成为一个很好的冰球运动员，但到 14 岁的时候——我大概 15 或 16 岁才发育——这在冰球里是致命的，因为我突然从一线二线掉到了三线四线。我从 Division I 级别的运动员变成了 Division III 的。我想，好吧，这条路走不通了。
所以我开始练举重。当时只有 135 磅。我告诉我的朋友们，到 19 岁的时候我要成为全国顶级的健美运动员之一。他们觉得我疯了。结果到 19 岁的时候，我真的参加了全国级别的比赛。
健美教给我的第一课是：如果你能改变自己的身体，你就能改变自己的人生。这其实是最根本性的改变。每个人都想改变周围的事物，但如果你先改变自己的身体呢？我甚至觉得，很多人说要改变思维，我会建议先改变身体。先改变你的生理状态。如果你不快乐，我会建议先把身体调健康，再去看心理治疗。先从生理开始。我觉得这能解决很多问题，然后你再去做其他的。但真的要从生理状态开始。如果你能改变自己的身体，你就能改变自己的人生。这是一种终极的赋权感。好了，我改变了我的身体，我还能改变什么？这是一个隐喻——最终你可以设计你周围的世界。我能改变身体，我能改变环境，最终我能改变世界。就是由内而外地展开。
但它教给我的另一件事可能更实用——你不可能在一天之内练出好身材。如果你去健身房练 20 个小时，你不会变得更强壮，反而会过度训练。变强的方式是通过渐进式超负荷（progressive overload）来适应。你给身体施加压力，身体在锻炼过程中其实并不会变强——它实际上在分解肌肉——这是一种适应性反应，就像免疫系统一样。它变得更强壮，你就不断重复这个过程。
基本的道理就是：你不可能在一天之内练出好身材，关键是每天进步 1%。如果每天复利 1%，你最终会获得巨大的收益。所以核心是纪律。而且健美也是非常讲究分析的。健美是一件很有意思的事——它是靠视觉评判的主观运动，但你用科学方法来衡量。你称你的食物重量，你必须让自己处于正确的热量赤字中，你要记录训练内容，记录举的重量。这教会了我非常注重分析和数据驱动，核心在于纪律和一致性。
我觉得这很重要，因为很多创始人放弃得太早了。关键是纪律。就像你练了一个月然后停了一个月，你就得从头来过。这就是要点——永远不要放弃，一直往前走。
所以我开始练举重。当时只有 135 磅。我告诉我的朋友们，到 19 岁的时候我要成为全国顶级的健美运动员之一。他们觉得我疯了。结果到 19 岁的时候，我真的参加了全国级别的比赛。
健美教给我的第一课是：如果你能改变自己的身体，你就能改变自己的人生。这其实是最根本性的改变。每个人都想改变周围的事物，但如果你先改变自己的身体呢？我甚至觉得，很多人说要改变思维，我会建议先改变身体。先改变你的生理状态。如果你不快乐，我会建议先把身体调健康，再去看心理治疗。先从生理开始。我觉得这能解决很多问题，然后你再去做其他的。但真的要从生理状态开始。如果你能改变自己的身体，你就能改变自己的人生。这是一种终极的赋权感。好了，我改变了我的身体，我还能改变什么？这是一个隐喻——最终你可以设计你周围的世界。我能改变身体，我能改变环境，最终我能改变世界。就是由内而外地展开。
但它教给我的另一件事可能更实用——你不可能在一天之内练出好身材。如果你去健身房练 20 个小时，你不会变得更强壮，反而会过度训练。变强的方式是通过渐进式超负荷（progressive overload）来适应。你给身体施加压力，身体在锻炼过程中其实并不会变强——它实际上在分解肌肉——这是一种适应性反应，就像免疫系统一样。它变得更强壮，你就不断重复这个过程。
基本的道理就是：你不可能在一天之内练出好身材，关键是每天进步 1%。如果每天复利 1%，你最终会获得巨大的收益。所以核心是纪律。而且健美也是非常讲究分析的。健美是一件很有意思的事——它是靠视觉评判的主观运动，但你用科学方法来衡量。你称你的食物重量，你必须让自己处于正确的热量赤字中，你要记录训练内容，记录举的重量。这教会了我非常注重分析和数据驱动，核心在于纪律和一致性。
我觉得这很重要，因为很多创始人放弃得太早了。关键是纪律。就像你练了一个月然后停了一个月，你就得从头来过。这就是要点——永远不要放弃，一直往前走。
**Brian Chesky:** Weirdly, bodybuilding taught me so much that I could apply to Silicon Valley. It taught me two important principles. So just by way of background, my dad was really into ice hockey, wanting me to be an ice hockey player. Unfortunately, I was very skinny. I hit puberty really late. And I went to a sports academy for hockey. And when I was 13, I thought I could be a really good hockey player, but by the time I was 14, I didn't hit puberty till I was like 15 or 16. And that's a death sentence in hockey because suddenly I went from first or second line to third or fourth line. And I went from a Division I athlete to Division III athlete. I'm like, "Okay, it's not really going to work out for me."
And so I started weightlifting. I was like 135 lbs. And I told my friends I'm going to be like one of the top bodybuilders in the country by the time I'm 19. And they thought I was out of my mind. I ended up by 19 competing at the national level.
And the first lesson I learned from bodybuilding was if you can change your body, you can change your life. That it was actually the most fundamental thing to change. Like everyone wants to change things around them, but what if you change you first physically? And I even think like I would, if you could start somewhere, a lot of people say change your thoughts. I would change your body first. Like change your physical biology. If you're unhappy, I would get healthy before I go to therapy. Like that's first biology. I think that fixes a lot and then you can do other things. But really start with your physical biology. If you can change your body, you can change your life. It was the ultimate expression of empowerment. Okay, now I changed my body. What else can I change? It's a metaphor for eventually you can design the world around you. I can change my body. I can change my environment. Eventually I can change the world. It's like you just go inside out.
But the other thing it taught me which might be even more helpful is that you can't get in shape in one day. And if you go to the gym and work out for like 20 hours, you're not going to get in better shape. In fact, you're going to overtrain. And the way you get stronger is an adaptation from progressive overload. You basically stress the body. The body doesn't get stronger during exercise. It actually breaks the muscles down and it's an adaptive response like an immune system. It gets stronger and you just keep doing it.
The basic idea is that you can't get in shape in one day and it's about 1% better every single day. And if you compound 1% a day, then you can actually have massive gains. And so it's really about discipline. And it's also very analytical. Bodybuilding is this wonderful thing where it's judged. It's a subjective sport that you judge visually, but you measure it scientifically. You weigh your food. You have to put yourself in the right caloric deficit. You have to write down your training. You have to write down your weights. It taught me to be very analytical, metrics driven, and that it's really about discipline, consistency.
And I think that's important because I think a lot of founders just give up too early. It's about discipline. And it's about like, you know, if you train for a month, you take a month off, you're starting over. And that's the key. You never quit. You just keep going.
And so I started weightlifting. I was like 135 lbs. And I told my friends I'm going to be like one of the top bodybuilders in the country by the time I'm 19. And they thought I was out of my mind. I ended up by 19 competing at the national level.
And the first lesson I learned from bodybuilding was if you can change your body, you can change your life. That it was actually the most fundamental thing to change. Like everyone wants to change things around them, but what if you change you first physically? And I even think like I would, if you could start somewhere, a lot of people say change your thoughts. I would change your body first. Like change your physical biology. If you're unhappy, I would get healthy before I go to therapy. Like that's first biology. I think that fixes a lot and then you can do other things. But really start with your physical biology. If you can change your body, you can change your life. It was the ultimate expression of empowerment. Okay, now I changed my body. What else can I change? It's a metaphor for eventually you can design the world around you. I can change my body. I can change my environment. Eventually I can change the world. It's like you just go inside out.
But the other thing it taught me which might be even more helpful is that you can't get in shape in one day. And if you go to the gym and work out for like 20 hours, you're not going to get in better shape. In fact, you're going to overtrain. And the way you get stronger is an adaptation from progressive overload. You basically stress the body. The body doesn't get stronger during exercise. It actually breaks the muscles down and it's an adaptive response like an immune system. It gets stronger and you just keep doing it.
The basic idea is that you can't get in shape in one day and it's about 1% better every single day. And if you compound 1% a day, then you can actually have massive gains. And so it's really about discipline. And it's also very analytical. Bodybuilding is this wonderful thing where it's judged. It's a subjective sport that you judge visually, but you measure it scientifically. You weigh your food. You have to put yourself in the right caloric deficit. You have to write down your training. You have to write down your weights. It taught me to be very analytical, metrics driven, and that it's really about discipline, consistency.
And I think that's important because I think a lot of founders just give up too early. It's about discipline. And it's about like, you know, if you train for a month, you take a month off, you're starting over. And that's the key. You never quit. You just keep going.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 健美的一个好处是视觉反馈。你看得到——你可以照镜子，别人也能看出来"你在练"。但作为一个领导者，你想用同样的渐进式超负荷原则来提升的很多能力是看不见的。你怎么找到目标函数？怎么把同样的方法应用到别人看不到的东西上？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** One of the nice things about it is the visual feedback. Like you just judge visually. You can literally see it. You can look in the mirror. Other people can look at you and say you've been working out. Probably some of the skills that you would want to apply the same progressive overload thing to as a leader are very invisible. How do you figure out the objective function? Like how do you apply that same thing to something else that other people can't see?
**Brian Chesky：** 这是个好问题。我不再试图关注所有人觉得我们公司有多好，而是把注意力聚焦到具体项目上。给你举个例子。其中一个项目就是打造最优秀的团队。所以每年大概两次，我们会做一个大型的路线图评审（roadmap review），公司前 100 号人坐在一个房间里，我能看到这些人的质量。我们前两天刚做了一次。
我在 Airbnb 最重要的工作之一就是招聘，这是一个完全可以单独聊的话题。而视觉反馈就是——每半年我把前 100 号人聚在一个房间里，我能看到对话中这些人的水平。换句话说，有很多我关注和执着的指标。也许是应用本身，我就看设计。也许是公司运营的好坏，我就看决策质量。核心永远是把问题拆解成可以观察和衡量的东西。
顺便说一下，这一点非常重要。作为一个领导者，你可以选择把时间花在招聘上还是管理上。两者是二选一的。人越好，越不需要被管理。你花在招聘上的时间越多，花在管理上的时间就越少。这是一比一的关系。
我记得刚创立 Airbnb 的时候，Sam Altman——就是现在大家都知道的 OpenAI 那位。他当时像个神童，因为我们是最早的几家由 Sequoia 投资的 Y Combinator 公司之一。在我之前只有两个人从 Y Combinator 拿到 Sequoia 的投资：一个是 Dropbox 的 Drew Houston，另一个就是 Sam Altman，他做了一家叫 Loopt 的公司——在 iPhone 出现之前做的一个能在手机上看到朋友位置的应用。我记得他跟我说，当时我大概 27 或 28 岁，Sequoia 刚以三百万美元投后估值投了我们六十万美元，这是 Y Combinator 有史以来最高估值。现在平均估值是三千万了。
他说："你会把 50% 的时间花在招聘上。"说实话我从来没做到过。这成了我的致命伤——没有在招聘上花足够的时间。我在招聘上花的时间越少，就不得不在管理上花越多时间。后来我终于明白，我的第一要务就是招聘。
每天早上醒来我打的第一个电话就是给我的招聘负责人。说真的，我觉得如果可以的话，创业者的第一个员工应该是招聘人员，而不是工程师。因为他们是最重要的人——他们能帮你找到所有其他人。公司好坏取决于人，好公司和伟大公司之间的差距就在于人。我觉得 AI 时代更说明了这一点——一切都取决于人。
我非常执着于招聘。我每天花好几个小时在这上面，而且我不只是招高管，我会深入到两三层以下。
我在 Airbnb 最重要的工作之一就是招聘，这是一个完全可以单独聊的话题。而视觉反馈就是——每半年我把前 100 号人聚在一个房间里，我能看到对话中这些人的水平。换句话说，有很多我关注和执着的指标。也许是应用本身，我就看设计。也许是公司运营的好坏，我就看决策质量。核心永远是把问题拆解成可以观察和衡量的东西。
顺便说一下，这一点非常重要。作为一个领导者，你可以选择把时间花在招聘上还是管理上。两者是二选一的。人越好，越不需要被管理。你花在招聘上的时间越多，花在管理上的时间就越少。这是一比一的关系。
我记得刚创立 Airbnb 的时候，Sam Altman——就是现在大家都知道的 OpenAI 那位。他当时像个神童，因为我们是最早的几家由 Sequoia 投资的 Y Combinator 公司之一。在我之前只有两个人从 Y Combinator 拿到 Sequoia 的投资：一个是 Dropbox 的 Drew Houston，另一个就是 Sam Altman，他做了一家叫 Loopt 的公司——在 iPhone 出现之前做的一个能在手机上看到朋友位置的应用。我记得他跟我说，当时我大概 27 或 28 岁，Sequoia 刚以三百万美元投后估值投了我们六十万美元，这是 Y Combinator 有史以来最高估值。现在平均估值是三千万了。
他说："你会把 50% 的时间花在招聘上。"说实话我从来没做到过。这成了我的致命伤——没有在招聘上花足够的时间。我在招聘上花的时间越少，就不得不在管理上花越多时间。后来我终于明白，我的第一要务就是招聘。
每天早上醒来我打的第一个电话就是给我的招聘负责人。说真的，我觉得如果可以的话，创业者的第一个员工应该是招聘人员，而不是工程师。因为他们是最重要的人——他们能帮你找到所有其他人。公司好坏取决于人，好公司和伟大公司之间的差距就在于人。我觉得 AI 时代更说明了这一点——一切都取决于人。
我非常执着于招聘。我每天花好几个小时在这上面，而且我不只是招高管，我会深入到两三层以下。
**Brian Chesky:** Well, that's interesting. I stop trying to focus on like how good of a company everybody thinks we are and I take it to the project. So I'll give you one example of a project I focus on. One is I want to build the best team possible. So I basically like twice a year we do this giant thing we call roadmap review and there's the top 100 people in the room and I see the quality of the people in the room and we did one the last two days.
And one of my most important jobs, the most important job I do at Airbnb is hiring. That's a whole separate topic. And the visual feedback is every twice a year I get the top 100 people in the room and I can see the quality of the people in the conversation. So in other words, there's many metrics that you use and I obsess over. Maybe it's the app and I just look at the design of the app. Maybe it's how well the company operates and I look at decision-making. So it's always about breaking the problem down to something that's observable and measurable.
By the way, just on this because this is a really important point. Basically, as a leader, you can choose if you want to spend time hiring or managing. One or the other. The better the people, the less they need to be managed. The more time you spend on recruiting, the less time you have to spend on management. It's one to one.
I remember when I was starting Airbnb, Sam Altman, who obviously everyone knows now at OpenAI. He was like a kind of wunderkind because I was like one of the first Sequoia funded companies. Before me were two people that had ever been funded by Sequoia from Y Combinator: Drew Houston from Dropbox. But the first one was Sam Altman, this company called Loopt. It was like a way to see your friends on a phone before the iPhone. And I remember him telling me, I was like 27 or 28, Sequoia just funded us $600,000 at a $3 million post money valuation, highest valuation Y Combinator. Now the average valuation is 30 million.
And he said, "You're going to spend 50% of your time on hiring." I never did, by the way. It was my death blow, not spending more time on hiring. The less time I spent on hiring, the more time I spent managing. And I started learning my number one job was hiring.
Every day I wake up and the first person I call is my recruiter. I actually think if you could have, I think people should think about their first employee being a recruiter, not an engineer because they are the most important person because they are the ones that get you every other person. I mean a company is as good as its people and the difference between the good companies and the great companies are the people and I think AI kind of makes that clear now that it's all about the people.
But I obsess over recruiting. I spend hours a day and I don't recruit executives. I recruit two, three layers deep.
And one of my most important jobs, the most important job I do at Airbnb is hiring. That's a whole separate topic. And the visual feedback is every twice a year I get the top 100 people in the room and I can see the quality of the people in the conversation. So in other words, there's many metrics that you use and I obsess over. Maybe it's the app and I just look at the design of the app. Maybe it's how well the company operates and I look at decision-making. So it's always about breaking the problem down to something that's observable and measurable.
By the way, just on this because this is a really important point. Basically, as a leader, you can choose if you want to spend time hiring or managing. One or the other. The better the people, the less they need to be managed. The more time you spend on recruiting, the less time you have to spend on management. It's one to one.
I remember when I was starting Airbnb, Sam Altman, who obviously everyone knows now at OpenAI. He was like a kind of wunderkind because I was like one of the first Sequoia funded companies. Before me were two people that had ever been funded by Sequoia from Y Combinator: Drew Houston from Dropbox. But the first one was Sam Altman, this company called Loopt. It was like a way to see your friends on a phone before the iPhone. And I remember him telling me, I was like 27 or 28, Sequoia just funded us $600,000 at a $3 million post money valuation, highest valuation Y Combinator. Now the average valuation is 30 million.
And he said, "You're going to spend 50% of your time on hiring." I never did, by the way. It was my death blow, not spending more time on hiring. The less time I spent on hiring, the more time I spent managing. And I started learning my number one job was hiring.
Every day I wake up and the first person I call is my recruiter. I actually think if you could have, I think people should think about their first employee being a recruiter, not an engineer because they are the most important person because they are the ones that get you every other person. I mean a company is as good as its people and the difference between the good companies and the great companies are the people and I think AI kind of makes that clear now that it's all about the people.
But I obsess over recruiting. I spend hours a day and I don't recruit executives. I recruit two, three layers deep.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你具体在做什么？除了跟他们聊天之外还有什么？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** What are you doing? Are you beyond talking to them?
**Brian Chesky：** 我会试图摸清硅谷所有最优秀的人才。好的，我告诉你怎么招到好的人。不要做搜索。不要做搜索。通常你应该做的是建立人才管线（pipeline）。大多数人招聘的方式是这样的：我需要招一个什么职位，然后做一次搜索，找一家猎头公司。猎头公司扫一遍市场，给你 50 份简历，你筛到 10 个人，联系这 10 个，5 个有兴趣。在这 5 个里面面试，有几个中途退出，现在你剩下 3 个候选人，选最好的那个录用。然后你做背景调查，让候选人给你几个推荐人，当然推荐人肯定说好话，然后你录用了，让他们自己干，一年后你才知道他们到底行不行。如果不行，糟糕，他们已经招了自己的团队了。这是错误的做法。
最好的方式是 pipeline recruiting——持续招聘。你要不断地见人。具体做法是这样的：你要持续不断地见人。比如说我需要招非常优秀的工程师，我不做搜索。我只是非正式地去认识世界上最好的工程师。每次见面的目标就是获得下一次见面的机会，认识另一个人。如果我见了你，我会说："你认识的最厉害的人是谁？能帮我介绍两三个人吗？"所以你做的事情就是在正式搜索之前持续认识人，不断建立你的人才管线。你只需要认识大量人才，而且全部基于推荐。
判断一个人是否优秀有两种方式。一种是你本身就擅长评估人才。但最好的两种方式是——从结果出发，倒推到人。很多人会说，我想找一个很好的市场营销人才，那我去 Nike 看看，他们做得好。不，不要这样做。找一支你喜欢的广告，然后去查是谁做的这支广告。从结果出发，倒推到人。不要从简历出发。
另一种方式就是不断让别人帮你扩展你的人脉库。我一直在建立自己的人脉库（Rolodex），一旦我找到一个真的很优秀的人，我就问他们认识的最厉害的人都有谁。然后我就建立起这些小圈子。每家公司都有自己的人才小圈子——Uber 有运营圈子，Apple 有设计圈子——然后你建立这些小生态系统，他们会告诉你其他优秀的人是谁，你就不断地发现更多人才。
我做的事情是——我是公司前 200 号人的联合招聘经理（co-hiring manager）。这非常激进。很多 CEO 觉得他们的工作就是招自己的高管，然后高管去招自己的团队。我觉得这是致命的。理论上没错，理论上你应该有这么好的人，他们都能自己招自己的团队。但大多数创业者如果有 10 个高管，能有两三个不需要任何帮助就能做到这一点就很幸运了。
换句话说，你永远想要"向上匹配"——招来自未来的人。所以我一直在做的——我以前常说，我的高管应该招到那种如果没有我帮忙就不会来的人。意思是我们应该在够那些够不到的人。如果不需要我帮忙你就能招到他们，那说明我们够得还不够远。你要招到你能招到的最好的人。
所以我不断见人，不断面试。每天打的第一个和最后一个电话都是给招聘团队的。到现在还是这样。我大概每天花两三个小时在这上面。而且每年我花在招聘上的时间比例都在增加，管理的比例在减少。说实话在 2010 年代我没这么做。那时候我觉得关键是有好的想法、有招聘机器、管理好人就行。好的一面是我现在不怎么需要管理了。你花在招聘上的时间越多，管理上花的时间就越少，因为真正优秀的人是自我管理的。这太棒了。
如果你需要管理一个人，那也许你应该考虑升级你的人才了。
最好的方式是 pipeline recruiting——持续招聘。你要不断地见人。具体做法是这样的：你要持续不断地见人。比如说我需要招非常优秀的工程师，我不做搜索。我只是非正式地去认识世界上最好的工程师。每次见面的目标就是获得下一次见面的机会，认识另一个人。如果我见了你，我会说："你认识的最厉害的人是谁？能帮我介绍两三个人吗？"所以你做的事情就是在正式搜索之前持续认识人，不断建立你的人才管线。你只需要认识大量人才，而且全部基于推荐。
判断一个人是否优秀有两种方式。一种是你本身就擅长评估人才。但最好的两种方式是——从结果出发，倒推到人。很多人会说，我想找一个很好的市场营销人才，那我去 Nike 看看，他们做得好。不，不要这样做。找一支你喜欢的广告，然后去查是谁做的这支广告。从结果出发，倒推到人。不要从简历出发。
另一种方式就是不断让别人帮你扩展你的人脉库。我一直在建立自己的人脉库（Rolodex），一旦我找到一个真的很优秀的人，我就问他们认识的最厉害的人都有谁。然后我就建立起这些小圈子。每家公司都有自己的人才小圈子——Uber 有运营圈子，Apple 有设计圈子——然后你建立这些小生态系统，他们会告诉你其他优秀的人是谁，你就不断地发现更多人才。
我做的事情是——我是公司前 200 号人的联合招聘经理（co-hiring manager）。这非常激进。很多 CEO 觉得他们的工作就是招自己的高管，然后高管去招自己的团队。我觉得这是致命的。理论上没错，理论上你应该有这么好的人，他们都能自己招自己的团队。但大多数创业者如果有 10 个高管，能有两三个不需要任何帮助就能做到这一点就很幸运了。
换句话说，你永远想要"向上匹配"——招来自未来的人。所以我一直在做的——我以前常说，我的高管应该招到那种如果没有我帮忙就不会来的人。意思是我们应该在够那些够不到的人。如果不需要我帮忙你就能招到他们，那说明我们够得还不够远。你要招到你能招到的最好的人。
所以我不断见人，不断面试。每天打的第一个和最后一个电话都是给招聘团队的。到现在还是这样。我大概每天花两三个小时在这上面。而且每年我花在招聘上的时间比例都在增加，管理的比例在减少。说实话在 2010 年代我没这么做。那时候我觉得关键是有好的想法、有招聘机器、管理好人就行。好的一面是我现在不怎么需要管理了。你花在招聘上的时间越多，管理上花的时间就越少，因为真正优秀的人是自我管理的。这太棒了。
如果你需要管理一个人，那也许你应该考虑升级你的人才了。
**Brian Chesky:** I try to map out all the best people in the valley. And the basic way, okay, here's how you hire good people. Do not do searches. Do not do searches. Generally, what you want to do is build pipelines. So, here's the mistake people make when they hire. They do, I need to hire a blank. So, they do a search. They hire a search firm. And the search firm scans, they give you like 50 profiles and then you call it down to 10 people. You contact 10. Five are interested. Of the five they're interested, you interview them. A couple drop out. Now you have three candidates and you pick the best one you hire. And that's how almost everyone does it and then you do references. You ask them for references. They give you a few references and of course they're positive and then you kind of hire them and then you let them do their thing and a year later you realize they're good or bad and if they're bad, uh oh they've already hired their own team. That is the wrong way to do it.
So the best way to do is pipeline recruiting. You're constantly recruiting. You're constantly meeting people. So this is what you do. You basically are constantly meeting people. So let's say I need to hire really good engineers. I don't do searches. I just informationally meet the best engineers in the world. Every meeting the job is to get the next meeting, meet someone else. So if I were to meet you and I say, "Hey, who's the best people you know? Can you introduce me to two or three people?" So what you're doing is you're constantly meeting people in advance of searches and you're just building your pipeline. You just need to know lots of talent and all of it's referral-based.
The two ways to find out if people are good. One way is you're just good at assessing talent. But the two best ways is start with the results, work backwards to people. So, a lot of people say like, oh, I want a really good marketer. I'm going to go to Nike. They do really good marketing. No, no, don't do that. Find an ad you like and then figure out who made that ad. Start with results. Work back to people. Don't start with the resume.
The other thing to do is just keep asking people to build your Rolodex. And so I'm constantly building a Rolodex and the moment I find somebody that's really good, I ask them who all the best people they know are. And I basically build these little mafias. Like every company's got a little mafia of talent. So like Uber's got an ops mafia, Apple's got a design mafia and then you build these little ecosystems and they tell you who the other good people are and you're constantly finding more people.
And what I do is I am the co-hiring manager for the top 200 people in the company. This is very radical. A lot of CEOs think it's their job to hire their executive and their executive team hires their team. I think that is fatal. I mean theoretically yes. Theoretically you should live in a world where you have such good people they can all hire their own people. Most entrepreneurs if they have 10 executives would be lucky if two or three are able to do that without any support or help.
In other words, you always want to be marrying up, hiring people from the future. And so I'm constantly, I sometimes used to say my executives should hire people so good they would never work for them without my help. In other words, it should be like we're reaching. If you can hire them without my help, we're not reaching far enough. You want to hire the very best person you can.
So I'm constantly meeting people, constantly interviewing. The first and last call I make every day is the recruiting team. Still. I probably spend two, three hours a day on it. And every year I spend more of my time on recruiting and less on management. By the way, in the 2010s, I didn't. I thought it was all about having a good idea, having a recruiting machine, managing people. The great thing is I don't manage as much anymore. The more time you spend recruiting, less time you spend on management because the really good people are just self-managing. This is amazing.
And if you have to manage people, then maybe you should think about upgrading the talent.
So the best way to do is pipeline recruiting. You're constantly recruiting. You're constantly meeting people. So this is what you do. You basically are constantly meeting people. So let's say I need to hire really good engineers. I don't do searches. I just informationally meet the best engineers in the world. Every meeting the job is to get the next meeting, meet someone else. So if I were to meet you and I say, "Hey, who's the best people you know? Can you introduce me to two or three people?" So what you're doing is you're constantly meeting people in advance of searches and you're just building your pipeline. You just need to know lots of talent and all of it's referral-based.
The two ways to find out if people are good. One way is you're just good at assessing talent. But the two best ways is start with the results, work backwards to people. So, a lot of people say like, oh, I want a really good marketer. I'm going to go to Nike. They do really good marketing. No, no, don't do that. Find an ad you like and then figure out who made that ad. Start with results. Work back to people. Don't start with the resume.
The other thing to do is just keep asking people to build your Rolodex. And so I'm constantly building a Rolodex and the moment I find somebody that's really good, I ask them who all the best people they know are. And I basically build these little mafias. Like every company's got a little mafia of talent. So like Uber's got an ops mafia, Apple's got a design mafia and then you build these little ecosystems and they tell you who the other good people are and you're constantly finding more people.
And what I do is I am the co-hiring manager for the top 200 people in the company. This is very radical. A lot of CEOs think it's their job to hire their executive and their executive team hires their team. I think that is fatal. I mean theoretically yes. Theoretically you should live in a world where you have such good people they can all hire their own people. Most entrepreneurs if they have 10 executives would be lucky if two or three are able to do that without any support or help.
In other words, you always want to be marrying up, hiring people from the future. And so I'm constantly, I sometimes used to say my executives should hire people so good they would never work for them without my help. In other words, it should be like we're reaching. If you can hire them without my help, we're not reaching far enough. You want to hire the very best person you can.
So I'm constantly meeting people, constantly interviewing. The first and last call I make every day is the recruiting team. Still. I probably spend two, three hours a day on it. And every year I spend more of my time on recruiting and less on management. By the way, in the 2010s, I didn't. I thought it was all about having a good idea, having a recruiting machine, managing people. The great thing is I don't manage as much anymore. The more time you spend recruiting, less time you spend on management because the really good people are just self-managing. This is amazing.
And if you have to manage people, then maybe you should think about upgrading the talent.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 你之前说过你认为创始人是天生的，而 CEO 更多是后天塑造的。也许有一个补充——创始人也许不是天生的，但我们一辈子都在折腾和创造，你懂我意思。但你没法模拟做 CEO 的经历。
我本来想问你觉得人才是不是需要被"激活"的——也许原材料在那里，但需要某个事件来触发。Palantir 的 Sean 会把这个叫做 Bruce Banner 伽马射线之类的。你对激活人才有什么心得？
我本来想问你觉得人才是不是需要被"激活"的——也许原材料在那里，但需要某个事件来触发。Palantir 的 Sean 会把这个叫做 Bruce Banner 伽马射线之类的。你对激活人才有什么心得？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** You said before that founders are born, you think, and CEOs can be more shaped for the most part. And maybe the caveat to that is just like maybe founders aren't born but we spent our whole life tinkering and building and you know what I mean but you can't simulate being a CEO.
I was going to ask whether or not you think they're activated in some way like maybe there's the raw material but then some event happens. Sean from Palantir would call this the Bruce Banner gamma rays thing or something. What have you learned about activating talent?
I was going to ask whether or not you think they're activated in some way like maybe there's the raw material but then some event happens. Sean from Palantir would call this the Bruce Banner gamma rays thing or something. What have you learned about activating talent?
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得激活一个人的方式就是给他一个问题或者一个机会，看他能不能搞定。有高度主动性（agency）的人会搞定的。我不知道怎么教人变得有动力，说实话我觉得这可能教不了。我不认为你能让一个没有动力的人变得有动力。但我认为所有创业者都有自我驱动这个特质。所以核心就是给他们一个挑战，然后由他们自己来决定是否站出来激活自己。
**Brian Chesky:** I think the way to activate somebody is to give them a problem or opportunity and see if they can do it. And I think the people that have a high level of agency are going to do it. I don't know how to teach motivation. I don't know if it can be taught by the way. I don't think you can make a person who's not motivated motivated. But I think all entrepreneurs have the trait of being self-motivated. And so it's really about giving them a challenge and then it's up to them to step in and activate.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 既然你已经补上了崇拜这个漏水杯子的洞，那你现在进入下一个阶段的动力是什么？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Having plugged the leaky bucket of motivation of adulation, what's your motivation now as you attack this next chapter?
**Brian Chesky：** 我大多数的偶像都是艺术家。我说四个人吧，其中两个我已经反复提到了。Leonardo da Vinci、Vincent Van Gogh、Walt Disney、Steve Jobs。他们有很多共同点，但有一个什么共同点呢？他们生命的最后一天或最后一周，都在工作。
Leonardo da Vinci 一直把 Mona Lisa 带在身边直到去世。他画 Mona Lisa 绝对不是为了崇拜，因为他从来没有把它展示给任何人看。Vincent Van Gogh 一生只卖出一幅画，他死的时候是一个默默无闻的艺术家，倒在玉米田里。具体发生了什么不清楚，也许是被杀的，不确定，但他做这一切是因为他热爱。Walt Disney，生命的最后一天躺在病床上。他的哥哥 Roy 给他搓着冰冷的脚，他肺癌快死了，但他望着天花板上的方格瓷砖，想象着那就是 Disney World 的布局。Steve Jobs，Hiroki 说他生命最后几周还在看市场营销材料，还在看产品。
有些人可能会觉得这很悲哀——他们没有在陪家人。顺便说一下，Van Gogh 和 da Vinci 没有家庭。据我了解，Steve 和 Walt 在生命最后也有陪伴家人。但我不觉得他们在最后还在工作是一个悲伤的故事，因为我觉得他们在做自己热爱的事。Mozart 也是，历史上伟大的艺术家都在做自己热爱的事。
我的动力就是一个艺术家的动力。我只是想创造出伟大的东西。这就是我的动力。我当然也希望成功，希望股东得到回报，希望员工觉得自己在一家伟大的公司，希望能对世界产生巨大的影响。但归根结底，我就是想做东西。我觉得自己更像一个设计师而不是 CEO。而我可能被赋予了人类历史上任何设计师都拥有的最大的画布之一。因为通常设计师不会被给到这么多资源。这几乎像是系统里的一个漏洞——一些错误的气垫床让我钻了这个空子，拿到了我本不该拿到的这些资源。但我不会放手的。
所以我的动力就是一个艺术家的动力。我就是想做出不可思议的东西。
Leonardo da Vinci 一直把 Mona Lisa 带在身边直到去世。他画 Mona Lisa 绝对不是为了崇拜，因为他从来没有把它展示给任何人看。Vincent Van Gogh 一生只卖出一幅画，他死的时候是一个默默无闻的艺术家，倒在玉米田里。具体发生了什么不清楚，也许是被杀的，不确定，但他做这一切是因为他热爱。Walt Disney，生命的最后一天躺在病床上。他的哥哥 Roy 给他搓着冰冷的脚，他肺癌快死了，但他望着天花板上的方格瓷砖，想象着那就是 Disney World 的布局。Steve Jobs，Hiroki 说他生命最后几周还在看市场营销材料，还在看产品。
有些人可能会觉得这很悲哀——他们没有在陪家人。顺便说一下，Van Gogh 和 da Vinci 没有家庭。据我了解，Steve 和 Walt 在生命最后也有陪伴家人。但我不觉得他们在最后还在工作是一个悲伤的故事，因为我觉得他们在做自己热爱的事。Mozart 也是，历史上伟大的艺术家都在做自己热爱的事。
我的动力就是一个艺术家的动力。我只是想创造出伟大的东西。这就是我的动力。我当然也希望成功，希望股东得到回报，希望员工觉得自己在一家伟大的公司，希望能对世界产生巨大的影响。但归根结底，我就是想做东西。我觉得自己更像一个设计师而不是 CEO。而我可能被赋予了人类历史上任何设计师都拥有的最大的画布之一。因为通常设计师不会被给到这么多资源。这几乎像是系统里的一个漏洞——一些错误的气垫床让我钻了这个空子，拿到了我本不该拿到的这些资源。但我不会放手的。
所以我的动力就是一个艺术家的动力。我就是想做出不可思议的东西。
**Brian Chesky:** Most of my heroes are artists. I'll pick four people. Two I've mentioned repeatedly. Leonardo da Vinci, Vincent Van Gogh, Walt Disney, Steve Jobs. There's many things they had in common, but what is something they all had in common? The last day of their life or the last week of their life, they were working.
Leonardo da Vinci carried the Mona Lisa with him until he died. And he definitely didn't paint the Mona Lisa for adulation because he never showed it to anyone. Vincent Van Gogh sold one painting in his life. He died an obscure artist in the cornfield. Unclear what happened, maybe killed, unclear what happened, but did it because he loved it. Walt Disney, last day of his life he was laying in a hospital bed. His brother Roy was rubbing his cold feet, dying of lung cancer, looking at the ceiling tiles which were a grid imagining Disney World. Steve Jobs, Hiroki said the last couple weeks of his life he showed him marketing, he was still looking at products.
Now some people can look at that as an interpretation, oh that's sad, they weren't spending time with family. By the way Vincent Van Gogh and da Vinci didn't have families. My understanding is Steve and Walt spent time with their family at the end of their life. But I don't see that as a sad story they're working in the end because I think they did what they loved and Mozart, the great artists in history did what they loved.
My motivation is the motivation of an artist. I just want my motivation is to create something great. That is my motivation. I would like to be successful. I want our shareholders to get a return. I would like employees to feel they're at a great company. I would love to make a huge impact in the world. But mostly I just want to make. I feel like I'm a designer more than I am a CEO. And I might be afforded one of the greatest biggest canvases of any designer in human history. Cuz usually designers are just not given this many resources. It's almost like a glitch in a system. I figured it was almost accidental. Some error beds allowed me to crack this glitch and get all these resources I wasn't supposed to get. But I'm not letting go.
And so my motivation is that of an artist. I just want to make incredible things.
Leonardo da Vinci carried the Mona Lisa with him until he died. And he definitely didn't paint the Mona Lisa for adulation because he never showed it to anyone. Vincent Van Gogh sold one painting in his life. He died an obscure artist in the cornfield. Unclear what happened, maybe killed, unclear what happened, but did it because he loved it. Walt Disney, last day of his life he was laying in a hospital bed. His brother Roy was rubbing his cold feet, dying of lung cancer, looking at the ceiling tiles which were a grid imagining Disney World. Steve Jobs, Hiroki said the last couple weeks of his life he showed him marketing, he was still looking at products.
Now some people can look at that as an interpretation, oh that's sad, they weren't spending time with family. By the way Vincent Van Gogh and da Vinci didn't have families. My understanding is Steve and Walt spent time with their family at the end of their life. But I don't see that as a sad story they're working in the end because I think they did what they loved and Mozart, the great artists in history did what they loved.
My motivation is the motivation of an artist. I just want my motivation is to create something great. That is my motivation. I would like to be successful. I want our shareholders to get a return. I would like employees to feel they're at a great company. I would love to make a huge impact in the world. But mostly I just want to make. I feel like I'm a designer more than I am a CEO. And I might be afforded one of the greatest biggest canvases of any designer in human history. Cuz usually designers are just not given this many resources. It's almost like a glitch in a system. I figured it was almost accidental. Some error beds allowed me to crack this glitch and get all these resources I wasn't supposed to get. But I'm not letting go.
And so my motivation is that of an artist. I just want to make incredible things.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 这几乎是一个完美的收尾思考——考虑到我们现在手里的工具，每个人如果想的话都可以这样做。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** It's a beautiful almost closing thought given the tools now at our disposal that everyone can do that if they want.
**Brian Chesky：** 我觉得每个人都是艺术家。所有孩子生来都是艺术家，问题是长大后如何保持。AI 给了我们所有人成为艺术家、科学家和创造者的机会。我们不必再只是消费者了，我们可以成为创造者。真正的创造者。现在说到"创作者"这个词，你想到的可能是社交媒体上的表演者。那是一种创造方式，你可以表演。问题是我觉得以前的"创作者"更多是在表演。但现在"创作"可以是真正的创造、真正的制作。每个人现在都可以动手做东西了。这太棒了。
也许我再分享一个想法。天哪，这似乎是人类历史上最令人兴奋的时代。我可能有偏见，但这很可能是人类历史上最伟大的发明。AI，它是终极的创造性表达，它是平台级转变中的平台级转变中的平台级转变。
最近一次 Y Combinator 晚宴上，我看着台下所有的创业者说：我有点嫉妒你们。因为我站在台上，假装自己是那个成功的人在跟你们这些年轻人说话。两三年前，我还说我绝不会从头再来一次，因为我怕再也无法达到这个成功水平。但某种程度上我希望自己能回到 26 岁，抹掉所有成就，看看还有什么可能。然后我意识到，年龄只是一个数字。我还可以像 26 岁那样行动。我还年轻，我还有更多东西在身体里。我才刚刚开始。我们都才刚刚开始。这是最激动人心的时代。天哪，我们现在什么都能设计了。简直不敢相信。
也许我再分享一个想法。天哪，这似乎是人类历史上最令人兴奋的时代。我可能有偏见，但这很可能是人类历史上最伟大的发明。AI，它是终极的创造性表达，它是平台级转变中的平台级转变中的平台级转变。
最近一次 Y Combinator 晚宴上，我看着台下所有的创业者说：我有点嫉妒你们。因为我站在台上，假装自己是那个成功的人在跟你们这些年轻人说话。两三年前，我还说我绝不会从头再来一次，因为我怕再也无法达到这个成功水平。但某种程度上我希望自己能回到 26 岁，抹掉所有成就，看看还有什么可能。然后我意识到，年龄只是一个数字。我还可以像 26 岁那样行动。我还年轻，我还有更多东西在身体里。我才刚刚开始。我们都才刚刚开始。这是最激动人心的时代。天哪，我们现在什么都能设计了。简直不敢相信。
**Brian Chesky:** And I think everyone's an artist. All children are born artists. The problem is to remain one as you grow up. AI is the opportunity for all of us to become artists and scientists and creators. We don't have to be consumers anymore. We can be creators. True creators. And we hear the word creator, you think social media performer. That's one way to create. You can perform. The problem is I think creator has been performance. Now creator can be create. Make. Everyone can make now. It's amazing.
Maybe I'll just share one other thought. God, this seems like the most exciting time to be alive in human history. I mean, I'm kind of biased, but this is the greatest invention probably in human history. AI, it is the ultimate creative expression. It is the ultimate platform shift of platform shifts of platform shifts.
The most recent Y Combinator dinner, I looked at all the entrepreneurs in the audience and I said, I'm kind of jealous because here I am on stage pretending like I'm the successful guy talking to you, the young kids. And 2, 3 years ago, I used to say I would never do it all over again because I'm afraid I would never have this level of success again. Part of me wishes I could be 26 and get rid of all success and see what's possible again. And then I realized age is a number. I can still act like I'm 26. I'm still young. I still got more in me. I'm just getting started. We're all just getting started. This is the most exciting time to be alive. And my god, we can design anything now. It's unbelievable.
Maybe I'll just share one other thought. God, this seems like the most exciting time to be alive in human history. I mean, I'm kind of biased, but this is the greatest invention probably in human history. AI, it is the ultimate creative expression. It is the ultimate platform shift of platform shifts of platform shifts.
The most recent Y Combinator dinner, I looked at all the entrepreneurs in the audience and I said, I'm kind of jealous because here I am on stage pretending like I'm the successful guy talking to you, the young kids. And 2, 3 years ago, I used to say I would never do it all over again because I'm afraid I would never have this level of success again. Part of me wishes I could be 26 and get rid of all success and see what's possible again. And then I realized age is a number. I can still act like I'm 26. I'm still young. I still got more in me. I'm just getting started. We're all just getting started. This is the most exciting time to be alive. And my god, we can design anything now. It's unbelievable.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 我问每位嘉宾的最后一个问题都是一样的。别人对你做过的最善意的事情是什么？
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** The last question I ask everyone is the same. What is the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you?
**Brian Chesky：** 这个问题真好。最善意的事——别人给过我的最大的礼物就是相信我。我觉得你能给一个人最大的礼物之一就是相信他。
举几个例子。我 16 岁的时候转学到了一所公立高中。我非常喜欢艺术，画得还不错，但不知道自己到底有多好。我有一个老师叫 Miss Williams，她相信我。我记得她跟我父母说，他将来会成为一个出名的艺术家。我从来没有成为出名的艺术家，但这给了我信心，让我相信自己确实擅长某样东西。因为我不怎么擅长冰球，虽然我很希望自己行，也希望能让我爸在冰球上为我骄傲。但我就是没走多远。
那份信任让我走上了一条路。在那个时刻我决定要去读艺术学校。也是在那个时刻我意识到，我可以选择让自己余生都快乐。当你还是个孩子的时候，你做事是因为被迫的。你生活中 20% 的时间可以做自己想做的事，80% 的时间都在上学、做你被迫做的事。而我说——我可以让自己余生都快乐。
我来到硅谷，认识了 Michael Seibel 和 Justin TV 的那帮人，他们相信我。他们是最早的 YC 人。Paul Graham 破例让我进了早期的 Y Combinator，他相信我。我不是工程师，他几乎从不投非工程师背景的人。他其实觉得我们的想法不怎么样。他说："真的有人在用吗？"我说有。他说："他们怎么了？"但他相信了我。我的投资人们，我可以一个个列出来，他们都相信了我。Joe 和 Nate 相信了我。说实话我根本不该当 CEO，但 Joe 不知怎么就相信了我。如果没有这些人慷慨地相信我、帮助我，我不会在这里。
我觉得我能回馈的最大礼物就是相信别人、帮助他们。不是爬上去之后就把梯子抽走，而是真正地为他们指路。我很荣幸最终加入了 Giving Pledge（捐赠誓言），你需要写一封信。我记得我在信里写的是：如果你去问我高中的老师们谁会加入 Giving Pledge，他们不会猜到是我。
我人生哲学的基本理念是——我们每个人都有未知的潜力。我觉得我们脑子里都有一个关于自己能做到什么的故事。回到 John Wooden 的例子，有人问他成功的秘诀是什么，他说："我只要求我的球员尽全力。"那人说："这听起来挺奇怪的，像是家长安慰老输球的孩子说的话。"他说："关键在这里——我能看到他们身上自己看不到的潜力。"
这就是我的管理哲学。当我告诉某人"这还不够好"的时候，我不是在说你不够好。我是在说——我看到了你身上你自己还没看到的潜力。这是最有激励性的事——告诉一个人"我相信你，我相信你还能做得更好"。人们会为了这种信任去翻山越岭。
也许整个对话最终要落回到的一点是——你最需要相信的那个人是你自己。我觉得我们很多创业者都是被不安全感驱动的。我们被某种缺失驱动着。不是所有人，但很多人是这样。童年的某些经历，某些东西。我们很多人小时候都不是最酷的那个孩子。我们内心有某种东西想要证明自己。然后你变得非常成功，你仍然有冒名顶替综合症（impostor syndrome）。
通往幸福和救赎的很大一部分路径，就是学会相信自己。对我来说，在别人相信我很久之后，我才学会了相信自己。而现在我的使命就是把这份信任传递给别人。
举几个例子。我 16 岁的时候转学到了一所公立高中。我非常喜欢艺术，画得还不错，但不知道自己到底有多好。我有一个老师叫 Miss Williams，她相信我。我记得她跟我父母说，他将来会成为一个出名的艺术家。我从来没有成为出名的艺术家，但这给了我信心，让我相信自己确实擅长某样东西。因为我不怎么擅长冰球，虽然我很希望自己行，也希望能让我爸在冰球上为我骄傲。但我就是没走多远。
那份信任让我走上了一条路。在那个时刻我决定要去读艺术学校。也是在那个时刻我意识到，我可以选择让自己余生都快乐。当你还是个孩子的时候，你做事是因为被迫的。你生活中 20% 的时间可以做自己想做的事，80% 的时间都在上学、做你被迫做的事。而我说——我可以让自己余生都快乐。
我来到硅谷，认识了 Michael Seibel 和 Justin TV 的那帮人，他们相信我。他们是最早的 YC 人。Paul Graham 破例让我进了早期的 Y Combinator，他相信我。我不是工程师，他几乎从不投非工程师背景的人。他其实觉得我们的想法不怎么样。他说："真的有人在用吗？"我说有。他说："他们怎么了？"但他相信了我。我的投资人们，我可以一个个列出来，他们都相信了我。Joe 和 Nate 相信了我。说实话我根本不该当 CEO，但 Joe 不知怎么就相信了我。如果没有这些人慷慨地相信我、帮助我，我不会在这里。
我觉得我能回馈的最大礼物就是相信别人、帮助他们。不是爬上去之后就把梯子抽走，而是真正地为他们指路。我很荣幸最终加入了 Giving Pledge（捐赠誓言），你需要写一封信。我记得我在信里写的是：如果你去问我高中的老师们谁会加入 Giving Pledge，他们不会猜到是我。
我人生哲学的基本理念是——我们每个人都有未知的潜力。我觉得我们脑子里都有一个关于自己能做到什么的故事。回到 John Wooden 的例子，有人问他成功的秘诀是什么，他说："我只要求我的球员尽全力。"那人说："这听起来挺奇怪的，像是家长安慰老输球的孩子说的话。"他说："关键在这里——我能看到他们身上自己看不到的潜力。"
这就是我的管理哲学。当我告诉某人"这还不够好"的时候，我不是在说你不够好。我是在说——我看到了你身上你自己还没看到的潜力。这是最有激励性的事——告诉一个人"我相信你，我相信你还能做得更好"。人们会为了这种信任去翻山越岭。
也许整个对话最终要落回到的一点是——你最需要相信的那个人是你自己。我觉得我们很多创业者都是被不安全感驱动的。我们被某种缺失驱动着。不是所有人，但很多人是这样。童年的某些经历，某些东西。我们很多人小时候都不是最酷的那个孩子。我们内心有某种东西想要证明自己。然后你变得非常成功，你仍然有冒名顶替综合症（impostor syndrome）。
通往幸福和救赎的很大一部分路径，就是学会相信自己。对我来说，在别人相信我很久之后，我才学会了相信自己。而现在我的使命就是把这份信任传递给别人。
**Brian Chesky:** Oh, it's such a good question. The kindest thing, the biggest gift anyone's given me is believe in me. And I think the biggest gift you can give somebody or one of the biggest gifts is believe in you.
A couple examples. When I was 16 years old, I transferred to a public high school. I was really into art. I was a pretty good artist. I didn't know how good I was. And I had a teacher named Miss Williams and she believed in me and I remember her telling my parents he's going to be a famous artist. I never became a famous artist but it gave me confidence that I was actually good at something because I wasn't that good at hockey and I wish I was and I wish I could make my dad proud at ice hockey. I just didn't get very far.
And suddenly that belief set me on a path and that moment I said I'm going to go to art school. And that moment I realized I can decide to be happy the rest of my life. When you're a child, you do things because you're forced to. And 20% of your life you get to do whatever you want and 80% of your life you go to school and you do things and you're forced to do them. And I said I can be happy the rest of my life.
I came to Silicon Valley. I met Michael Seibel and the guys at Justin TV and they believed in me. They were early YC people. Paul Graham made an exception to let me into early Y Combinator. He believed in me. I wasn't an engineer and he almost never funded non-engineers. He thought the idea was not a good idea actually. He said people are actually doing this? I go yes. He goes what's wrong with them? But he believed in me. My investors, I can go down the list of investors. They believed in me. Joe and Nate believed in me. I was, I had no business being a CEO. Joe somehow believed in me. I wouldn't be here if it wasn't for the generosity of people believing in me and helping me.
And I think the greatest gift I can give back is believing in others and helping them and not pulling the ladder up behind me but to really show them. I had the great privilege to eventually join the giving pledge and you have to write a letter. I remember my letter was if you could ask my high school teachers who would join the giving pledge, they wouldn't have guessed me.
The basic idea in my life philosophy is we all have unknown potential. And I think we have these stories in our own head about what we're capable of. And to go back to John Wooden, somebody once asked him what's the secret to success? And he said, "I only ask my players to do their very best." And the person goes, "Oh, wow. That seems weird. That sounds like what a parent says of the kid who loses all the time." And he goes, "Here's the catch. I saw potential in people they didn't see in themselves."
And that's my management philosophy. When I tell somebody it's not good enough, I'm not saying you're not good enough. I'm saying I see potential in you that you don't see in yourself. That is the most motivating thing you can do, to say I believe in you and I believe you can do even more. And people will climb a mountain for that type of thing.
And maybe the way to finally end this whole conversation is the most important person ever that you can believe in is yourself. And I think a lot of us that are entrepreneurs were driven by insecurity. We're driven by some hole. Not all of us, but a lot of us. Something in our childhood, something. A lot of us were not the coolest kids or whatever. And there's something in us we wanted to prove. And then you get really successful and you still have impostor syndrome.
And a lot of the path to happiness and salvation is just the path of learning to believe in yourself. And for me, I only believed in myself long after other people believed in me. And now my gift is to try to give it to others.
A couple examples. When I was 16 years old, I transferred to a public high school. I was really into art. I was a pretty good artist. I didn't know how good I was. And I had a teacher named Miss Williams and she believed in me and I remember her telling my parents he's going to be a famous artist. I never became a famous artist but it gave me confidence that I was actually good at something because I wasn't that good at hockey and I wish I was and I wish I could make my dad proud at ice hockey. I just didn't get very far.
And suddenly that belief set me on a path and that moment I said I'm going to go to art school. And that moment I realized I can decide to be happy the rest of my life. When you're a child, you do things because you're forced to. And 20% of your life you get to do whatever you want and 80% of your life you go to school and you do things and you're forced to do them. And I said I can be happy the rest of my life.
I came to Silicon Valley. I met Michael Seibel and the guys at Justin TV and they believed in me. They were early YC people. Paul Graham made an exception to let me into early Y Combinator. He believed in me. I wasn't an engineer and he almost never funded non-engineers. He thought the idea was not a good idea actually. He said people are actually doing this? I go yes. He goes what's wrong with them? But he believed in me. My investors, I can go down the list of investors. They believed in me. Joe and Nate believed in me. I was, I had no business being a CEO. Joe somehow believed in me. I wouldn't be here if it wasn't for the generosity of people believing in me and helping me.
And I think the greatest gift I can give back is believing in others and helping them and not pulling the ladder up behind me but to really show them. I had the great privilege to eventually join the giving pledge and you have to write a letter. I remember my letter was if you could ask my high school teachers who would join the giving pledge, they wouldn't have guessed me.
The basic idea in my life philosophy is we all have unknown potential. And I think we have these stories in our own head about what we're capable of. And to go back to John Wooden, somebody once asked him what's the secret to success? And he said, "I only ask my players to do their very best." And the person goes, "Oh, wow. That seems weird. That sounds like what a parent says of the kid who loses all the time." And he goes, "Here's the catch. I saw potential in people they didn't see in themselves."
And that's my management philosophy. When I tell somebody it's not good enough, I'm not saying you're not good enough. I'm saying I see potential in you that you don't see in yourself. That is the most motivating thing you can do, to say I believe in you and I believe you can do even more. And people will climb a mountain for that type of thing.
And maybe the way to finally end this whole conversation is the most important person ever that you can believe in is yourself. And I think a lot of us that are entrepreneurs were driven by insecurity. We're driven by some hole. Not all of us, but a lot of us. Something in our childhood, something. A lot of us were not the coolest kids or whatever. And there's something in us we wanted to prove. And then you get really successful and you still have impostor syndrome.
And a lot of the path to happiness and salvation is just the path of learning to believe in yourself. And for me, I only believed in myself long after other people believed in me. And now my gift is to try to give it to others.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 很好的收尾。Brian，谢谢你。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Beautiful place to close. Brian, thanks.
**Brian Chesky：** 非常感谢。谢谢你。
**Brian Chesky:** Thank you very much. Thank you.
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy：** 谢谢，兄弟。
**Patrick O'Shaughnessy:** Thanks, man.
